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1.  OVERVIEW 
1.  Introduction 
Initially  conceived  for  intra-Community  balance  of payments  support,  macro-financial 
assistance from the Community has  been  extended  since  1990  to  third  countries.  mainlv 
those of Central and Eastern Europe, with a view to supporting their political and economi-c 
reform efforts. 
The first Community macro-financial operation  in  favour of a third  country goes back  to 
February  1990,  where the Council,  on  a  proposal  by  the  Commission,  decided  to  grant 
Hungary a five-year ECU 870 million loan in  support of the country's efforts to overc-ome 
structural adjustment difficulties. 
In  I 991,  in  view of the political impetus given by the European  Council at  its  December 
1990 meeting, the Commission presented to the Council a series of Community initiatives 
in  favour of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) similar to  the one decided 
for  Hungary.  The Council  adopted  f9ur  decisions  in  that  respect  granting  6  or  7  year 
financial  assistance of ECU 375  million to  Czechoslovakia, ECU 290 million to  Bulgaria, 
ECU 375 million to Romania and a further ECU 180 million to Hungary 
All  these  initiatives  were  taken  in  the  context  of overall  G-24  coordinated  financing 
packages.  Overall  the  requests  totalled  some  ECU  2.4  billion  in  1991,  around  50%  of 
which was committed by the Community. 
The  macro-financial  assistance  operations  have  been  responding  to  the  follo\ving 
principles; that were recently reconfirmed by the Council · 
Exceptional  character  :  the  assistance  is  exceptional  in  nature.  All  operations  are 
undertaken on a strictly case by  case basis.  The operations are to be discontinued when 
the recipiei't country can fully rely on financing from  the IFis and  private sources of 
capital 
r· 
Political  pre-conditions  : the assistance  is  provided to  third  countries with which  the 
Community  maintains  close  political  and  economic  links,  taking  into  account  their 
gegographical  proximity,  on  the  proviso that they  fully  respect  effective  democratic 
mechanisms. 
Complementarity : the basic prerequisite for the  mobilization of the  assistance  is  the 
existence of a significant residual external financial  gap,  over and  above the resources 
provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and despite the implementation 
of strong economic stabilization and reform programmes. 
Conditionality: the loans are generally released ·in successive tranches, the disbursement 
of each of them being conditional upon the fulfillment of macroeconomic performance 
and structural adjustment criteria, normally based on  the economic programmes of the 
beneficiary countries, as agreed in an arrangement with the IMF. 
Community  macro-fmancial  assistance  complements  and  supports  other  Community 
assistance  instruments,  including  in  particular  technical  assistance  in  favour  of CEECs 
(PHARE), project financing (Effi), and EC agreements with CEECs (trade and cooperation 
agreements and Europe agreements). In fact, the possibility for the Community to provide, 
in  exceptional circumstances, macro-fmancial assistance is  referred to under the chapter of 
financial  cooperation  in  the context of the Europe  Agreements  recently  signed  with  the 
CEECs. - 2 -
2.  Implementation of the assistance packages for 1991  in favour of CEEC 
As  reported  in  the  Commission's  Communicati-on  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament, dated  16 September 19921,  the stabilization and  reform programmes supported 
by  the  Community and  G-24 balance of payments assistance presented common features. 
Hungary,  Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and  Romania, although  starting from  different  initial 
conditions, all  embarked in  1991  upon comprehensive programmes of transformation from 
highly  centralized  planned  sys~ems to  market  oriented  economies,  while  implementing 
policies to  stabilize the financial  situation.  The attempt to adapt  their economic structures 
for integration into the world economy involved far-reaching reforms to  move quickly to 
the desired  market-based productive structure,  including  : liberalization of foreign  trade; 
price  liberalization  and  a  substantial  elimination  of price  subsidies;  privatization  and 
restructuring of state enterprises; unification of exchange rate and  introduction of current 
account convertibility; and fmancial sector reform. With respect to  the exchange rate, both 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia adopted a peg as a  nominal anchor; Bulgaria and  Romania, 
for lack of foreign exchange reserves, let the exchange rate float.  · 
The programmes were implemented in  the context of an  external environment significantly 
harder than initially envisaged, notably with regard to  the greater-than-expected decline in 
trade with the ex-CMEA countries, especially the USSR, and in a situation where structural 
reform  had  not  yet  generated  an  adequate  supply  response.  In  the  circumstances,  the 
decline in  output turned out to  be larger than expected and  inflationary pressures persisted 
in  most economies. Furthermore, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, there was a shortfall 
in  pledges  from  non-Community  G-24  countries  and  delays  in  the  disbursement  of 
commitments. 
Nevertheless,  the countries benefiting from  assistance from  the Community and  the G-24 
determinedly  implemented  the  programme  measures,  including  price  and  trade 
liberalization,  cautious  financial  and  income  policies,  fi~cal  and  financial  reform  and 
liberalization  of the exchange regime.  In  addition,  the authorities  introduced a  series  of 
important  structural  measures,  with  the  aim  of fostering  private  economic  activity, 
privatizing state assets and building the legal and institutional framework necessary for the 
efficient  functioning  of a  market-based  economy.  In  view of the  performance  achieved 
with regard to the quantifict.d performance criteria and the structural adjustment criteria, the 
review of the conditionality attached to  the Community loans was positively concluded in 
all countries and the assistance from the Community for 1991  was entirely disbursed. 
While all  the countries achieved significant results, there have been important differences 
in  performance among them, reflecting in part the diversity in the initial conditions that the . 
various countries faced at the start of the reform process.  Consequently, the advancement 
of the process of return to external viability has varied considerably· among the countries. 
In  particular, Hungary and  Czechoslovakia experienced rapid  progress towards access  to 
international  capital markets, whereas, as  anticipated, the mobilization of external  private 
funding remained modest in the case of Bulgaria (burdened by an external debt overhang) 
and Romania, which relied heavily on credit from official sources to  finance their external 
deficit in the short run.  · 
Consequently,  no  additional  exceptional  financing  was  required  for  Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia in  1992,  whereas additional  macro-financial  assistance from  the EC and 
the  G-24  was  needed  to  sustain  the  stabilization  and  reform  efforts  in  Bulgaria  and 
Romania. 
3.  Other macro-financial assistance packages in 1991 
Two other Community loan operations were decided by the Council in  1991  in  favour of 
countries outside the region of Central  and Eastern Europe.  In  the context of Community 
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supp'?rt  for  Middle~Eastern and  Mediterranean .countries  adversely  affected  by  the  Gulf 
confl1ct,  the Council granted to  Israel  m July  1991  an  ECU  160  million  loan,  whicr  was 
made  available  in  a  single  tranche  and  for  a  six-year  period  The  loan,  that  was 
accompanied by an interest-rate subsidy totaling_ECU 27.5 million in  charge of the general 
budget of the Community, was released in J  anuaryJ 992 
In September 1991, another_medium-term loan ofECU 400 million was decided  in  favour 
of Algeria to help the country carry through the. political and economic reforms under ,way. 
The Community assistance also played  a major role  in  catalyzing  an  important voluntary 
refinancing  arrangement  between Algeria  anp  its  commercial  bank  creditors  The  first 
tranche of the loan was released in  January  1992. However, owing to a later relaxation of 
stabilization and reform efforts, the second tranche could not be disbursed. 
4.  Community macro-financial assistance in 1992-93 
In late 1992, a second series of Community loan operations was decided by the Council for 
CEECs, comprising: a further ECU 110 million for Bulgaria; a further ECU 80 million in 
a single tranche for Romania;  and  a global  amount of ECU  220 million  in  favour of the 
Baltic States (  40 million for Estonia, 80 million for  Latvia and  I 00 million for Lithuania to 
be disbursed  in  two  tranches).  Macro-financial  support  was  also  decided  in  favour  for 
Albania (ECU 70 million, also in  two tranches) but took the form of a grant in  view of the 
low level of development of this country and its lack of creditworthiness. 
All  these  initiatives were  taken  in  the  context  of G-24  financing  packages  designed  to 
complement the resources provided by the multilateral  financial  institutions.  Overall,  the 
requests for  exceptional financial  assistance from·the G-24 totalled US$  1185  million,  of 
which the Community contributed approximately half 
Clearly, when these new assistance packages were launched the beneficiary countries were 
in different stages of the transition to market economies. Romania and Bulgaria had already 
begun  to  put  in  place  some of the  necessary  legislative  framework  and  to  implement 
important structural reforms,  includir.5 -in  the key areas of liberalization of foreign  trade, 
introduction of convertibility, and price liberalization.  Both countries,  however,  had been 
less successful in macroeoonomic stabilization than other CEECs (owing largely to a more 
difficult starting position and  a harsher external environment).  In  Albania and  the Baltic 
States reform was still at earlier stages. 
In both Romania and Bulgaria, the new economic programmes were designed to maintain 
the  momentum  of stabilization  and  reform.· Along  with  the  consolidation  of the  key 
achievements of 1991  - in  particular,  the liberalization of prices, trade and  the exchange 
rate,  and  privatization, strict monetary and fiscal  policies were essential  means to reduce 
inflation and create the necessary preconditions for sustained growth and external viability. 
In Romania, the government maintained prudent fiscal  and monetary policies during most 
of 1992.  All  quantitative  macro-economic  performance  criteria  for  end-June  and  end-
September were observed,  and  the  IMF could  complete its  review of the  programme  in 
November.  Significant progress was made in  the implementation of the structural reform 
measures  :  in  particular,  consumer prices were  substantially further  liberalized;  and  the 
phased elimination of consumer subsidies proceeded on schedule. In view of this progress 
and of the commitment by the authorities to remedy the slippages recorded in  the area of 
the exchange rate and the privatization process, the Community loan was disbursed. 
Despite this progress, macroeconomic developments in. 1992 showed that the results of the 
economic programme were mixed. Economic activity continued to deteriorate sharply and 
following initial success in bringing down inflation, a surge in  prices re-emerged by year-
end  that  was fed  by  a  relaxation  of the  monetary  stance.  Also,  the  overall  balance-of-
payments  target for end-1992  was  not  reached,  owing to  delays  in  the  disbursement of 
foreign  assistance  (commitments  from  the  G-24  in  particular  only  reached  US$  111 
million, including ECU 80 million from the EC, against an identified financing gap of US$ 
180  million),  and  to  the inadequate  exchange rate  policy  at  t~e end_ of _the  ye.a:  .  As  no 
decisive action was taken in  1993  to  overcome the persistent d1fficultJes  m stabillZlng the - 4 -
economy,  inflation  continued  unabated,  the  premium  in  the  parallel  market  remained 
substantial,  and  official  reserves  were  depleted  by  end-1993.  Furthermore,  the  pace  of 
reform in state enterprises remained slow. 
Owing to  policy shortcomings, Romania was not in  a position to  make the fmal  purchase 
under  the  IMF  stand-by  arrangement  before  it  expired  at  end-March  1993,  an9  the 
negotiations on a new stand-by arrangement dragged on during most of 1993.  · 
In  Bulgaria, the authorities continued to  implement tight  macro-economic policies  in  the 
first half of 1992 that resulted  in  progress towards stabilization.  They  also  developed the 
legal  framework  for  enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization,  and  proceeded  with  the 
reform of the financial sector. 
,However,  from  mid-1992,  in  a  context  of growing  political  and  social  tension,  the 
authorities relaxed their policy stance. Performance of state enterprises deteriorated  Owing 
to spending overruns, the fiscal deficit widened. Inflation rose again to 5-6% per month by 
the  end  of 1992  and  the  arrangement  with  the  IMF  went  off track.  In  1993,  policy 
performance remained weak, and  efforts by the authorities to  maintain the stability of the 
currency through central bank intervention resulted in  a sharp drop of official reserves by 
the end  of 1993.  In the circumstances, negotiations with  the  llv1F  on  a new  arrangement 
could not be concluded and Community assistance remained undisbursed. 
Despite irreversible progress in the process of  transformation io a market-based economy in 
both Romania and Bulgaria, delays in  the implementation of appropriate reforms have led 
to  renewed  price  pressures.  Also,  progress  towards  external  viability  remained  elusive 
through the end of 1993.  Clearly, external trade has  been depressed by the trade embargo 
on  Serbia-Montenegro,  and  in  the  case  of Bulgaria,  by -the  lack  of agreement  with  its 
commercial  creditors  on  a reduction  package for  the  debt  contracted  under the previous 
regime.  The impact of the external  factors  has  been  compounded  by  inadequate demand 
management  and  overvalued  exchange  rates.  These  policy  shortcomings,  in  turn,  have 
precluded the mobilization of  foreign official financial assistance. 
The agreement in principle with the IMF in December 1993  on a new programme in  both 
countries, and on a  compr~bensive debt reduction scheme with commercial creditors in  the 
case  of Bulgaria,  should  be  a  major  step  towards  stabilization,  reform  and  external 
viability. To that effect, further assistance from the EC/G-24 will  have to  be considered in 
1994.  . 
In Albania, the government embarked on a comprehensive economic reform programme in 
mid-1992, when the country was experiencing severe economic, social and administrative 
dislocation and·facing fiscal and external imbala'1ces much larger than in  other countries in 
the region -at  the beginning of their transformation process.  The immediate priority of the 
programme  was  to  stabilize  the  economy  and  to  initiate  profound  structural  changes 
towards an open market economy. 
By mid-1993,  the first stage of economic stabilization and  reform  had  been  successfully 
achieved.  The slide into hyperinflation had  been  reversed,  the downward spiral of output 
halted and fmancial discipline on state enterprises was enforced. Price reform had advanced 
rapidly, and foreign trade was liberalized. Land privatization had resulted in a significant 
resumption  of growth  of agricultural  production,  allowing  a  rapid  phasing-out  of the 
massive food  aid that the international community, with the EC as  a principal donor, had 
been  providing  since  1991.  Macro-fmancial  assistance  from  the  Community  (ECU  70 
million disbursed in two tranches in December 1992 and August  1993) and from other G-
24 countries had been instrumental in strengthening the reserve position of the country and 
in  allowing  the  authorities  rapidly  to  stabilize  a  freely  determined  exchange  rate.  The 
stabilization gains remain fragile and tentative, however, and Albania will have to  continue 
to  rely  heavily on  foreign  assistance  in  the short run.  Exports  cover only  a  fraction  of 
import needs, and the external outlook remains clouded by Albania's large external debt. 
The Albanian authorities have now shifted from  a mainly short-term horizon, dictated  by 
the  state  of  crisis,  towards  a  consistent  medium-term  approach,  by  adopting  a 
comprehensive medium-term economic programme for  1993-96 that was  presented to the !21 
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G-24  High Level meeting in  November .1993.  The G-24  recognized  the  need  for  further 
macro-financial ass.istance  (complement~ry t.o  the ESAF arrangement agreed  in  July  1993). 
In the context of th1s programme, Albama will seek an early normalization of relations with 
its commercial creditors. 
It  was  against a background  of major  disruptions  in  the  trade,  payments,  and  monetary 
arrangements with  the other countries of the  former  Soviet  Union  that  the  Baltic  States 
embarked  in  mid-1992  upon  comprehensive  programmes  of transformation  to  market-
oriented economies. In the circumstances, the reintroduction of their own currencies at  an 
early stage of the adjustment process, in order to  insulate their economies from inflationary 
impulses from  the other states of the former  Soviet  Union,  constituted  an  important and 
original featUre of the stabilization and economic reform programmes.  These programmes 
1lso  encompassed  a  rapid  liberalization  of prices  and  foreign  trade  to  realign  domestic 
prices  with  world  prices,  as  well  as  strong  fiscal  and  monetary  stabilization  policies, 
supported by incomes policies designed to adjust real  wages to  the severe terms of trade 
shocks that resulted from the move by Russia towards world market prices for oil  and raw 
material exports.  In support of these programmes, substantial financial assistance from the 
international community was mobilized.  Assistance by the EC/G-24 reached 87.2 per cent 
of the identified financing gap. 
The Baltic States have been successful  in  stabilizing their  economies despite these severe 
initial  conditions;  the consistency of the policies  pursued  by  successive governments  has 
greatly  contributed  to  this  success.  In·  Estonia,  furthermore,  the  currency  board 
arrangement,  wich  provided  a  strong  anchor  for  the  price  system,  helped  gain  strong 
confidence from the outset. Despite progress in reforms, restructuring of the banking sector 
has  incurred  substantial  delays.  In  all  three  countries,  the  stabilization  process  was 
accompanied  by  large  losses  in  output;  however,  by  end-1993,  the  output  decline  had 
bottomed out.  The first tranches of EC assistance were disbursed  in  1993, and the second 
tranches are expected to be disbursed in  early  1994,  as  reviews  are completed. No further 
exceptional macro-financial assistance has been requested by the Baltic States. 
5.  Conclusions 
Overall,  the Community  has  committed so  far  some ECU  3. 1 billion  in  macro-financial 
assistance to third  countries (Table  1  ).  This includes  in  particular the support to  CEECs 
that since 1991  has been entirely provided in the context of the G-24 coordination process, 
where an  overall amount of US$ 3.5 billion were mobilized, the non-EC donors providing 
roughly 40% of the assistance (Table 2).  Among them, Japan has been, by far,  the single 
most important contributor (some 20 percent of overall assistance}, followed by the EFT  A 
countries (17 per cent  altogether).  Clearly, the coordinated  effort has  permitted sizeable 
untied  assistance to  be mobilized which would probably not have been forthcoming  in  a 
purely bilateral context. 
This exceptional assistance has been instrumental in  the liberalization of foreign trade and 
the introduction of external convertibility in the recipient countries at an early stage of the 
transformation process.  More generally, it has improved the mix between adjustment and 
financing  and  therefore  helped  stabilize  the  economy  and  maintain  the  momentum  of 
reform.  This  quick-disbursing Community  support was  also  effective  in  providing the 
implementation  in  the  CEECs  of the  necessary  legal  framework  and  sectoral  reforms, 
allowing for a better absorption of project-related Community assistance (PHARE, Effi) 
and private investment from EC member states.  Overall, macro-financial assistance by the 
Community (and the G-24) has played a major role in  supporting reform and thereby in 
strengthening the democratic process, as  it is now clearly recognized. Where governments 
were  unable  to  implement  appropriate  stabilization  and  reform  policies,  however, 
assistance was suspended until policy shortcomings were remedied, and cooperation could 
be  re-established.  (Macro-economic  performance  indicators  and  the  status  of economic 
reform aresummarized in Tables 3 and 4) - 6 -
No  additional funding from  the Community (and the G-24) was required by  Hungary and 
the Czech Republic (that regained access to international capital markets) and by  the Baltic 
States  (that  recorded  relatively  strong  external  reserve  positions).  Nevertheless,  the 
Community (and the G-24)  have to  respond  this  year  to  further  requests  from  Bulgaria, 
Romania,  Albania,  and  possibly  other  countries  (the  Slovak  Republic,  Algeria,  etc.)  to 
sustain their stabilization and reform efforts.  · 
* * 
* 
The  present  report,  submitted  in  accordance  with  Council  decisions  regarding  macro-
financial  assistance from  the  Community to  Hungary  (90/83/EEC  and  91/31 0/EEC),  the 
Czech  and  Slovak  Federal  Republic  (91/106/EEC),  Bulgaria  (91/311/EEC  and 
92/511/EEC), Romania (91/384/EEC and 92/551/EEC), Albania (92/482/EEC), the Baltic 
States  (92/542/EEC),  Israel  (91/408/EEC)  and  Algeria  (91/510/EEC)  assesses  the 
economic situation and  prospects of each  country and  the  progress of economic reforms 
with particular reference to the implementation of the conditions attached to the assistance  . 
.~··· - 7 -
TABLE I 
COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES 
Status of effective disbursements as of 31.01.94 
(in million of ecus) 
Country  Maximum amount  · Disbursed  Undisbursed 
authorized 
(Council Decision) 
·Hungary I  870  610  260 
(struct. adj  {22.2.90)  (350- April  1990) 
loan)  (260-Febr. 1991) 
Czech and Slovak  375  375 
Federal Republic  (25.2.91)  (185- August 1991) 
(BOP Joan)  (190- Febr.  1992) 
Hungary II  180  ..  180 
(BOP loan)  (24.6.91)  (1 00-August 1991) 
(80 -Jan.  1993) 
Bulgaria  290  290 
(BOP loan)  (24.6.91)  (150-Aug. 1991) 
(140- March 1992) 
Romania  375  375 
(BOP loan)  (22.7. 91)  ·( 190 - Jan.  1992) 
/"  {185  -April 1992) 
Israel  160  160 
(struct. adj.  (22.7.91)  (March 1992) 
soft loan) 
Algeria  400  250  150 
(BOP loan)  (23.9.91)  (Jan.  1992) 
Albania  70  70 
(BOP grant)  (28.9.92)  (35 -Dec. 1992) 
(35- Aug.  1993) 
Bulgaria II  I I 0  110 
(BOP loan)  (19.10.92) 
BaJtics  220  110  110 
(BOP loans)  (23.1 1.92) 
ofwhich: 
Estonia  40  20 (March 1993)  20 
Latvia  80  40  "  40 
Lithuania  IOO  50 (July 1993)  50 
Romania II  80  80 
(BOP loan)  (27.1 I .92)  (Feb.  1993) 
Total  3130  2500  630 -8-
Tsb!e ?ECJG-24 ~ncjal  3SSis!ance tlJ CMtral and EastBm Eurpoe sine& 1991 (cumulative amounts} 
---
Ccuntry  ALBANIA  BALTIC STATES  BULGARIA { 1) 
Identified  (US$ 165 milfion)  (US$ 600 miDion)  (US$ 800  million) 
lg3pS) 
Commitments  Di:sburs.  Cornml!rnenTS  oi&bU:rS.  .  ~,!'~iy:r':E!nls  . ·-.- Disburs  . 
Min  'lfogf  'j4,gf  Min  Min  'l(,gf  'lfo of  Min  Min  %of  %of  Min 
US$  gap  Fomrnlt  US$  US$  gap  ~it  US$  .US$  gap  cxmmit.  USS 
·-~·  - ·-· 
Community  82.5  50.0  71.8  82.5  300.0  50.0  57.4  150.0  400.0  50.0  65.2  400.0 
EFTA  12.4  7.5  10.8  4.2  123.1  20.5  23.5  31.5  95.0  11.9  15.5  32.0 
United States  10.0  1.3  1.6  10.0 
Japan  20.0  12.1  17.4  100.0  16.7  19.1  100.0  12.5  16.3 
Others  8.7  1.1  1.4 
Total  114.9  69.6  100.0  86.7  523.1 1  87.2  100.0  181.5  613.7  76.7  100.0  442.0 
-- --
·- ..  ····-
Cotinll'y  CSFR  HUNGARY  ROMANIA 
Identified  (US.S 1000 rnilrton)  (US.S 500 millicn)  {US$ 1180 mifiion) 
l9i1P.5l 
Commitrnenls  Disburs.  CcrnrnitrrMiS  .  oiSburs.  Commitments  Ou;burs. 
Min  %of  'lfiDf  Min  .  Min  'l(,af  'l6ol'  Min  Min  %of  %of  Min 
uss  gap  lczmmiL  uss  US$  gap  Fomma  US$  USS  gap  ~mit  US$ 
-··· 
Communily  500.0  50.0  58.4  500.0  250.0  50.0  48.3  250.0  590.0  5o.O  69.5  590.0 
EFTA  146.0  14.6  16.5  146.0  95.0  19.0  18.3  95.0  136.4  11.6  16.1  13S.4 
United States  15.0  1.5  1.7  15.0  10.0  20  1.9  10.0 
Japan  200.0  20.0  22.5  200.0  150.0  30.0  29.0  125.0  100.0  8.5  11.8  62.5 
others  26.0  2.6  2.9  1.0  12.8  2.6  2.5  12.8  22.0  1.9  2.6  22.0 
---· ..  ····-
Total  is7  .88.7  100.0  862.0  517.8  10:S.6  100.0  482.8  848.4  71.9  100.0  810.9 
Counll'y  ALL 
ldenlified  (US$ 4240 milliont 
~~ 
Commitments  Dlsbw-s. 
Min  'l(,af  '!(,of  Min 
US$  gap  ~commit  US$ 
Comrnunil;y  2122.5  50.0  60.6  19n.S 
EFTA  607.9  14.3  .,7,3  445.1 
United States  ·as.o  0.8  1.0  35.0 
!Japan  870.0  ·15.8  19.1  387.5 
Others  69.5  1.6  2.0  35.8 
TD!al  lSM-9  12.8  100.0  2175.9 
(1) Cornmitmen1s for the 1992/93 exercise are not  1aken into c:onsidera!ion since the operallon has not been implemented. 
European Commission -9-
Table 3: Selected ecooomic in.ditators 
1991  1992  1993 
Pragramme  (1)  AcluaJ  Programme  (1]  Actual  !>rogramme  111  Estimates 
GDP at constant prices  (Percent change) 
Albania  -27.0  -22.0  -10.0  0.0  11.0 
Bulgaria  -11.0  -12.0  -4.0  -5.4  -4.0 
CSFR  -5.0  -15.9  -5.0  -7.0 
Czo:h Republic  2.0  O.S 
Slovak Ro:publir;  -9.0  -7.0 
Hun,gmy  -3.0  -11.9  2.0  4.4  0.0  -1.0 
.Estonia  -11.8  -28.0  -23.0  1.0  -5.0 
Latvia  -8.3  -25.0  -33.8  -10.0 
Lithuania  -13.4  -25.1  -37.7  -16.2 
Romania  0.0  -1:5.1  -5.0  -15.4  1.0 
Algeria  4.5  0.2  2.8 
CoDJumer!retail price (end year)  (Pen:cnt r;haugc) 
Albsnia.  104.0  345.0  237.0  32.0  31.0 
Bulgaria  234.0  339.0  44.0  79.0  64.0 
CSFR  30.0  52.0  12.0  12.7 
Cza:h Rc:publir;  15.0  18.2 
Slovak Republic  30.0  25.1 
Hung.a:ry  31.0  32.2  17.0  21.6  19.2  21.1 
Estonia  302.7  953.5  35.7 
Larvia  262.5  958.6  31.3 
Lithuania  /''  382.7  1069.0  1162.5  188.6 
Romania  104.0  222.8  130.0  198.5  298.0 
Algeria  35.0  22.8  32.0 
Fiscal balance • Cash  (Percent ofGDP) 
Albania  43.1  -28.2  -21.8  -16.7  -15.5 
.Bulgaria  0.1  -3.7  -4.5  -6.9  -9.4 
CSFR.  0.8  -2.0  -2.9  -3.6 
Czech Rcpublir;  -1.0  0.0 
Slovak Republic  -7.0  -7.0 
Htmga.ry  -1.5  -4.4  -0.5  -7.4  -7.0  -7.0 
Estonia  4.8  1.0  1.0  0.0  0.0 
Latvia  6.4  -1.8  0.0  -0.4 
Lithuania  2.8  0.3  0.9  -0.1 
Romania  -l.S  ·-2.6  -2.0  -5.6  -2.0 
Algeria  4.5  4.3  -0.7 
.. 1 ... -10-
Table 3 :Selected ecooomic indicators (contin~) 
1991  1992  1993 
Progrvnme o>  Actual  Prcgr;unmecn  Actual  Programme  (1)  Eslimstes 
Broad money  (Percent change) 
Albania  104.0  122.0  153.0  47.0 
Bulgaria  122.0  38.5  43.5  51.0 
CSFR  5.9  26.9  12.0  17.5 
Czech Republic  17.5  17.7 
Slovak Republic  19.0 
I hiD gary  22.9  29.4  27.4  19.8 
Estonia  68.0  21.0 
Latvia  153.1  123.0  169.9  76.1 
Lithuania  133.2  270.6  351.3  114.0 
Romllllin  15.0  101.2  &8.0  74.8  108.0 
Algeria  11.7  21.3  23.6 
Current accoUilt (conYertib1e)  (in biUion USS) 
Albnnin  ~.20  ..0.50  ..0.40  ..0.40  -0.40 
Bulgaria  -2.00  0.30  -1.40  -0.40  -1.00 
CSJ"K  -2.50  0.33  -0.60  023 
Cz.ech Republic  0.70  0.60 
S1oval: Republic  ~.30 
Hungary  -1.20  0.25  -0.65  0.26  -l.SS  -2.70 
Estonia  -0.18  -0.01  0.00  -0,07 
Latvia  ~.09  0.05  -0.24  0.04 
Lithuaaia  -0.16  0.09  -0.48  - -025 
Roma.o.ia  -1.70  -1.30  -1.30  -1.50  -1.30 
Algeria 
/'  ..0.31  2.56  1.20 
Official foreit[D excbuge re.serve.s (level)  (m billion USS) 
Albania  O.Ql  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.15 
l:lulgaria  0.50  0.40  1.00  0.90  0.70 
CSFR  1.70  320  2.20  1.30 
Cacll  Rc:public  2.20  3.80 
Slovak Republic  0.30  0.40 
Hungary  ].90  4.00  2.20  4.40  6.00 
Estonia  0.14  020  0.16  0.34 
Latvia  0.15  0.16  023  0.52 
Lithuania  0.04  0.14  O.JS  0.28 
RDI!Uillia  1.00  0.20  0.70  0.10  0.05 
Algeria  153  1.61  1.70 
(1)  Pnlgramme targt;U M  set in:  August 92 for Albania. Match 9land  April 92 for Bulgaria, 
Januaty 91  for CSFR, March 93 for the C7.A!:Ch R!!:public, July 93 far tlu!:  Slo~ak R.::public., 
Fc:bruazy 91  and Scptc:mba 93 for Hungmy. Scptc:mbc:r 92 for Estonia l!Dd Latvia, October 92 for 
Uthuania, April 91  and May 92 for Romania and May 91  for Algma. 
Sources: Nationalllllthorities - II -
TABLE 4 
STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFOR..l\1 
I.  ALBANIA 
I.  Price liberalization  Most wholesale and  retail  prices  freed  in  1992-93, with the 
exception.of.prices for wheat, bread, sugar beet and a number 
of non-food  items  produced  under monopolistic  conditions, 
for \vhich major adjustments were mace in mid-1993. 
2.  Trade liberalization  Major liberalization in  1992-93.  No  quantitati\·e  restrictions 
on  imports;  import  duties  ranging  0-40%  Limited  export 
restrictions.  , 
3.  Exchange  regime  Free  float  since  July  1992.  Current  account  convertibility. 
Large  e:ll.1emal  debt  arrears  to  commercial  banks  to  be 
negotiated. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  Liberal  regime,  recently  streamlined  to  limit  approYal 
requirements 
5.  Monetary policy  Use of bank-by-bank credit ceilings.  Administrative guidance 
to ensure that interest rates remain positive in real terms. 
6.  Public finances 
/' 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial seCtor reform 
Ongoing  efforts  to broaden  tax base:  personal  incomes  tax 
introduced  in  1993;  property  tax  scheduled  for 
implementation  in  1994  and  VAT in  1995-96.  Regarding 
e:ll.]>enditure:  major reduction  in  price  subsidies  in  1  992-93; 
allowance made for investment in line with PIP in  budget for 
1994. 
80% of  land  area privatized  with  distribution of titles to be 
completed  by  end  1994.  Small  privatization  in  trade  and 
services completed. Law on restitution passed in April  1993. 
Industrial enterprises : privatization of  small and medium-size 
enterprise. in late 1993 through decentralized auction;  newly-
created  Enterprise  Restructuring  Agency  to  supervize  30 
major  problem  enterprises.  However,  finan,cial  discipline 
reestablished in early 1993 through strict monetary policy and 
abolition of~e  system of  receivable orders. 
Two-tier banking system.  Three existing state-owned  banks 
still  to  be  restructured,  and  their  non-performing  loans 
replaced by government bonds. 
~  .. - 12  -
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
2.  BULGARIA 
I.  Price liberalization  Most  prices  freed  in  1991.  Close  to  90% of retail  turnover 
under free  prices.  Subsidies on  some energy prices gradually 
reduced, but prices remain below cost. 
2.  Trade liberalization  Imports  liberalized  in  1991.  Import  tariffs  and  remaining 
quantitative  restrictions  on  exports  low  by  international 
standards. Trade agreement with the EC and the EFTA. 
3.  Exchange regime  Since  1991,  unified  floating  exchange  rate  and  internal 
current account convertibility (with few  restrictions). Massive 
Central Bank interventions in late  1993 to limit exchange rate 
depreciation.  Large  interest arrears on  foreign debt.  Debt and 
debt  service  reduction  agreement  with  commercial  bank 
creditors expected to be finalized in mid-1994. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  .  Liberal foreign investment regime allowing direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
(law  adopted  early  1992).  Free  repatriation  of profits  and 
proceeds of liquidation  of investment by  non-residents.  But 
has been limited by delays in reaching DDSR agreement with 
banks. 
Bank-specific credit ceilings  remain the  main  instrument for 
conducting  monetary  policy,  but  increasing  reliance  on 
indirect  instruments  and  reserve  money  targeting.  Limited 
open market operations introduced in  1993:  Development of a 
market  for  government  securities.  For  1994,  specific  credit 
ceilings  on  the  largest  loss-making  enterprises  are 
contemplated. 
Laws  on  VAT,  excise  tax,  tax  administration  and  budget 
procedure  adopted  in  1993.  VAT to  enter in  force  in  April 
1994. 
Restitution of land and small  urban property to be completed 
in  1994.  Most  enterprises  transformed  into  joint-stock 
companies,  with  the  State  as  unique  share-holder.  Further 
restructuring and privatization of  industry on hold in 1992-93, 
allowing therefore hidden privatization and decapitalization of 
the state sector. Bankruptcy legislation still lacking. Financial 
discipline  weak.  The  authorities  are  contemplating 
acceleration  of privatization  through  a  new  programme  for 
market  privatization  in  1994  and  a  voucher-based  mass 
privatization scheme for 1995. Private sector accounts for 20-
25%ofGDP. 
Two-tier banking  system.  Banking  supervision:  prudential 
regulations adopted mid-93; on-site inspections to be held in 
1994.  Bank consolidation started in  1991  close to  complete. 
Partial  clean  up  operation  of commercial  banks'  balance 
sheets in  1992-93. Law on non-performing pre-1991  loans to 
enterprises (issuance of government bonds against bad debts) 
adopted in December 1993. Stock exchange introduced Ill 
- 13  -
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
3.  THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
1.  Price liberalization  Virtually all  prices free,  following  ex1ensive  liberalization in 
1991  and  follow  up  action  in  subsequent  years.  Only  few 
products still subject to some form of price regulation. 
2.  Trade liberalization  Imports  iberalized,  except  for  a  few  remaining  quantitative 
.. restrictions  on  agricultural  products, tex1iles,  steel  and  coal. 
All  imports  subject to  an  ad  valorem  import tariff of about 
6%.  Limited number of  products still require ex-port licenses. 
Trade agreements with  the  EC,  the  EFTA  and  the  Visegrad 
cou,ntries.  Customs union with  Slovakia since  dissolution of 
CSFR. 
3.  Exchange regime  Current  account  convertibility  almost  completed  m  early 
1991;  remaining  restrictions  to  be  removed  in  1994,  with 
phased  liberalization  of capital  outflows  Exchange  rate 
pegged to a basket of two  currencies (the  US  dollar and  the 
D-Mark).  Since February  1993, transactions with the Slovak 
Republic conducted through  a clearing  system at  a  different 
exchange rate. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  No  limits  on  equity  participation  m  enterprises  by  non-
residents,  except  in  the  case  of a  few  sensitive  or defence-
related sectors. Free repatration of profits and proceeds from 
the liquidation of  investments 
5.  Monetary policy  r  Czech  National  Bank  (CNB)  created  in  January  1,  1993; 
operates  independently  from  govemn1ent.  Czech  crown 
introduced in February  1993.  Since October 1992, monetary 
policy  conducted ·through  indirect  instruments.  Banks' 
lending and deposit rates have been gradually freed. 
6.  Public finances  VAT reformed,  excise tax system,  and  personal  income tax 
introduced  in  January  1993.  Profit  tax  share  substantially 
reduced. 
7.  Privatization and  First wave  of large-scale  privatization  completed  in  Spring 
enterprise restructuring  1993.  Second wave to be completed by end-1994, by which 
time  about  90%  of the  assets  of the  economy  will  be  in 
private hands.  Bankruptcy  legislation  since  April  1993  but 
very few companies have filed for bankruptcy, 
8.  Financial sector reform  Two-tier banking system established in January 1990.  Major 
financial  institutions partially  privatized under first  wave of 
large-scale  privatization.  Since  1991,  several  measures  to 
strengthen banks' balance-sheets.  Prague Stock. Exchange in 
operation since April  1993.  A bond market and a significant 
market for Treasury and CNB bills emerging. - 14 -
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
4.  THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
I.  Price liberalization  96%  of total  turnover based  on  free  prices,  with  regulation 
still  in  force  only in  the  areas  of transportation,  heating and 
rental. 
2.  Trade liberalization  Imports liberalized except for a few  sensitive items subject to 
import licences.  6% average tariff.  Export licensing remains 
for a limited number of  products.  Free trade agreements with 
the  EC,  the  EFT  A  countries  and  the  Vise grad  countries. 
Customs union with  Czech  Republic since dissolution of the 
CSFR. 
3.  Exchange regime  Current  account  convertibility  almost  completed  in  early 
1991. Temporary restrictions on  ~urrent account convertibility 
reintroduced  to  stem  loss  of reserves.  Exchange  rate  pegged 
to  a  basket  of 5 Western  currencies.  Since  February  1993, 
transactions  with  Czech  Republic  conducted  through  a 
clearing system at a different exchange rate. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  No  limits  on  equity  participation  in  enterprises  by  non-
residents,· except in  the  case  of a  few  sensitive  or  defence-
related sectors.  Free repatriation of profits and proceeds from 
the liquidation of  investment. 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Slovak  National  Bank  established  in  January  1993  operates 
independently from  government.  Slovak crown introduced in 
,. ·  February 1993.  Monetary policy relying on credit ceilings. 
VAT reformed,  excise  tax  system  and  personal  income  tax 
introduced  in ,January  1993.  Profit  tax  share  substantially 
reduced. 
First wave of large  scale  privatization  completed  by  Spring 
1993.  Second  wave,  under  preparation,  will  emphasize 
traditional  privatization  methods  (direct sales, tenders,  etc.). 
With  completion,  80%  of state  enterprises  privatized.  A 
bankruptcy law since June  1993 but very few companies have 
filed for bankruptcy. 
Two-tierbanking system established in January 1990.  Major 
financial institutions privatized under first wave oflarge-scale 
privatization. ·But state-oMted Savings Bank with controling 
stake  in  the  biggest commercial  bank  (VUB).  Since  1991, 
several  measures  to  strengthen  banks'  balance-sheets. 
Bratislava  Stock  Exchange  in  operation  since  1993  but 
financial markets remain underdeveloped. 1.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restrucn{fing 
8.  Financial sector reform 
- 15  -
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
5.  HUNGARY 
Nearly all price controls and subsidies eliminated 
About  93% of non-agricultural  imports  liberalized.  Several 
industrial  products  subject  to  import. licensing.  Imports of 
consumer goods  under a universal  quota  sys~em. Free trade 
agreements  with  the  EC,  the  EFT  A  and  the  Visegrad 
countries. 
Current account convertibility, except for certain services and 
transfers  Crawling-peg  system  against  US  dollar  and  D-
Mark 
No  limits  on  equity  participation  m  enterprises  by  non-
residents,  except  in  the  case  of a  few  sensitive  or defence-
related  sectors.  Free  repatriation  of profits and  proceeds  of 
liquidation of  investment by non-residents. 
Moneta!)' policy through indirect instruments. 
Taxation  gradually  shifting  away  from  corporate  taxation 
towards personal income and consumption.  VAT introduced 
in  1988.  Large cuts in  State subsidies from  13% of GDP in 
1988 to less than 5% in 1993. 
About 20% of  the business property held by the state in  I 990 
privatized.  Private sector accounting for  some 45% of GDP 
end  1993.  Tough bankruptcy  law  into  effect  since January 
1992. 
Two-tier banking system  introduced in  1986.  Interest  rates 
progressively  freed.  Several  operations  to  recapitalize  and 
clean up banks' portfolios.  State holds controlling stakes in 
major banks but the Banking Law requires a reduction of  state 
ownership  in  all  banks  to  25% by  1997.  Budapest  Stock 
Exchange opened in June I 990. I.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
- 16-
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
6.  ESTONIA 
Major  price  liberalization  in  1991.  Bv  end  1992.  virtual 
completion of  price liberalization, including in  energ~: sector. 
In  early  1992,  abolition  of most  import  tariffs  (except  fe\\ 
luxury  goods),  and  of most remaining  quotas  and  licensing 
requirements except for oil shale, clay, quartz.  Import subject 
to a  0.5% administrative  fee  plus  18%  VAT.  Few  exports 
tariffs (art works, rape seed oil, metals). Free trade agreement 
with Biltic States and Nordic countries. 
Current account convertibility.  In  June  1992  departure  from 
rouble  zone.  Since  1992,  Estonian  Kroon  pegged  to  the  D-
Mark under a currency board system. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
7.  ·  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
Central  bank  responsible  for  operation  of currency  board 
(Issue Department) and,  in  exceptional  cases,  for emergency 
lending to banking system (Banking Department, responsible 
for  managing  reserves  in  excess  of currency  board  cover). 
Bank does not interfere  with  the  setting of interest  rates  by 
commercial banks. 
In  1991, personal  income tax and  VAT introduced,  turnover 
r ·  tax replaced by corporate income tax; social security,  natural 
resource and specific excise taxes introduced. 
Well  advanced  in  small-scale  privatization  (more  than  50% 
privatized  by  mid-1993 );  slower  progress  on  large-scale 
privatization.  Establishment  of  Estonian  Privatization 
Agency in 1992 to organize the privatization process. 
' 
Two-tier  banking  system.  Increased  pressure  on  s~te 
enterprises to restructure through hard budget constraints and 
selective  application  of the  bankruptcy  law.  Reduction  of 
number of commercial banks from  40 to 24  through increase 
in minimum capital requirement following a banking crisis in 
Winter 92/93. Stock exchange introduced. 1.  Price liberalization · 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  Public finances 
r' 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
- 17-
TABLE 4 (Continued) 
7.  LATVIA 
Major  price  liberalization  in  1991  and  1992  including  for 
energy products. Maximum profit margins abolished. By end-
1992,  price  liberalization  essential!\·  completed,  excluding 
utility pric1 s af\d rents. 
All  export  quotas  and  licensing  and  most  export  tariffs 
. abolished in  1992. No licensing requirements for imports, but 
various  import  tariffs.  Free  trade  agreements  with  Baltic 
States and Nordic countries. 
Exchange  rate  unified  and  current  and  capital  account 
convertibility introduced.  In  July  1992 departure from  rouble 
zone.  Exchange rate  of lats stabilized under managed floating 
system 
Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
Independent  central  bank.  Credit  policy  through  indirect 
instruments. 
New  tax  system  since  January  1991.  VAT  introduced  in 
February  1992.  In  1993  replacement  of progressive  income 
tax  tiy  flat  rate  tax  (25%)  plus  a  I 0%  surcharge  on  annual 
income. 
Substantial. progress  on  small-scale  privatization,  but barely 
any progress on large-scale privatization. Problems still to be 
solved  : restitution issues and  establishment of a  centralized 
and  coherent privatization  strategy.  State  enterprises  not  up 
for  immediate  privatization  transformed  into  stock 
companies. Slow progress on liquidation. 
Two-tier banking system.  49 former branches of the Bank of 
Latvia either merged into  a  core  bank  (21  now  forming the 
Universal  Bank  to  be  restructured  and  privatized  later)  or 
privatized,  except  for  one  which  was  liquidated.  Capital 
adequacy  ratio  increased  in  January  1994.  Stock  exchange 
introduced. I.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetary policy 
6.  · Public finances 
7.  Privatization and  r' 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
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TABLE 4 {Continued) 
8.  LITHUANIA 
Major price liberalization in  1991,  1992 and  1993, including 
for most energy products.  Level  of subsidization reduced  for 
natural gas (household use), heating, transport and hot water ; 
plans to abolish subsidization completely in Fall 1994 
Export quotas and licensing removed partially in the course of 
1992 and  completely in June  1993.  All  import controls  and 
licenses removed. New system provides for import tariff rates 
bet\veen 5 and 15%on majority of goods. 
Exchange  rate  unified  and  current  and  capital  account 
convertibility. Left rouble zone in Fall  1992. Exchange rate of 
litas stabilized vis-a-vis a basket ofWestem currencies. 
Free  repatriation  of profits  and  proceeds  of liquidation  of 
investment by non-residents. 
Largely  independent  central  bank.  Credit  policy  through 
indirect instruments 
Reform  of tax system  which  now includes  personal  income 
and profit taxes, property tax, natural resource tax, individual 
excise taxes, as well as general sales tax. 
Substantial  progress  on  small  and  large-scale  privatization 
through  auction,  public  share  subscription  and  voucher 
system.  By January  1994,  2/3  of all  companies  eligible for 
privatization {1/3  of state  capital) privatized.  Little progress 
on  land  privatization.  Autonomous  operation  of  state 
.enterprises promotes efficiency. 
Two-tier  banking  system.  Creation  of  t\vo-tier  banking 
system in  1992  with  State Commercial Bank taking over all 
commercial  functions  of  Bank  of  Lithuania.  No  further 
progress on reforming the banking sector dominated by three 
State Banks is eh.'Pected in 1994. Stock exchange introduced  .. I.  Price liberalization 
2.  Trade liberalization 
3.  Exchange regime 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
5.  Monetruy policy" ' 
6.  Public finances 
7.  Privatization and 
enterprise restructuring 
8.  Financial sector reform 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
9.  ROMANIA 
Liberalisation  of most  prices  completed  in  May  1993. 
Energy  prices  remain  controled  but  adjusted  regularly 
for  changes in international  prices.  Public utilities and 
some  basic  staple  food  pricP.s  still  controled  and 
subsidised. 
Fully  liberalised.  A  limited  number  of import/export 
quota/bans is  still  in  force,  either for  health  reasons  or 
for subsidised goods.  Trade agreement with the EC and 
the EFTA· 
Mutiple exchange rate  practice.  Official  exchange rate 
established  at  Central  Bank  foreign  currency  auctions 
which  are  not  market  clearing.  Foreign  exchange 
available  to  individuals  ·through  private  exchange 
bureaus  at  a  free  market  rate,  substantially  above  the 
official  rate.  Major  overhaul  of the  exchange  rate 
regime is expected in early 1994. 
Free  legal  environment  for  equity  participation  and 
profits repatriation  by  non-residents.  Lack of progress 
with  respect to  privatisation  has  limited  the volume of 
investment  inflows.  Land  ownership  by  foreign 
nationals not allowed yet. . 
Attempts to tighten  monetary  policy  by  an  increase in 
refinancing rates; but strongly negative real interest rates 
stimulate flight  into  foreign  currency  holdings.  Weak 
financial discipline of state companies. 
Major reforms including succesful introduction of single 
rate VAT, abolition of nearly all consumer subsidies and 
incorporation  of  extra-budgetary  funds  into  a 
consolidated budget.  New profit tax  law.  Overhaul of 
the income tax .system is expected by end 1994. 
Substantial  progress  with  privatisation  of small-scale 
enterprises  through  management-employee  buy-outs. 
Progress  with  medium- and  large  scale  enterprises 
privatisation through the State Ownership Fund remains 
far below targets.  About 80% of arable land has  been 
privatised  by  distribution  to  farmers.  Registration  of 
land titles is on-going.  Private sector about a quarter of 
GDP mid-1993. 
Two-tier banking system.  Several foreign banks already 
operational.  Clearing  of  interbank  payments  and 
transfers  remains  very  slow.  Privatisation  of former 
state-owned banks expected to start in  1995 only. - 20-
ll.  HUNGARY 
"I.  Introduction 
In  the autumn of 1989 Hungary was  at  a critical turn of its  recent  economic and  political 
history. A comprehensive set of measures to promote structural reform and adopt a market 
economy model  were being implemented and  the  country was  preparing to  hold the first 
free  elections  of  the  post-war  period  (eventually  held  in  April  1990).  On  the 
macroeconomic front, however, the situation was extremely difficult. A sharp deterioration 
of the domestic and external economic and financial situation in the first half of 1989 had 
led to  the suspension of IMF  support in  the summer of that year.  The emergence of an 
unsustainable current  account deficit (which  would reach  almost  US$  1500  mio  for  the 
whole  of 1989)  and  a  heavy  foreign  debt  burden  threatened  the  consolidation  of the 
economic and political reforms.  , 
In this context, the Hungarian authorities requested supplementary medium-term financial 
assistance to  the European Community to  help the country meet its  growing debt service 
burden, rebuild its foreign exchange reserves and  introduce current account convertibility. 
In  response,  the  Council  agreed  on  22 February  1990  (Decision  90/83/EEC) to  grant  an 
ECU  870  million  medium-term  loan  to  help  Hungary  overcome  the  difficulties  of the 
structural adjustment of its economy. 
The  1990  loan  was  to  be  disbursed  in  three  iranches,  the  first  of which  (of ECU  350 
million) being conditional on the conclusion of a stand-by agreement between Hungary and 
the  IMF  and  the  other  two  on  the  fulfillment  of the  macroeconomic  and  structural 
performance  criteria  listed  in  the  Memorandum  of Understanding  subsequently  signed 
between the Commission and  the Hungarian authorities.  The first tranche was  effectively 
disbursed in  April  1990 and, following a successful review by the Commission of progress 
in  economic stabilization and  reform  (including the  compliance with  the .Memorandum's 
performance criteria), the second tranche (of ECU 260 million) was  released in  February 
1991. 
Changes in  the international e;nvironmerit, and in  particular the collapse of the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance trading and payments system, made it clear at the beginning 
of 1991  that Hungary, like other Central and European countries, would be facing a much 
more difficult  external  position than was  initially forecasted.  While the  IMF  granted  in 
1991,  at  the  Hungarian  authorities'  request,  an  Extended  Financing  Facility  (EFF)  and 
access to the Compensatory and Contingency Facility under the  "oil  window", the Fund's 
assistance  was  not  expected  to  be  sufficient  to  cover  all  the  exceptional  balance  of 
payments  financing  needs  for  1991.  Accordingly,  Hungary  requested  complementary 
financial  assistance from  the Community and the Group of Twenty-Four (G-24)  This led 
the  Council  to  adopt  on  24  June  1991,  on  a  Commission  proposal,  a  new  Decision 
(91 /31 0/EEC) providing further fmancial assistance to Hungary of ECU 180 million, with 
the understanding that a similar amount would be provided by the other members of the G-
24. The objectives of this new initiative were to ensure a sustainable balance of payments 
situation and to strengthen Hungary's reserve position. 
The 199 I loan was to be disbursed in two installments. The release of the first installment 
(of ECU  100 million), which was conditional. upon  the  Hungarian  government reaching 
agreement with the IMF on a three-year EFF, took place in August 1991. The release of  the 
second tranche (of ECU 80 million) was agreed in mid-1992, following the Commission's 
review of Hungary's economic  situation  and  the fulfillment of the  performance criteria 
listed  in  the  1991  loan's  Memorandum of Understanding but,  for  technical  reasons,  the 
assistance  was  actually  disbursed  in  January  1993.  The  Commission  agreed  with  the 
Hungarian authorities to  consider at a later stage the disbursement of the third tranche of 
the 1990 loan. This tranche, amounting to ECU 260 million, has not been disbursed to date. 
As  noted  in  the  previous  report,  Community macro-financial  assistance  to  Hungary  has 
undoubtedly  played  an  important  role  in  helping  the  country  overcome  the  difficult 
economic and political situation it faced at the beginning of its current process of reforms 
The delicate balance of payments situation that prevailed in  1989 threatened to  increase to 141 
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unacceptable l_evels  t~~ c~sts in terms of lost output and unemployment associated with the 
macroeconomic stab1hzatwn an  structun.l transformation of tk economv.  This risked  in 
tum, weakening the supp<:rt  of ~he Hungarian population for  the  economic  and  political 
reforms.  EC macro-financ1al assistance was successful both in easing Hungary's balance of 
payments constraint and in helping the country restore its access to the international private 
capital markets. 
The following sections review economic developments in Hungary in  1992 and  1993. 
2.  Recent Macroeconomic Developments 
2.1.  Out.put and unemployment 
The four-year reform programme adopted by the Hungarian government in  early  1991  had 
projected a modest 3% decline of GDP in  1991, followed by  a  I to 3% increase in  1992, 
accelerating in  1993. In the event, real  GDP fell  by  11.9% in  1991,  by a further 4.4% in 
1992,  and is estimated to have declined by I% in  1993  despite an encouraging recovery of 
industrial production in the second half of the year. 
The weaker than expected behaviour of total output in  1992 and  1993  is  partly explained 
by the  collapse of agricultural  production  Between December 1991  and  December  1993 
agricultural  output is  estimated to  have fallen  by about  30% reflecting  a severe drought, 
cut-backs in investment and export subsidies and  problems and delays in  the privatization 
and structural transformation of formerly state-owned farms 
Industrial production declined a further 9.8% in  1992 but has been experiencing a distinct 
recovery since last summer. Thus,  industria:!  output was in  the period  January-November 
1993 4.3% higher than in the same period of 1992 and was growing in November 1993 at a 
year  -on-year rate of  7%. 
l}nemployment  growth  slowed  down  in  1991,  with  the  registered  unemployment  rate 
increasing from 8.5% at  end-1991  to  12.3% at end-1992. After reaching a peak in  March 
1993,  the  number of registered  unemployment has  been  steadily  declining,  standing  at 
632.000 by the end of-1993, or 12.1% of the labour force. While this trend  partly reflects 
the decreasing number of people receiving unemployment benefit, it  may  also  reflect the 
fact that much of the labour shedding associated with the restructuring and  liquidation of · 
enterprises has already taken place 
2.2  Inflation 
In the first half of 1992, substantial progress was made in  reducing inflation, partly thanks 
to the "strong-forint" policy pursued by  the .authorities. Year-on-year inflation fell  to 20% 
in  July  1992  from  32.2%  at  end-1991.  However,  in  the second  half of 1992  monthly 
inflation accelerated again, reflecting a large drought-related surge in seasonal food prices 
and anticipatory buying in advance of the January of 1993 VAT reform. In  1993, increases 
in the VAT and excise taxes aimed at controlling the budget deficit,  combined again with 
above-average price increases, have caused inflation pressures to remain high. Thus, at the 
end of December 1993, year-on-year inflation -stood  at 21.1 %, about the same level as in 
December  1992  (21.6%).  Consistent  with  the  real  appreciation  of the  forint,  however, 
producer prices are increasing half as fast as consumer prices. 
2.3.  Fiscal policy 
In  1992, the deficit of the consolidated state budget widened sharply (from 4.4% of GDP in 
1991  to 7.4% of GDP), leading in  mid-1992 to  the interruption of the EFF agreed with the 
IMF  in  1991.  Despite  the  corrective  measures  taken  last  summer,  which  included,  as 
indicated before, an increase in  indirect taxes, the deficit is  estimated to have reached 7% 
of GDP in  1993.  Such measures were part of the conditions agreed with the IMF to obtain 
last  September a  IS-month  stand-by  credit  The authorities'  commitments with  the  IMF 
also  include  other  corrective  fiscal  measures  to  be  implemented  in  1994  However, - 22-
reflecting upward revisions in  debt service due to  higher than  expected interest rates,  the 
1994  budget  that  was  approved  by  the  Parliament  in  December  1993  foresees  a 
consolidated budget deficit  Ft 81  bn  higher than the Ft 249 bn  target initially agreed with 
the Th1F. 
The difficulties that Hungary has encountered in  reining in  its budget deficit are bas.icall y 
due  to  the  sharper  than  expected  contraction  in  economic  activity  (which  has  both 
weakened  revenues  and  increased  unemployment  compensation),  difficulties  to  tax  the 
emerging private enterprises and  incomes, and several one-time events often  linked to the 
reform  efforts. ·Among the  one-time events,  the  most  important  are  the  loss  of revenues 
from taxation of  oil imports following the shift of CMEA prices to world market levels, the 
suspension of tax  and social security payments by firms filing for bankruptcy proceedings 
as  a  result  of the  adoption  of the  Accounting  and  Bankruptcy  Laws,  and  the  costs 
•  associated  with  the  clean-up  of banks'  balance-sheets (including the  sharp  fall  of profit 
taxes from fmancial institutions as banks accelerated their provisio;J.ing to comply with the 
new capital adequacy requirements). Another factor increasing pressures on the budget has 
been the rapidly .rising public .debt interest payments due  to  the larger-than-programmed 
deficits.  · 
While  some  of the  fiscal  problems  faced  by  Hungary  will  gradually  disappear  as  the 
economy and the tax base recover, other problems will remain. This  is  obviously the case 
of the erosion of the traditional state-enterprise tax base and the pressures to  extend social 
security benefits.  \ 
2.4.  Monetary policy 
From late 1991  through mid--1993,  the Nation,al  Bank of Hungary (NBH) allowed banks' 
liquidity to build up so  as  to  put downward pressure on market interest rates, and reduced 
on several occasions its  official  interest rates.  This policy, however, met with only partial 
success  as  banks,  fearful  of lending  to  insolvent  companies  and  needing  to  increase 
provisions against bad loans  in  their portfolios, cut lending rates  much more slowly than 
deposit rates. As a result, spreads between lending and  deposit rates widened substantially 
and,  with  producer prices  rising much  more slowly than  consumer prices, this  led to the 
coexistence of very high real interest rates for loans to  enterprises (which hampered private 
investment) and negative real interest rates for depositors (which undermined incentives for 
private saving).  In  contrast with  commercial  lending rates,  yields on  treasury  bills were 
pushed down rapidly as banks sought safe investments for their excess liquidity. 
At  the  beginning  of last  summer  it  became  clear  that  interest  rates  on  deposits  and 
government  paper  had  been  allowed  to  decline  too  much.  The  high  public  borrowing 
requirements,  the  weakening  of  private  savings  and  ~oubts  about  the  authorities' 
commitment to  a  "strong forint  policy" were beginning to "put  upward pressure on short-
term interest rates.  In that context, the NBH decided to raise its  intervention rates last July 
and again last September. 
2.5.  Balance of payments and exchange rate policy 
Since  the  third  quarter  of  I 992,  the  Hungarian  current  account  has  suffered  a  sharp 
deterioration and is expected to show a deficit of  about US$ 2. 7 bn (7. 5% of  GDP) in  1993 
(against  a  US$  261  mio  surplus  in  1992).  This  rapid  worsening  of Hungary's  current 
account is  basically explained by four  factors.  First,  domestic demand is  experiencing  a 
recovery  at  a  time  when  Hungary's  main  Western  export  markets  are  suffering  from 
recession or very weak growth. Second, agricultural production and exports have collapsed 
as  a  result  of recent  droughts  and  the  disorganization  caused  by  the  privatization  or 
transformation  of state-owned  farms  and  cooperatives.  Third,  exports  have  also  been 
negatively affected by the observance of the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro. 
And fourth, Hungary has -suffered an  important loss of external competitiveness in  recent 
years, as reflected in a cumulative appreciation of the forint's real exchange rate or around 
35% (measured with consumer prices) since the beginning of 1990. - 23  -
The re~l appreciation of the forint is the main cost of the "strong-currency policy" followed· 
by the authorities until recently to  bring down inflation  Such r  policy basically meant that 
the  forint  was  regularly  devalued  within  a  "crawling-peg  system"  but  in  amounts 
insufficient  to  fully  compensate  Hungary's  inflation  differential  with  its  main  trading 
partners.  The poor  performance of exports  since the third  quarter  of 1992  has  led  the 
authorities  to  increase  since  early  1993  the  frequency  and  magnitude  of  the  forint 
devaluations  in  order to  produce some real  depreciation  of the  currency  With  inflation 
remaining above 20%, however, the impact of this shift in  policy on the real exchange rate 
has so far been very limited. 
While exports are expected to grow substantially in  1994, as agricultural production and, to 
a lesser extent, foreign demand recover, this will be partly offset by the increase in  imports 
as  domestic  demand  accelerates.  Furthermore,  the  recovery  of exports  itself  could  be 
limited  by  the  weak  competitive  position  of the  outward-processing  sector,  pers1stent 
structural difficulties in  the agricultural sector and the loss of export .base associated with 
the bankruptcy of a  large  number of traditional  export  companies.  In  this  context,  the 
current account deficit  is  expected  to  shrink only  moderately  in  1994  (to  about  6% of 
GOP). 
Despite the very high current account deficit, official  foreign  exchange reserves expanded 
from  US$ 4.4 bn at end-1992 to  US$  5.7  bn  at  the end of October  1993.  This was made 
possible by the following two reasons  First, with an  estimated  US$  I .3  bn net  inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FID) in  1993, Hungary COf!tinues  t,o  be the main beneficiary of 
FDI flowing into Central  and Eastern Europe.  Second, Hungary enjoys an  easy access to 
the  international  capital  markets,  which  has  allowed  the  NBH  to  successfully  place 
international bonds in  1993 in the amount of about US$ 4 bn.  · 
The negative side of the aggressive international borrowing programme of the NBH  has 
been a rapid growth of foreign  debt in  1993.  Total convertible debt,  which had  decreased 
by US$ 0.9 bn in  1992,  is  estimated to  have risen from  US$  21.5 bn at end-1992 to  US$ 
24.9  bn  at  end-1993.  The  debt/GOP  ratio  has  also  deteriorated  slightly,  reaching  an 
estimated  66J%  at  the  end  of  last  year.  There  has  been,  however,  a  significant 
improvement in  the  structure of the  debt,  with  the proportion  of medium and-long tem1 
debt increasing from 89.8 to 92.8%. 
/"'. 
Total debt service amounted to 4 3 bn, practically the same level as  In  1992. However, with 
exports  estimated  to  have  fallen  by  about  20%  in  I 993,  the  debt  service  ratio  has 
considerably worsened, increasing from  43.9 to  48.1%  Principal repayments are expected 
to amount to around US$ 2.5  bn this  year,  down from  US$ 2.8  bn  in  1993,  but they are 
projected to rise sharply in  1995  and  1996 to,  respectively,  US$ 3.4 bn  and  US$ 3.9 bn. 
With the current account deficit expected to remain at relatively high levels in those years, 
this "bunching" of amortizations could put considerable pressure on Hungary's balance of 
payments 
3.  Review of the structural reform program me 
Important steps have been taken in recent years in all the main areas of structural reform in 
order to transform the Hungarian economy into a market economy.  These have basically 
included  :  1) tax  and  other public sector reforms;  2)  the  removal of most subsidies· and 
price controls; 3) the almost complete liberalization of trade and other current international 
transactions; 4) privatization and the strengthening of governance of firms remaining under 
state control; 5) the introduction of new accounting and bankruptcy laws; and 6) a series of 
measures to reform the banking system. Since 1992 efforts have been concentrated in these 
last three  areas  of reform.  Also  significant  has  been  the  signature of several  trade  and 
association agreements with the EC, the EFT  A countries and Hungary's Central European 
neighbours. 'Recent actions in these four fields are described in what follows 
3 .1.  Privatization and the strengthening of  _gQvem£_nce_in.state  enterprise~ 
Privatization started in  Hungary in  1988 with the adoption of the  1988  Company Act and 
the 1988 ·Foreign Investment Act Since then, privatization has been carried out through a - 24 -
~umber of different programmes and ve~icles  Changes ofapproach have been frequent but 
m  general pnvattzatJOn has relted heavtly on  for~tgn capttal  and  has emphasized sales to 
"real  owners",  that  is,  those who  would  take  an active  role  in  managing the  privatized 
enterprises.  The important  role  assigned  to  foreign  investors  is  explained  bv  the  initial 
desire to maximize foreign exchange revenues at a· time of balance of payments'  difficulties, 
the  limited  financial  wealth  of  domestic  investors  and  the  need  to  bring  Western 
technology,  and  marketing  and  managerial  expertise  to  Hungarian  firms  As  for  the 
emphasis on sales to "real owners", it has avoided the negative implications for the proper 
restructuring of the. enterprises that may result from  the excessive dispersion of ownership 
created by mass-privatization schemes 
One limitation of the Hungarian approach to  privatization (as opposed to,  for example, the 
Czech  and  Slovak  "voucher-based"  schemes)  it  that  it  has  resulted  in  a  slow  pace  of 
privatization for big state-enterprises. Thus, while almost all  retail establishments under the 
control of the State Property Agency have now been privatized, the government estimates 
that only  about  20% of the total  business  property  held  by  the  state  in  1990  has  been 
privatized. The growth of the Hungarian private sector in  recent  years  is,  thus, explained 
more by the creation of new,  previously  inexistent firms  than  by  the  transfer to  private 
hands of state property.  The combination of both factors  has  increased  to  about 45% the 
share of GDP generated by the Hungarian private sector in  1993 (from  15% in  1990). 
In order to both avoid a possible loss of steam of the privatization process and increase the 
participation of domestic investors, the Hungarian authorities have taken several initiatives. 
These have included compensation for past expropriations with warrants that can be used to 
purchase  state  property,  preferential  credit  arrangements  to  facilitate  purchase  of state 
assets by domestic investors and "leasing" arrangements to  enable Hungarian managers to 
buy their companies.  Also,  the government  has  introduced  a  new  programme for  small 
domestic investors to acquire with deferred payment shares in  privatized enterprises. 
Concerning the strategy for residual state ownership, the government announced in  August 
1992  a  list  of 1  SO  business  organizations  in  which  the  state  will  retain  at  least  part-
ownership. In October of that year the "State Asset Management Company" (A  VRT) was 
created to manage and restructure if nec.essary  those companies,  and  to  sell  the specified 
share not to be retained by the state. 
I'' 
3 .2.  Accounting and bankruptcy Jaws 
Following several unsuccessful bankruptcy laws, a drastic bankruptcy legislation came into 
force in January 1992 which forced any company with payments in  default for more than 
90 days to file for bankruptcy or liquidation  procedures.  The result was  quite dramatic. 
According to the OECD, in  1992 about one in  ~very six CO!J1panies  applied for bankruptcy 
or liquidation, representing about 17% of  employment and 25% of exports. 
To reduce the  harshness of the January  1992  law,  the  Parliament has  recently approved 
some amendments, including the substitution of the mandatory self-initiation of bankruptcy 
procedures by the initiation by creditors  The amended Jaw,  is hoped, will allow illiquid but 
potentially viable companies to escape lengthy proceedings and will make it  more likely 
that creditors will arrive at more constructive solutions. 
3.3.  Banking reforms 
In I 986 Hungary became the first country in Central and Eastern Europe to establish a two-
tier banking system separating central bank from  commercial bank activities.  Since then, 
the permitted operations of commercial and savings banks have been gradually enlarged, 
interest rates  have been  progressively freed  and  the National  Bank's and  Foreign  Trade 
Bank's monopoly on foreign  exchange operations has  been  loosened.  Furthermore, since 
1986 tl:e state has on several occasions injected capital into the banking system to improve 
the solvency of state-owned institutions and a new Banking Law was passed in  December 
1991  subjecting financial institutions to prudential regulations modeled on the Community 
financial Directives and the Basle Committee capital adequacy regulations  Supervision has 
also been strengthened through the establishment of a special supervisory agency in charge - 25 -
of ~v~rseeing banks'  ~ompliance with  prudential  regulations  and,  in  case of a  capital  or 
ltqUJdJty  shortfall,  des1gn1ng  ban~ restructunng programmes  Finallv,  a  National  Ofposit 
Insurance Fund was create.d last July  -
All these steps have not  been, however, sufficient to  solve the problem of bad  loans in  the 
banks'  portfolios  which,  like  in  other  Central  and  East  European  countries,  limits  the 
effectiveness  of  banks'  financial  intermediation.  Efforts  to  recapitalize  banks  were 
increased at the end of 1992 with the adoption of a "loan consolidation scheme'', whereby 
government bonds were swapped for 50 and 80% of the face value of non-performing loaris 
outstanding  in,  respectively,  1991  and  1992  A  new  bank  consolidation  operation  was 
launched in December 1993.  Such operation, which is  to  be supported by a US$ 150-200 
mio  Financial  and Enterprise  Sector  Adjustment  Loan  from  the  World  Bank,  aims  at 
recapitalizing  the  banks  through  the  acquisition  by  the  state  (in  return  for  20-year 
government bonds) of new shares in  8  major Hungarian banks.  In  contrast with the  1992 
bank consolidation operation, this new scheme leaves to  banks most of the responsibility in 
forcing the reorganization or otherwise liquidation of the debtor enterprises 
3 .4.  The new regional trade agreements 
The trade protocol of the  Association  Agreement between  Hungary  and  the  Community 
became effective on I March,  1992 and the "Visegrad agreements" with Poland, the Czech 
Republic and the Slovak Republic entered into  effect on  1 March,  1993.  A  similar trade 
agreement with the EFT  A countries came into effect in October 1993. All these agreements 
aim at a gradual lowering of import barriers with the final  objective of establishing a free 
trade  zone  (except  for  agriculture)  within  a  maximum  period  of ten  years  While  the 
Visegrad agreements are symmetrical, those concluded with the Community and the EFT  A 
are asymmetrical, that is,  the  Community and  EFT  A  countries will  reduce trade  barriers 
first,  with  Hungary  only  reciprocating  at  a  later  stage.  With  the  ratification  of  the 
Association Agreement by EC Member States having been completed, the Agreement came 
fully into force in February I, 1994. 
4.  Assessment and prospects 
Since the presentation  of the 1992 Report, progress has continued to be made in  the area of 
structural  transformation,  particularly  in  the  fields  of banking  reform  and  bankruptcy 
legislation. On the macroeconomic front, there has been a considerable deterioration as far 
as the fiscal and current account situation is concerned, with the II\1F interrupting, as  noted, 
the 1991  EFF in mid-1992 .due to non-compliance with the fiscal targets. However, the new 
economic policy programme agreed between the Hungarian authorities and the II\1F in the 
first half of I 993, and supported by the September 1993  stand-by arrangement, involves a 
serious  effort  of budget  consolidation.  Furthermore,  the  authorities  are  contributing  to 
macroeconomic  stabilization  through  the  conduct  of a  very  prudent  monetary  policy. 
Finally, a strong inflow of FDI and  a relatively high  degree of access to the international 
capital  markets  has  allowed  Hungary  to  finance· without  problems  its  growing  current 
account deficit, making it unnecessary for the G-24 to  complement the II\1F stand-by with 
further macro-financial assistance.  · 
No  doubt  Hungary  still  faces  difficult  challenges  ahead.  It will  have  to  take  tough 
measures to  reduce the public deficit without loosing popular support for the reforms.  It 
will  also have to bring down  its  current account deficit and  foreign  debt  burden to  less 
uncomfortable levels.  Finally,  the  Hungarian government will  have to  persevere in  its 
structural measures to avoid a  Joss  of momentum in  the transformation programme.  The 
authorities  are taking the right steps  in  these directions  and the country's  main  political 
forces  seem  committed to  carrying forward  the transition  process.  This,  as  well  as  the 
fairly  high  degree of consensus  among  the  population  in  favour  of the  reforms,  should 
ensure that progress continues to be made in the years to come. - 26 -
IIL  THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE SLOVAK REPliBLIC 
1.  Introduction 
In  February  1991  the EC  Council  (Council  Decision  91/J06/EEC) granted  an  ECU 375 
million loan to the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (hereafter CSFR).  This was 
done  in  the  context of an  initiative  by  the  Group  of Twenty-Four  (G-24)  to  provide 
financial  assistance  supplementing  that  offered  by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.  The 
objective of the loan was to ensure a sustainable balance of payments situation, strengthen 
international  reserves and  facilitate the introduction of currency convertibility.  Together 
with a broadly equivalent contribution from the non-Community members of the G-24, the 
loan  was supposed  to  cover the CSFR's  balance. of payments  "financing gap"  for  1991, 
estimated at US$ l  billion 
The loan was to be disbursed in two tranches.  The release of the first tranche was made 
•·· conditional upon the CSFR government reaching agreement with the IMF on  a  stand-by 
arrangement based on a comprehensive economic policy programme.  With the IMF Board 
having approved a 14-month stand-by credit in January 1991, the first tranche (of ECU 185 
million) was effectively disbursed in  August of that year.  The disbursement of the second 
tranche was subject to a successful  review by  the  European Commission, in  consultation 
with  the  Monetary  Committee,  of progress  in  the  field  of economic  stabilization  and 
stmctural  reforms,  including  the  observance  of a  number  of ·quantitative  performance 
criteria agreed by the two parties.  After a positive review, the second tranche (of ECU 190 
million) was released in  February 1992.  .  . 
Regarding the assistance granted by the non-Community members of the G-24,  US$ 384 
million were committed, mostly  in  the form  of medium-term loans to the CSFR. Of this 
amount, US$ 362 million were effectively disbursed.  ·  ' 
In  what  follows,  we  review  the  situation  after  the  full  disbursement of the  1991  loan. 
Section 2 gives a brief description of economic performance and  policies in  the CSFR in 
1992, the year before the break-up of th~ federation.  Section 3 then discusses the issue of 
the  division  of the  EC  lq.an  ben.veen  the  n.vo  republics  that  succeeded  the  CSFR on  I 
January 1993. Section 4 analyzes the main economic repercussions of the dissolution of the 
federation and Section  5 spells out, for the Czech Republic and for the Slovak Republic 
separately,  the  main  economic  trends  and  policy  measures  of  1993.  Finally,  section  6 
makes an overall assessment of the situation and prospects in the two countries. 
2.  Economic developments in the CSFR in 1992 
Real GOP in Lhe whole of the fonner CSFR fell again by  an estimated 7% in  1992, after 
decreasing by  15.9% in the previous year.  However, over the year the decline of output 
was partially halted and in  the second half of the year some sectors began to show signs of 
recovery.  Despite the decline in output, registered unemployment fell steadily during 1992 
in both republics.  For the whole of the CSfR, the unemployment rate fell from 6.6% at the 
end of I 991  to 5.1% at the end of 1992.  Nevertheless, regional differences in  the labour 
market remained pronounced: whereas, at the end of I 992 the unemployment rate stood at 
only 2.6% in the Czecb lands, in Slovakia the rate was 10.4%. 
Supported  by  the  continued  implementation  by  the  authorities  of the  CSFR  of tight 
monetary and fiscal  policies, average inflation slowed down to 12.7% in December 1992, 
after having reached  52%  ~n December 1991  in the wake of the liberalization of prices. 
However, consumer price inflation picked up somewhat in the latter half of 1992, partly as 
a result of an  acceleration of wage growth.·  In  an  attempt to compensate for the massive 
(25%) decline in real wages that took place in  1991, average wages rose by  17%, implying 
a real increase of  about 8% 
Having been almost in  balance in  1990, the general government deficit in  the CSFR swung 
into a def1cit of 2% of GDP in  199 J and of 3. 6% of GDP in  J 992  This deterioration of the 
fiscal  accounts is  basically explained by the loss of revenue associated with the decline of - 27 -
economic_ activity and  t~e erosion of the traditional state-enterprise tax  base,  as  well  as  by 
the  negat~ve budgetary  tmpact of several  structural .reforms  However,  in  comparison  to 
the expenence of other Central  and  Eastern European  Countries  in  transition  to  a  market 
economy, the deterioration of the fiscal  situation in  the former CSFR was  very  moderate 
and was in  fact consistent with a tight underlying fiscal stance. 
The monetary programme adopted by the authorities for  1992  targeted a price inflation of 
12%  during  the  year,  which  was  consistent  with  a  modest  real  increase  of credit  to 
enterprises  and  households.  Despite  the  complications  for  monetary  management 
introduced by the uncertainties associated with the impending dissolution of the federation, 
the objectives of the  programme were broadly  met,  with  inflation  growing  in  1992  by 
12.7% and broad money by 17.5%. Such uncertainties, however, resulted in  quite divergent 
monetary trends  in  the Czech  lands  and  Slovakia,  with  broad  money growing  at  around 
23% in the former and around 4.5% in the latter.  There was also significant changes, in  the 
stance of monetary policy in  the course of the year.  Until  August, the strong balance of 
payments position and the success in reducing inflation led the authorities to ease monetary 
conditions  in  an  attempt  to  support  economic  activity  But  from  September  onwards 
monetary conditions were tightened again as  inflation showed some signs of accelerating 
and  as  fears  about the  repercussions  of the  split  of the  federation  provoked  an  intense 
capital  flight  from  both republics (as well  as  from  Slovakia  to  the  Czech  lands).  Thus, 
banks' reserve requirements were raised and  auction refinancing credit rates  climbed from 
14% to 20% by the end of December. 
From the beginning of I 991  to  the dissolution of the federation,  exchange rate policv was 
characterized by the use of the exchange rate  as  a nominal  anchor of the reform  process. 
This was reflected  in  the  almost complete stability of the  nominal  exchange rate of the 
crown,  which remained  in  effect fixed  against a basket of five Western currencies.  With 
consumer prices increasing by 54% in  1991  as  a result of that year's liberalization of prices 
and  removal  of subsidies,  and  with  the  inflation  differential  vis-a-vis  the  CSFR's  main 
trading  partners  remaining  positive  in  1992,  the  stability  of the  nominal  exchange  rate 
translated  into  a  substantial  real  appreciation.  By  the  end  of 1992,  the  CSFR  had  lost 
practically  all  the  competitive  edge  gained  through  the  50%  nominal  devaluation 
engineered in  1990. 
Like monetary policf,.the CSFR's balance of payments experienced very different trends in 
the first and second halfs of 1992.  With exports to  the West growing strongly despite the 
recession in European markets, and imports below expectations, the current account posted · 
a  US$ 0. 7  billion surplus  in  the first  half of the  year.  Furthermore,  at  US$  2.1  billion, 
official  hard-currency  res.erves  at  mid-year  exceeded  by  US$  I  billion  the  projections 
incorporated in the stand-by programme agreed with the IMF in  April  By contrast,  in  the 
second half of the  year uncertainties  surrounding the  division  of the federation  affected 
very negatively inflows of foreign  direct investment (FDI),  provoked,  as  noted;  a capital 
flight  and  induced  an  increase  in  imports  on  concerns  about  future  external  relations 
between  the two  republics.  Imports  also  accelerated  at  the  end  of the  year  due  to  the 
expectations of the introduction of the VAT in  January  1993.  All  this resulted  in a sharp 
reduction in  official reserves to  US$  1.3  billion by  year-end.  For the whole of 1992,  the 
convertible current account surplus fell from US$ 357 million in 1991 to US$ 330 million. 
Although the dissolution of the CSFR tended  to  dominate the  political  debate since the 
summer of 1992 and diverted some attention from  structural reforms, progress in  several 
areas  continued  to  be made.  Thus,  the  bidding  rounds  of the  first  wave  of large-scale 
"voucher-privatization",  involving  1.500  companies with .a  book value of about  50% of 
GOP, were completed in  December of 1992. Under the voucher scheme, citizens  18  years 
or older  were  invited  to  purchase  a  booklet  of vouchers  worth  l 000  points  for  a  fee 
equivalent to one week's average wage. Individuals could use these points to bid for shares 
in  companies  being  privatized  or  entrust  them  for  management  to  the  Investment 
Privatization Funds (IPFs), apout 400 of which emerged spontaneously. In  the event, about 
70% of  the distributed points were handed over to the IPFs. 
Following the  1991  "big bang",  some further  deregulation of prices  took  place  in  1992. 
Further progress was also made in the institutional and regulatory framework for the capital 
markets with  the adoption of a  Securities Act  and  a basic  law  to  regulate the  IPFs,  and - 28-
preparations  to  set up stock  exchanges  in  both  Pr-ague  and  Bratislava  (which  would  be 
eventually opened in  1993).  The authorities of both republics also worked intensively last 
year in the design of a comprehensive tax reform which entered into force in  January 1993 
and  included  the  introduction  of a  VAT  and  a ·complete  overhaul  of direct  taxation 
Concerning the banking sector, bank  regulation  and ·supervision was  strengthened  by  the 
adoption in  February 1992 of new banking laws establishing capital adequacy regulations 
in  line with BIS standards, as well as  limits on large credit exposures and foreign exchange 
positions  The main elements of these banking regulations have been broadly maintained 
by the new independent republics after the dissolutiqn of the CSFR. Additional measures to 
improve  the  portfolio  and  capital  position  of banks _were  also  taken  by  the  federal 
authorities in  1992. 
In  the  area  of foreign  trade,  the  provisions  on  trade  of the  Association  Agreement 
· concluded with the Community in December 1991  became effective in March  1992 on the 
·'basis of an interim agreement. The Association Agreement, which was replaced in  October 
1993  by separate Agreements with each of the successor republics,  aims at establishing a 
. free  trade  area  between  the  Community  and  the  former  CSFR  in  ten  years.  Regarding 
industrial  goods,  many of the  remaining  EC  tariffs  and  quantitative  restrictions  were 
eliminated  immediately  after  the  agreement  entered  into  force.  For  some  sensitive 
industrial products and  for most agricultural products,  however,  a less  ambitious or more 
gradual  liberalization  was  agreed.  In  March  of 1992, ·the  CSFR  signed  another  trade 
agreement with  the EFT  A  countries  and  in  December of 1992  concluded  the  so-called 
"Visegrad Agreement" with Hungary and Poland,-which aims at the gradual introduction of 
a free trade area among those neighbouring countries by the year 2000 at the latest. Like in 
the case of the European Agreement, the agreements with the EFT  A and the other Visegrad 
countries have been replaced in  1993 by separate agreements for each successor republic. 
3.  Division of the 1991 EC Loan 
In view of  the institutional changes which led to the partitioning of the Czech  and  Slovak 
Federal Republic into two separate states, the Commission took the initiative to propose to 
the authorities  of the CSFR and  of the two  successor republics  in  December  1992,  and 
again in  January  1993,  that the loan  be continued on  the understanding that the two new 
republics would be jointly arfd severally liable towards the Community for the full amount. 
The authorities of both  republics,  however,  declined  on  several  occasions  to  accept the 
proposal  made  by  the  Commission  and  requested  that  the  Community  consider  the 
possibility of individual liability of the Czech and the Slovak Republics, according to a 2: 1 
ratio,  consistent  with  their  separation  agreement.  In  justifying  their  position,  the  new 
republics emphasized the fact  that individual  r~sponsibility is  one of the most  important 
aspects of sovereignty, and that economic autono"my was· a crucial factor in  the separation 
of the Czech and  Slovak Republics.  They also argued that some other important official 
creditors had already accepted separate liability of  the successor states. 
After consultation  of the Monetary Committee,  the Commission  agreed  to  go along the 
Czech and Slovak request and  adopted in  August 1993  a proposal for a Council decision 
designed to establish the principle of the split of the  1991  EC loan to the CSFR according 
to the 2:1  ratio, with each successor Republic being individually liable for only its allocated 
part  of the  loan.  Accordingly,  the  Czech  Republic  and the  Slovak  Republic  will  be 
responsible for,  respectively, two thirds and  orie third ofthe total  payments of principal, 
interest and fees  associated with the EC loan.  After consultation  of the Parliament,  the 
proposal was formally  approved  by the Council  on  January 24,  1994.  It empowers the 
Commission to  agree with the national  authorities of the two  republics on the necessary 
adjustments to the original Loan Agreement  -
Finally,  it  must be noted that since the partition of the federation  the authorities of both 
republics have been discharging fully and timely the interest-payments associated with the 
1991  loan.  · (51 
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4.  Economic implications of the dissolution of the CSFR 
Following the general elections of June 1992, the governments of the two republics decided 
to  dissolve  the federation  by  the  end  of the  year.· They  then  proceeded  to  agree  on  the 
division of federal assets and liabilities. Fixed properties would be divided according to the 
territorial  principle  and  most  other  assets  and  liabilities  according  to  a  21  ratio  that 
reflected the relative population shares of the two republics. 
In  order to  avoid  excessive disruptions  in  economic relations  between  the  two  republics 
after  the  separation,  the  respective  governments  also  agreed  to  set  up  a  customs  and 
monetary union between the two countries starting on  l January,  1993. The customs union 
guaranteed the free movement of goods and services between the two republics,  prohibited 
the  use  of tariff and  non-tariff barriers  within  the  territory  of the  former  CSFR,  and 
stipulated identical custom policies vis-a-vis third countries. Capital and labour would also 
be allowed to circulate freely between the two countries. As for the monetary union, it  was 
·envisaged to last at least six months but could be dissolved earlier under certain conditions, 
including  a  sharp  decline  in  international  reserves  or  bank  deposits  in  any  of the  two 
republics. 
Nevertheless,  uncertainty  about  the  consequences  of the  break-up  of the  federation  and 
speculation  about  the  future  of the  monetary  union  (which  was  seen  as  a  transitory 
agreement)  soon  gave  rise  to  a  strong  capital  flight  out  of both  republics  and  out  of 
Slovakia and into the Czech  lands (on  expectations of a devaluation of the  Slovak crown 
against the Czech crown). This produced large losses of foreign  exchange reserves in  both 
republics and provoked the collapse of the monetary union  at  the beginning of February, 
that is, only a month after it was set up. 
The  introduction  of new  currencies,  initially  through  the  attachment  to  the  notes  of 
different stamps  in  each  republic,  proceeded  smoothly.  The  conversion  against  the  old 
Czechoslovak currency was effected at par for both the Czech crown and the Slovak crown. 
In  order to  minimize  possible .disruptions  of trade  after  the  split of the  currencies,  the 
authorities of both countries  introduced  a  bilateral  settlement system for  inter-republican 
transactions.  Payments  between  the  Czech  Republic  and  the  Slovak  .Republic  ure  now 
centralized  through  two  clearing  accounts.  Payments  arising  from  post-8  February 
transactions are settled,through an account denominated in  "clearing ECUs", with balances 
being settled  in hard::'currency  at  the  end of the month  and  only to  the extent that they 
exceed ECU 130 million. While, in principle, one clearing ECU is equivalent to  one ECU, 
the exchange rate of both national currencies in  terms of the clearing ECU are allowed to 
deviate  by  ± 5%  from  their  exchange  rates  against  the  actual  ECU.  Inter-republican 
payments arising from pre:-8  February transactions are settled through a different clearing 
account denominated in  the so-called "Czechoslovak Accounting Crown". Balances in this 
second clearing account are regularly settled either in hard-currency or by transferring them 
to the ECU-based account 
Despite  the  establishment  of the  bilateral  clearing  system  and  the  maintenance  of the 
customs union,  inter-republican trade fell  sharply (by  about 45%) in  the  first  quarter of 
1993.  Although  bilateral  trade  turnover  has  recovered  somewhat  since  then,  inter-
republican trade is estimated to have declined by around 20% in  1993 as a whole. 
The split of the federation and the subsequent demise of the monetary union between two 
republics has  had a much more adverse impact on  Slovakia than on. the Czech Republic. 
First, the dissolution of the CSFR has put an  end to the very considerable fiscal  transfers 
that Slovakia used to  receive from the Czech Republic through the federal budget This, in 
tum,  has  unmasked  an  important  Slovak  current  account  deficit  vis-a-vis  the  Czech 
Republic.  Second,  with  the  separation,  Slovakia  has  also  lost  much  of  the  federal 
government's solid reputation for orthodox macro-economic policies  and  market-oriented 
reforms, a reputation that ha.S  in  effect been inherited by the Czech Republic  Third, with 
most  federal  institutions  being  located  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  many  of the  better 
qualified  professionals  remaining  in  the  newly-created  Czech  institutions,  Slovakia's 
economic policy has been impaired by the Jack of proper institutions and human capital. - 30 -
To  the  comparatively  worse  repercussions  of the  division  of the  CSFR  on  the  Slovak 
Republic must be added  the less  favourable  economic situation that  already  prevailed  in 
Slovakia before the division. At the end of 1992  Slovakia had not only an average rate of 
unemployment  four  times  higher  than  that  of the  Czech  Republic  but  also  ~ weaker 
industrial structure and  a greater share of the defense and  heavy industries that  had  most 
suffered from the collapse of  the CMEA traditional markets. 
5.  Economic developments in 1993 
5.1.  The Czech Republic 
Real GDP in  the Czech Republic is  estimated to  have grown moderately in  1993  (between 
0  and  1  %),  the first  positive rate since real  output  began  declining  in  1990.  Rea!  GDP 
(seasonally adjusted), has been growing since the second quarter of 1993, spurred both .by 
the recovery of consumption and  investment and  by a surprisingly strong performance of 
convertible exports 
With  banks  and  other creditors  continuing to  refuse to  apply  effectively the April  1993 
bankruptcy law, the unemployment rate has remained at very low levels (3  5% at end-I 993, 
only moderately up from the 2.6% rate prevailing a year before). 
Following  a  8. 5%  price jump in  January  1993  associated  with  the  introduction  in  that 
month of the VAT, inflation came down rapidly to  about 0.5% per month in  March-July. 
Inflation, however, accelerated again between August and October as  a result of unusually 
large food  price increases and ended the year at  18.2%, above an  initial target of 14-16% 
and the 12.7% rate recorded in December 1992. The main threat to inflation continues to be 
the  rapid  growth  of wages.  Although  wage  increases  moderated  somewhat  after  the 
reintroduction  by  the  Czech  authorities  on  July  I,  1993  of a  tax  on  excessive  wage 
increases, they have remained very high. Thus, in the third quarter of l 993 nominal wages 
in  enterprises with 25  or more employees were 26% higher than  in  the same  quarter of 
. 1992. 
Speculation against the currency, unfavourable wage and price developments and the need 
to drain the excess bank liquj.dity that resulted from the conversion of cash holdings and 
bank deposits ahead of the currency split, led the Czech National Bank to tighten monetary 
mili.£y in the first months of the year. However, since the end of April  1993, as trends in 
currency in  circulation began to  reverse, foreign exchange reserves increased and inflation 
started to show a positive behaviour, monetary policy has been gradually eased. Regarding 
fiscal  policy, the state budget recorded in  1993  a Kc I. I  bn surplus, representing 0.1% of 
GDP. Together with an unexpectedly strong financial position of the local authorities, this 
has resulte_d  in a general government deficit close to zero, against the l% of GDP deficit 
target that had been agreed with the IMF. 
The Czech current account (excluding transfers to Slovak citizens of shares in enterprises 
privatized in the first wave of  voucher-privatization) is tentatively estimated to have posted 
. in  1993 a surplus of some US$ 600 million, or.about 1.9% ofGDP. This is a surprisingly 
good result given the acceleration of domestic demand and imports and the weakness of the 
Czech Republic's main export markets. In contrast with the sharp drops in exports suffered 
by  other  Central  European  countries,  Czech  exports  (excluding  exports  to  Slovakia) 
performed strongly, growing by 13% in real termsin the first 10 months of 1993. 
Although the net inflow of  foreign direct investment slowed down in 1993 to US$ 450 mio 
(from US$ 983  mio in  1992), the Czech Republic has been experiencing a surge in other 
capital inflows since the third quarter of 1993. Thus, net portfolio investment (to a  large 
extent in  the form of equity purchases) reached  in  1993  about US$ 700 mio and Czech 
enterprises  borrowed  abroad  US$  750  mio  (basically  in  the  form  of bank  credits). 
Furthermore, the Czech National Bank successfully placed several international bond issues 
last year.  This relatively high degree of access of the Czech Republic to the international 
capital  markets  has  been  reinforced  by the upgrading of Moody's  rating (from  the Ba I 
previously assigned to the CSFR to Baa3) and by the assignment by Standard and Poor's of 
a  comparable BBB  rating.  This  makes  the  Czech  Republic  the  only  Eastern  European - 31  -
country to have been issued an  "investment grade" mark by the lending international rating 
agenc1es. 
The combination of a healthy current account position and  a stron'g capital  inflow has put 
upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate and has resulted in a  rapid grov.'th of official 
foreign  exchange reserves, which stood at  US$ 3.8  bn  at end-1993, compared to US$ 0. 7 
bn  at  end-1992.  In  order tb  stem  the  upward  pressure  on  the  exchange  rate,  the  Czech 
National  Bank  is  planning  to  make  the  crown  fully  convertible  for  current  account 
transactions and to liberalize in a. phased manner controls on capital outflows. 
Despite recent speculation on a possible revaluation of the Czech crown, the currency has 
remained stable against the reference basket of  Western currencies used to peg its value. As 
of May 1993, the number of currencies in the basket was reduced from  5 to 2 (the US$ and 
the  Deutsche  Mark).  This  has  strengthenea  considerably  the  link  of the  crown  to  the 
German  currency.  The persistence  of a  significant price  and  wage  inflation  differential 
between the Czech Republic and  its  main trading partners has continued to appreciate the 
real exchange rate, which stands now at a level  similar to that which prevailed before the 
1990 devaluations  · 
The Th1F  approved a  12-month,  SDR' 177  mio  stand-by  credit  to  the  Czech  Republic  in 
March  1993.  Granted  in  the wake  of the  speculation  and  sharp  decline  in  reserves  that 
accompanied the dissolution of the CSFR, the credit aimed  at  providing an  early boost to 
reserves  and  helping  the  Czech  authorities  reestablish  international  confidence  in  its 
policies.  With the external  situation  improving rapidly  in  the  course of 1993,  the Czech 
authorities only made the first purchase under the stand-by arrangement (SDR 70 mio) and 
repurchased this amount ahead of  schedule in  September 1993. 
The Czech  Republic  has  continued  to  make· progress  on  the  structural  side.  With  last 
spring's  distribution  of enterprise shares,  the  first  wave of large-scale  privatization  was 
completed. Moreover, a second wave of large-scale privatization  is  already underway.  As 
was the case in the first wave, almost one third of the assets, with an  estimated book value 
of Kc 145  billion will be sold through the voucher method.  The distribution of vouchers 
began in October 1993 and the first bidding round is  expected to start in April of this year. 
The second wave should be completed by end-1994, by which time about 90% of the assets 
of the economy will be in private hands. 
/' 
The implementation of bankruptcy legislation was originally planned for October of I 992 
but  was  delayed  for  fear  that  an  excessive  number  of  bankruptcies  could  boost 
unemployment, thwart the recovery of the economy and clog-up the court system. In April 
of 1993, the bankruptcy law finally came into effect, following an  amendment that allows 
three months for creditors to attempt to reach an  agreement before a bankruptcy procedure 
is  initiated by the court. Contrary to expectations, however, the number of companies filing 
for bankruptcy procedures since the law came into effect has been relatively small. 
Regarding the reform and development of the financial system, the Prague Stock Exchange 
started operating in  April  1993  and  the banking laws  inherited from .the  CSFR have been 
slightly modified to strengthen banking supervision.  In  addition,  part of the privatization 
proceeds have been earmarked by the National Property Fund to purchase bad loans in the 
banks' portfolios at a discount. 
5.2.  The Slovak Republic 
Slovak  real  GDP  is  estimated  to  have  declined  by  5-7%  in  1993,  implying  the  fourth 
consecutive  year of recession.  Unemployment,  for  its  part,  has  kept  climbing,  reaching 
14.4% of the labour force at end-1993, up from  104% at end-1992. 
The prolongation of the Slovak recession is  largely explained  by the negative effects the 
dissolution of the CSFR has had on Slovakia. The split of the CSFR not only has disrupted 
trade  with  the  Czech  Republic,  but  has  also  obliged  the  Slovak  authorities  to  pursue 
restrictive macro-economic policies. Monetary policy had to  be overly tight in the first half 
of  1993  in  order  to  defend  the  country's  foreign  exchange  reserves  amid  persistent - 32 -
speculation  about  a  devaluation  of the  Slovak  crown.  While  the  monetary  stance  was 
gradually eased after the July devaluation,  the reemergence of pressures  on ·the  exchange 
rate at  the end of 1993  obliged the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) to  raise the discount 
rate from 9.5% to  12% on December 21.  On the fiscal  front,  the  authorities  have made a 
significant effort to  control  the budget  deficit· after the  termination of the fiscal  transfers 
from the Czech lands. In particular, the government adopted in the summer of 199~ a tough 
package of fiscal measures (including an  increase in  the VAT) aimed at cutting· the deficit 
by  2.5%  of GDP  in  the  second  half of the  year.  Although  the  general  government  is 
estimated to have run a deficit of about 7% of GOP last year, this would mean a substantial 
correction from an  estimated budget deficit before C.zech transfers of 14% of GDP in  1992. 
The increases  in  indirect taxation and  the  10% dev<!luation  of the  Slovak  crown  in  July 
1993 have resulted in  an  increase in CPI inflation fro111  12.7% at end-1992 to 25  I% at end-
1993. 
The loss of the fiscal  transfers from the Czech~  Republic was expected to unmask a large 
deficit in  the  Slovak current account.  In  the  event,  however,  the  sharp  compression  of 
domestic demand and  imports and  the devaluation of the  Slovak crown have avoided the 
emergence  of a  too  serious  current  account  deficit.  Thus,  excluding  transfers  from  the 
Czech Republic associated with the distribution of voucher-shares to  Slovak citizens, NBS 
data show a total current account of US$ 289 mio (or 2. 9% of GDP) in the first  I 0 months 
of 1993. 
Slovakia is,  however, having problems to  finance even  this smaller-than-expected current 
account deficit.  First, at an  estimated US$  I 00 mio in  1993, net foreign direct investment 
continues  to  be  of  little  significance.  Second,  Slovakia  lacks  good  access  to  the 
international capital markets.  Slovak borrowers have,placed only  two  international  bonds 
since the break-up of the CSFR2  and  in  both cases paying quite high spreads over Libor. 
Third, speculation about a devaluation of the Slovak crown has  resulted both  in  the first 
half of 1993 and since the end of  that year in a significant outflow of short-term capital. 
To help ease its balance of payments constraint, the IMF granted to Slovakia an  SDR 64,35 
mio (US$ 89 mio) Systemic  Transforma~ion Facility (STF) loan in  July  1993.  The IMF is 
also  about  to  reach  agreement  with  the  Slovak  authorities  on  an  economic  policy 
progamme that could be supported in the coming months by  a stand-by arrangement and, 
possibly,  a  second  purchase from  the  STF.  In  addition,  the.  World  Bank  approved  in 
November  1993  a  US$  80  mio  Economic Recovery  Loan.  It can  also  be  expected  that 
further  macro-financial  assistance  from  the  G-24  will  eventually  be  requested  to 
supplement the IMF and World Bank loans. 
The weakness of Slovakia's balance of payments  has  been  reflected  in  a very wlnerable 
foreign exchange reserve position. Capital flight-in early  1993  practically depleted official 
hard-currency reserves, which (excluding gold and  SDR holdings) fell  from approximately 
US$ 350 mio at end-1992 to US$ 119 mio at end-February 1993. This led the authorities to 
restrict current account convertibility. Thus, in  late January banks were obliged to increase 
their overall short position in foreign  currency to  35% of their capital  before they  could 
buy foreign exchange from the NBS, and in February minimum financing requirements for 
imports were introduced. Between May and September official foreign exchange reserves 
recovered  gradually,  reaching  US$  513  mio  at  end-September.  Much  of the  increase, 
however,  reflected  the  STF  purchase  and  the· international  bond  issued  by  the NBS  in 
September. Furthermore, since the second half of October the NBS has again been losing 
reserves. In spite of  this, the authorities decided to remove the restrictions on convertibility 
introduced  in early  1992.  Official  foreign  exchange reserves  stood  at  US$ 415  mio  (or 
about three weeks of imports) at the end of 1993. 
Regarding exchange rate policy, the currency continues to  be pegged to  a  basket of five 
Western currencies. The Slovak crown was devalued by 10% against convertible currencies 
2  A  US$  240 mio bond issued by the SNB  in  September 199 3 and a US$  21  mio bond  issued by  Cal ex, a  state-
owned manufacturing company, in January 1994. - 33  -
last July.  This was done in the context of the adjustment programme agreed with the IMF 
and. supported by_ the STF purchase  Fu;1hermore, the  Slovak crown was devalued by 5% 
agamst  the  cleanng ECU  1n  early  December  1993  Given  the  almost  simultaneous  3% 
revaluation of the Czech crown against the clearing ECU, this means that, since the split of 
the currencies and with respect to  inter-republican transactions, the Slovak crown has been 
devalued by about 18% against the Czech crown.  · 
Concerning structural measures, with the first wave of large-scale privatization completed 
last  spring,  the Slovak government is  now preparing a second  wave including some 650 
enterprises. In contrast to the fust wave (and the second Czech wave), however, the Slovak 
government intends to  rely  primarily on  traditional privatization methods,  such  as  direct 
sales to  investors,  "management buy-outs"  and  tenders.  Coupon privatization will  still  be 
used but  in  a much smaller scale than  before.  The  aim  of this shift to  more conventional 
methods is both to  increase badly-needed state and foreign exchange revenues and to make 
sure that enterprises are transferred to capable owners.  · 
A  bankruptcy law finally entered  into  effect in  June  1993,  following. (like  in  the Czech 
case) an  amendment under which a board of creditors will have three months to work out a 
rehabilitation plan. The Slovak government has also initiated an operation to  net out part of 
the inter-enterprise arrears.  At  a first  stage,  the operation  was  concluded  on  a  voluntary 
basis but, in  order to  achieve a further reduction of inter-enterprise arrears, the government 
has recently decided to make enterprise registration of claims obligatory. 
Finally, regarding financial sector reform,  Slovakia is  preparing some amendments to  the 
banking laws and regulations inherited from the former CSFR and is  elaborating a strategy 
to  strengthen the balance-sheets of the major Slovak banks,  probably with the  support of 
the ffiRD and the PHARE programme.  · 
6.  Assessment and prospects 
As  noted  in  the  1992  Report,  by  helping  to  close  the  estimated  balance  of payments 
"financing-gap" at a crucial moment in the country's transition towards a market-economy, 
EC  macro-financial assistance to  the  former  CSFR has  contributed  to  the  success of the 
CSFR's stabilization an,d  reform  programmes. Without the G-24/EC  balance of payments 
support, the cost of the transformation process in  terms of output lost and unemployment 
would have been significantly  higher  and,  perhaps,  unacceptable  to  the  population.  G~ . 
24/EC macro-financial assistance eased the CSFR external constraint both directly and by 
helping the country to gain access to the international private capital markets. 
Since the presentation of the previous Report,  progress has  continued to  be made in  both 
republics in the major areas of structural reform  On the macro-economic front, the Czech 
Republic has continued to implement sound and orthodox fiscal  and monetary policies. As 
a  result,  inflation  has  been  brought  back  under  control  following  last  January's  VAT.,. 
induced  price-jump,  and  official  reserves  have  been  rebuilt  to  very  comfortable  levels. 
Also, the projected current account deficit will be amply financed by expected inflows of 
foreign direct investment and other private capital inflows. 
The Slovak Republic faces,  as noted, a more difficult macro-economic situation. First, the 
loss of large fiscal transfers from  the ,Czech Republic has  resulted in an  important budget 
deficit and, although a serious current account deficit will probably be avoided, the Slovak 
recession has proved to be deeper and longer than was initially expected. Second, the recent 
devaluation of the Slovak crown and a new increase in indirect taxes has complicated the 
fight against inflation. Third, official reserves remain at a very low level and Slovakia has 
limited access to the international capital markets. However, recent measures like the tough 
emergency fis'cal  package adopted by the Slovak government last summer, and the rigorous 
monetary policy implemented since the beginning of 1993  confirm the high priority that 
the Slovak authorities continue to attach to the stabilization of the economy. 
The dissolution of the federation has had negative repercussions on both the Czech and the 
Slovak economy, compounding for the latter the difficulties of the' transition  process.  But 
both  countries  seem  committed to  the  structural  reform  programmes  and  are  taking  the - 34 -
right steps to  ensure that the  reforms  continue to  be backed by  a stable macro-economic 
framework. 
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IV.  BULGARIA 
1.  Introduction 
The radical economic reform  process in  Bulgaria started  in  early  1991  when the countrv's 
first non-communist government embarked on  an  ambitious stabilization  and  reform  pro-
gramme  under  which  tight  macro-economic  policies  were  put  in  place  and  several 
important structural reforms were undertaken. In  support of the programme, the II\1F  con-
cluded with the authorities a twelve-month Stand-by arrangement in March 1991  providing 
for up to some US$ 390 million, with an  attached contingency mechanism  for oil  and gas 
prices,  under which  approximately US$ 80  million  was  drawn.  The World  Bank was to 
make  available a  Structural Adjustment  Loan  (SAL) of US$ 250  million.  The Group of 
Twenty-Four  pledged  complementary  financial  assistance  of  some  US$ 600  million, 
including a  Community loan  of ECU 290  million  (disbursed  in  two  tranches,  in  August 
1991  and March 1992). 
As  noted  in  the  previous  report,  the  results. of the  policies  implemented  in  1991  were 
satisfactory : price distortions were decisively addressed; trade and exchange systems were 
liberalized;  and  some  important  institutional  and  legislative  changes  were  introduced. 
Several  key structural  reforms,  in  particular land  reform  and  enterprise  restructuring and 
privatization, proceeded, though more slowly than planned owing mainly to political uncer-
tainties. 
The programme for  1992-1993 was  designed to  achieve further progress towards a viable 
external  financial  position  to  secure  a  stable  domestic  financial  framework  with  low 
inflation and increased financing of the non-government sector,  and  finally  to reduce the 
fall  in  output  mainly  through  the  continuation  of the  structural  transformation  of the 
economy.  The programme was in  particular intended to  make a decisive start on  the long 
delayed ownership reform. 
The financing  needs  associated  with  the  programme were  estimated  at  US$ 2.6  billion, 
down  from  US$ 3.8  billion  a year  earlier.  They  were assumed  to  be  met,  like  in  1991, 
through debt rescheduling (with the Paris Club of official creditors) and roll-overs (with the 
commercial  banks), .rand  through  official  assistance  from  the  International  Financial 
Institutions and the Group of Twenty-Four. In  particular, the programme was supported by 
a new twelve-month Stand-by arrangement with the IMF (concluded in  April  1992) under 
which Bulgaria would  be  able to  purchase up  to  some US$ 21 5 million,  and  the second 
tranche of the World Bank 1991  SAL (US$ 100 million). The G-24 was requested to  pro-
vide  new complementary  financing  of US$ 240  million.  In  the  context of the  1992-93 
assistance package, the Community decided to grant Bulgaria a new loan of ECU 110 mil-
lion (Council decision 92/511/EEC of 19  October 1992) which represented approximately 
50% of the residual financing gap. However, the IMF supported programme went off-track 
and the Community loan has not been disbursed. 
2.  Macro-economic developments and policies in 1992-1993 
In the first half of 1992, the Bulgarian authorities continued to  implement tight macro-eco-
nomic policies, and achieved further progress towards stabilization.  In mid-1992, though, 
the government came under strong criticism from  the ·opposition, the trade unions and the 
industrialists for mishandling the economic reform  and  in  particular for neglecting to  ad-
. dress decisively the needs of the enterprise sector (by the end of 1992, half of Bulgaria's 
state and municipal enterprises were operating at a loss) and for proceeding too slowly with 
privatization. As  political opposition to the stabilization programme was growing, macro-
economic  management weakened  in  the  second  part of the  year  and  most  programme 
targets for fiscal, monetary and incomes policies were missed. As a result, Bulgaria was not 
in a position to draw the last tranche under the SBA (some US$ 43  million). 
In  late October 1992,  the centre-right Union of Democratic Forces government had  even-
tually to step down. A new, non-party, government, backed by a heterogeneous coalition of 
the Socialist Party, the Movement for Rights arid Freedom and a fraction of the UDF, carne - 36 -
to power on 30 De~embe~ 1992.  Fro~ th.e  outset, cthis  government placed an  emphasis on 
structural reforms,  m partJcu_Jar  on  pnvat1zation  At the same time,  it  was  not  prepared to 
take u~p?pular econom1c po~1cy measures. The new authorities did  not  implement strict fis-
cal po!Jc1es, and therefore faded to conclude in  199.3 the discussions with the I:MF  on a new 
financing arrangement. The World Bank, on  its part,: withheld the disbursement of the sec-
ondtrancheofthe 1991  SAL. 
2.1.  Macro-economic policies 
The fiscal policy intended to be implemented in ·1992  was aimed to limit budget financing 
and credit to state enterprises to make financial resources available for the growing private 
sector. In particular, the budget deficit was intended to be limited to 4.5% of GOP. 
From July 1992, government spending increased beyond targets due to wage, social' assis-
tance  and  defence spending overruns.  The adJustment of energy prices,  that  would  have 
broadened the energy sector profits tax base, failed to" materialize. Meanwhile, the financial 
performance of the state sector continued to deteriorate, bringing about a structural decline 
in tax revenues. For the year as  a whole, the fiscal deficit was thus close to 7% of GDP. In 
1993, fiscal policies remained lax; the budget deficitincreased further, approaching 11% of 
GDP. 
Monetary  policy  reflected  the  fiscal  stance.  In  the  first  half of  1992,  the  monetary 
authorities  respected the targets for  money  creation  that  had  been  agreed  with  the  Th1F. 
Growth  of domestic credit to  government was  contained  to  6%  in  the  first  six  months, 
against an  increase in the general price level of almost 40%. In  the second half of the year, 
it almost doubled; the resulting increase in the genera'! government's monetary financing by 
more than II 0% far exceeded the targets of the economic programme. Credit expansion to 
government crowded out the private sector. 
Restrictive incomes policy had been one of the essential  components of the government's 
stabilization programme since Februaiy 1991. Its relaxation in July 1992 when the govern-
ment raised minimum wages and wages of state employees was one of the main causes for 
inflation in the second part of the year.  Average real wages rose by about 12% in  1992.  In 
1993  (on  1 April),  wages of  ,public sector employees were increased by 44% and  a  new 
wage indexation system whiCh  reflected nearly  100% of price increases and thus perpetu-
ated inflation. 
2.2.  Economic results 
GDP fell  by about 6% in  1992 (after a drop of some 12% in  1991 ).  Industrial production 
declined by around II%, as  compared to  18.6o/~· the previous year.  The services sector de-
clined much less (around 3%) and began to show signs of recovery, thanks to private sector 
activity, especially in retail trade. Agricultural production declined by about 7%.  For 1993, 
GDP decline is estimated at 3 to 4%. 
As  a result of depressed activity and  labour shedding in  the state sector,  unemployment 
rose  during  1992 and  early  1993, from  I 0% to  16%,  the  highest  level  in  all  of Eastern 
Europe.  It has  remained  stable  at  around  this  level  since.  Private  sector  employment, 
however, recorded a dramatic rise. It is estimated that by the end of 1992 the private sector 
accounted for  some 14% of total  employment.  "Side income"  (various  forms of income 
from  the private sector) is  estimated by the authorities to  have greatly risen and to have 
become  the  second  largest  source  of household  income  by  end  1992.  These  trends 
continued in  1993. 
The monthly inflation rate fell to 2% in July 1992, but rose again to 5-6% by the end of the 
year.  The annual  inflation rate was  91% in  1992.  In  1993,  the year-on-year inflation rate 
decreased to 73% (end-year inflation in  1992 and 1993 was 79% and 64% respectively). 
After the initial sharp devaluation following the exchange system reform in February 1991, 
the lev gradually depreciated. from  around  18  per dollar in  April  1991  to 27  per dollar by 
August I 993This nominal depreciation of the Bulgarian currency represents in  fact a strong - 37- . 
real  appreciation.  In  the  last  months of 1993,  however,  the national  currency came under 
strong pressure and the exchange rate depreciation accelerated  By  the end of 1993, tht ex-
change rate of the lev was about 32 per dollar. 
2.3.  External Developments 
The structural shift in  foreign  trade from  the former CMEA countries  to  the Western  in-
dustrialized countries continued in  1992 from the previous year. Exports in  convertible cur-
rencies rose by 30% (reflecting a competitive exchange rate,  low labour costs and  a more 
liberal trade regime), while those to former c:tviEA countries halved in  1992. According to 
national statistics, trade with the EC increased particularly rapidly,  with  both  exports and 
imports doubling. EC trade is expected to receive a further boost through the recent Interim 
Agreement, which came into force on 31  December 1993. 
The trade  account was· balanced  in  1992,  but it  is  likely  to  have  recorded  a  significant 
deficit  in  1993,  estimated  at  US$ 0 5  billion.  This  is  due  not  only  to  reduced  external 
competitiveness,  following  wage increases  and  real  appreciation  of the  lev,  but  also  to 
recession  in  the EC export markets  and  to  UN  trade  sanctions  against  rump  Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and  Montenegro). The sanctions, imposed in  May  1992  and  made more severe in 
April  1993,  not only  bar exports  to  Serbia and  Montenegro,  but also  disrupt  trade with 
Western Europe by blocking transport links. The Bulgarian authorities allege that they cost 
the country US$ 240 million a month between lost  exports and  increased transport costs. 
Latest IMF estimates of the effect of the sanctions on Bulgaria's current account point to  a 
loss of up to US$ 400 million in 1992 and US$ 700 million in  1993. 
Smaller than  expected  official  capital  inflows have been  more than  offset  by  private  in-
flows,  mainly related to  export receipts  and repatriation of capital  due to  high returns on 
leva  denominated  domestic  financial  assets.  The  Bulgarian  National  Bank  could  thus 
increase its international reserves to  close to US$ 1 billion, equivalent to  over three months 
of merchandise imports. By the end of 1993, the reserves were much lower (some US$ 700 
million)  due  in  particular  to  the  interventions  of the  BNB  in  support  of the  national 
currency on tht:  foreign  exchange market.  Foreign direct  investment remained,  however, 
extremely low (some US$ 40 million in  1992 and US$ 20 million in the first half of 1993), 
despite  a  particularly liberal  law passed  in January  1992  allowing foreign  investment  in 
virtually all sectors of the economy.  · 
In order to secure deferral  and  rescheduling of external  debt servicing obligations on  of-
ficial debt, in  December 1992 Bulgaria reached an  agreement with the Paris Club of offi-
cial creditors. This agreement that covered maturities falling due until  April  1993  was the 
second agreement of this type (the first one was concluded in  April  1991 ).  A new official 
debt  rescheduling  will  need  to  be  negotiated  as  soon  as  Bulgaria  has  reached  an 
arrangement with the IMF. 
In parallel Bulgaria was negotiating a comprehensive restructuring of its private debt (the 
bulk of the debt is owed to  some 300 commercial banks).  In November  1993, after three 
years of ups and downs in these negotiations, the authorities and the banks' advisory com-
mittee virtually agreed  on  the  parameters of a  comprehensive debt  and  debt-service  re-
duction scheme (an agreement in principle on the main orientations of the scheme had al-
ready  been  reached  in  November  1992).  According  to  the  agreement,  Bulgaria's 
commercial debt (approximately US$ 7.3 billion, in principal) will be substantially reduced 
through a mix of debt cash buy-backs and long-term securities (discount bonds at  SO%  of 
face  value  and  front~loaded interest reduction  bonds).  The  agreement  foresees  separate 
treatment of  interest arrears (some $2 billion), through buy-backs, cash payments and long-
term bonds. The deal, however, will have a high cost for Bulgaria: up to US$ 900 million 
up front, which is  more than all of the Central Bank's international reserves, and US$ 280 
million per year in  terms of debt servicing in the first years of restructuring (substantially 
more than Bulgaria had been paying since the last months of 1992 when it started making a 
portion of current interest payments as  a goodwill gesture;  such  payments were,  however, 
discontinued later to be resumed only in December 1993). - 38 -
3.  The structural reform process in 1992-1993 
3.1.  Liberalization 
After the extensive price liberalization at the onset of the reform programme,. controls had 
remained  at  the  end  of 1991  only  for  prices  of energy  and  agriculture  products.  In  the 
course  of  1992  and  1993,  despite  repeated  nominal  increases,  most  energy  prices 
(electricity, heating and coal) were still below cost.  Only the prices of petroleum  products 
are virtually liberalized, since they are adjusted monthly on the basis of  a formula that links 
them to world prices.  The number of agricultural products subject to price restriction was 
reduced in  May  1992. It is  estimated that some 85  to  90% of all  retail turnover takes place 
upder free prices. 
In the area of foreign trade liberalization, the tariff system was modified in July 1992 with 
a new, simplified .set of tariffs being introduced. Under the new system, the maximum tariff 
is 40% and the (unweighted) average tariff 18%. By comparison, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and  Poland all  had  average unweighted tariffs between  9 and  14%  in  1992.  The average 
weighted tariff in  Bulgaria in  1992 was  1  0.6%.  Restrictions on  exports.,  for the most part 
removed at the beginning of 1991, remained low by international standards despite the re-
introduction of quantitative restrictions  on  a small  number of products  in  July  1992  and 
January  1993,  as in  particular licensing requirements for  a number of agricultural  goods 
were replaced by export taxes. 
3.2.  Enterprise restructuring and privatization 
The. structural  reform  programme,  that was  launched  at  the beginning of 199 I,  recorded 
significant progress in  the  first  half of 1992  when  a number of important measures  was 
adopted. Between December 1991  and February 1992legislation was enacted allowing the 
restitution of shops and small businesses to the former owners. The law on  privatizat;on of 
agricultural land was finally revised in April 1992 and by the end of 1993 about 40% of ag-
ricultural  lands was restituted.  Following the  implementation of the  1991  Company Act, 
two  thousand  large state-owned  industrial  enterprises were transformed  into  commercial 
companies  with  the  state  as  single  shareholder  by  November  1992.  In  April  I 992,  a 
comprehensive law was  passed  on  the  privatization of both  small  and  large state owned 
enterprises, and in September a programme to privatize 1600 companies was announced. 
Although  these  measures  were  implemented  at  a  lower  pace  than  initially  envisaged 
(mainly due to lack of political consensus),  by end-1992  a new,  dynamic sector of small 
retail  and  service  enterprises  emerged,  especially  in  the  cities:  by  that  time,  46%  of 
property had  been returned to its original owners.  Overall,  it  is  estimated that the private 
sector contributed 50% of the total retail and wholesale trade in  1992, and between 15  and 
30% of total value added in the Bulgarian economy. 
3.3.  Financial sector reform 
Financial sector reform continued in  1992 with the adoption of a Law on Banks and Credit 
Activity. The legal framework for the creation of a modem banking system is now in place, 
including an independent central bank and a private banking sector. In September 1992, the 
Bulgarian  National  Bank  also  introduced  new  payment  and  clearing  arrangements.  A 
second stock exchange was created in early 1992, dealing with small but rising amounts of 
shares.  By  mid-1993,  the  two  stock  exchanges  together  traded  several  million  leva  per 
week. 
Despite these achievements, many critical problems of the financial sector remained largely 
unresolved, and the banking system is still in  dire need of modernization and  recapitaliza-
tion. Bank assets comprise many non-performing loans to enterprises; partial clean-up op-
erations of bad debts that have taken place in  the past and  are to  be implemented in  1994 
(following the adoption of a law on pre-1991  debts) are still insufficient to restore the com-
mercial  banks'  balances.  The  state  enterprise  sector  is  weak  and  debt-ridden  (inter-
enterprise debt may  account for  about one-quarter of the value of industrial  production). - 39-
Budget constraints on enterprises remain too  soft,  partly  because no  effective bankruptcv 
provisions exist yet.  This lack of adequate bankruptcy legislation and  banking -supervision 
(prudential regulations were only adopted by- the second half of 1993) allows  unprof.table 
enterprises to absorb a large share of domestic savings, thus reducing the scope for invest-
ment and  development of private enterprise.  Some progress  has  been  made with  the  re-
structuring of the banking system, but the consolidation of the existing commercial banks 
into  a  small  number  of viable  units  was  still  not  completed  A  process  of  gradual 
recapitalization of the banks. progressed only slowly, owing to its budgetary cost 
3.4.  Institutional strengthening of public finances 
In  the second half of 1993, with the adoption by parliament of new tax laws (on VAT, in-
come tax and profit tax), the new taxation system whose foundations had been put in  place 
as  early as in  1991  was virtually completed.  Together with. the laws on budget procedure 
and  on  tax  administration,  the adoption  of new  laws  are  viewed  as  an  important  step 
towards institutional strengthening of public fmance. 
4.  Community macro-financial assistance in 1992-1993 and prospects 
The ECU 110 million Community loan was to  be disbursed  in two tranches, the disburse-
ment of each tranche being 'subject to a number of specific conditions. In particular, in  view 
of significant delays in  implementing the 1991  G-24 assistance package (often due to inef-
ficiencies on the Bulgarian side) and the uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations 
on the restructuring of the country's foreign debt, two specific conditions were attached to 
the  release of the first  tranche of the  loan:  (i)  the  Bulgarian  authorities  had  taken  the 
necessary steps to allow the release of the amounts committed by the non-Community G-24 
members in the context of the 1991  support package, and (ii) an agreement in principle had 
been concluded between Bulgaria and its commercial bank creditors on a set of guidelines 
regarding a future  debt restructuring  deaL  The second tranche was to be disbursed when 
decisive progress had been made towards a comprehensive medium-term commercial debt 
restructuring,  and subject to a positive assessment by the Commission of progress in  the 
field of economic stabilization and  rcimm, on the basis of precise criteria that were to be 
specified in a Memorandum of Understanding. 
/' 
By the end of 1992, Bulgaria had completed the negotiations on the assistance with most 
members of the G-24 that had made commitments in  1992;  it had  also reached an under- -
standing with the  commercial  creditors  on the parameters  of a  future  debt restructuring 
package.  The implementation of the Community assistance was,  however, delayed as  the 
1992 stand-by arrangement with the IMF went off track and the authorities started negotiat-
ing  a  new financing  programme  with  the  Fund.  For the same reason,  no  other  G-24 
assistance_has been disbursed so far under the 1992-93 complementary package. 
The situation did not change during most of 1993  as  the discussions on a new IMF  -sup-
ported programme could not be concluded. However, at the very end of 1993, two impor-
tant  developments  took  place  that  basically  restored  conditions  for  the  resumption  of 
Community and  G-24  assistance  to  Bulgaria.  An  agreement on  the  restructuring of the 
commercial debt was reached that regularizes Bulgaria's position  as  a debtor and  clarifies 
its  medium-term financing  needs;  and  a  new stand-by  arrangement with  the  Fund was 
agreed in principle.  · - 40-
V.  ROMANIA 
l.  Introduction 
In  July  1991,  the  Council  of Ministers  decided  to  grant  Romania  a  first  medium-term 
financial assistance of ECU 370 million in the context of an  initiative by the G-24 aimed at 
providing a total of US$ 1 billion in  assistance. This  initiative supported a comprehensive 
reform programme aimed at stabilizing the economic situation and initiating the process of 
transformation from a highly centralized pranned system to  a market-oriented economy in 
the aftermath of the long  period of political turmoil that had  followed the collapse of the 
Ceauscescu regime.  The financial  assistance from  the EC/G-24 was  complementary to  an 
IMF stand-by arrangement.  ·  · 
'As reported in the previous report, despite prpgress in  liberalizing the economy, the main 
-· stabilization objectives of the authorities' macro~conomic adjustment programme for 1991 
could  not  be  achieved.  Output  declined  substantially  (by  some  13  percent)  Inflation 
accelerated  late  in  the  year  and  reached  some  20  percent  per  month  in  January  1992, 
reflecting  both  the sharp  depreciation  following  the unification of the  exchange  rate  in 
November and  the accommodating credit policy resulting from  the rapid build-up of inter-
enterprise  payments  arrears.  External  reserves  were  depleted.  The  shortfall  in  non-
Community pledges and the resulting delays in the disbursement of external assistance was 
in  part responsible for these slippages,  especially with  regard  to  the international  reserve 
objective.  · 
Drawing on the experience of 1991, the Romanian authorities designed a new programme 
for 1992, that aimed to re-establish macroeconomic stability while developing the reform 
process. With regard to stabilization policy objectives, the authorities intended to slow the 
decline in real economic activity (to 5 percent), to lower the rate of inflation sharply (to 1.5 
percent per month by  year end);  and to  increase international  reserves (to  1. 7 months of 
imports by year end). To achieve these objectives, the authorities intended to  pursue strict 
fiscal and monetary policies, a tight incomes policy and a flexible exchange rate.  Structural 
reform measures included further price liberalization, privatization and financial discipline 
through restructuring state ;r:tterprises 
To support the Romanian economic programme,  on 27  November  1992,  the  Council of 
Ministers decided to grant to Romania a further medium-term loan in  the amount of ECU 
80 million to assist the country in its economic reform process and to  strengthen the reserve 
position  of the  central  bank3  The  assistance  was  made  available  in  the  context  of an 
initiative by the Group of Twenty-Four aimed at  providing a total  of US$  180 million in 
assistance  complementary  to  that  provided _by  ~he IMF  under  a  stand-by  arrangement 
approved if! late May 1992. 
The Community loan was disbursed in one tranche in  February  1993, following a positive 
assessment of progress in the field of economic stabilization and reform. 
2.  · Macro-economic performance in 1992 
The  government  maintained  prudent  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  exercised  wage 
restraint during most of 1992. Measures in all  !Cey areas showed the strong commitment of 
the  government  to  the  stabilization  programme  :  the  phased  elimination  of consumer 
subsidies began with an initial 25 percent reduction in May and continued with a further 25 
percent reduction in  September; the refinancing rate of the National Bank of Romania was 
increased to 80 percent in May in  an  effort to ensure that interest rate is  positive in real 
terms; and the exchange rate liberalization started on June 2,  following the elimination of 
the 1  00 percent surrender requirement a month earlier. 
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In  the fiscal  area,  in  response to  the significant erosion of the  tax  base  during the  year, 
nominal tax rates were raised  and  expenditures in  the state budget and  major social funds 
were restricted.  Thus the consolidated deficit of these entities amounted to  only  1 percent 
of GDP, well within the programme target 
Macroeconomic developments in  1992,  however,  indicate that the result of the economic 
programme of the Government was mixed.  The authorities had  some success  in  bringimr 
down  inflation,  but  economic  activity  continued  to  be  weak.  Inflation  came  dow~ 
dramatically  to  about 3  percent a month  in  July  and  August  1992,  but  following  a  new 
round of adjustments in  the prices of subsidized consumer goods in  September, it  hovered 
around  I 0 percent a month by the end of the year.  In  1992, aggregate output fell  by some 
15  percent The decline was especially marked in  the industrial sector, where output fell  by 
some 23  percent Unemployment increased from 3 percent to 9 percent of the labour force. 
Private sector activity, however, increased rapidly, reflecting in large part the privatization 
of agriculture,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  incipient  development of private  activity  in  the 
service sector. By the year-end, it already accounted for some 28 percent of recorded GDP. 
The  balance of payments  was  on  track  during  the  first  semester  of 1992.  In  the  third 
quarter;  the external current account improved significantly,  registering a  surplus of US$ 
100 million as  export performance remained strong while imports declined sharply. In the 
final  quarter of 1992,  however,  the current account  deficit  worsened sharply,  and  for the 
year as a whole, it amounted to some 8 percent of GDP. 
Official  balance of payments support from  the Community and  other G-24  countries was 
expected to reach US$ 917 million in  1992, including the carry-over of the disbursement of 
US$  737  million corresponding to  the  entire  balance of payments  assistance  relating  to 
1991.  Most of the  assistance  relating  to  the  1991  exercise was  disbursed  in  1992.  With 
regard  to  the  balance-of-payments  assistance  package  for.  1992,  corresponding  to  the 
identified financing gap of US$  180  million,  commitments only reached US$ Ill million 
(including  ECU  80  million  for  the  EC)  and  no  disbursement  was  made  in  1992. 
Consequently, the balance-of-payments target for the entire 1  Q92 was not reached. 
3.  Structural reform in 1991 
Significant progress was made  in  the implementation of the structural reform measures  : 
prices  were substantial)y  liberalized,  subsidies  reduced,  foreign  trade was  liberalized,  an 
agency  in  charge of the  privatization  process  was  established,  certificates  of ownership 
were  distributed,  state  enterprise  arrears  reduced  and  a  foreign  investment  legislation 
introduced. 
In certain areas of reform, however, some slippages wereTecorded. The exchange rate was 
pegged to ·the dollar in  the last quarter of 1992  at  an  unsustainable level  in  view of the 
prevailing inflation rate, resulting in the re-emergence of a parallel exchange market where 
the national  currency sold at  a discount of 20-25  percent.  Importers' requests for foreign 
exchange were not fully  met,  and following the elimination of surrender requirements for 
exporters  in  June  1992  exporters  built  up  their  deposits  in. foreign  currencies.  The 
privatization process recorded delays, affecting both the quick privatization programme for 
small subunits and the pilot privatization programme for large enterprises. Delays were also 
recorded in the passage of adequate legislation regarding bankruptcy. 
4.  Review of performance criteria attached to the EC financial assistance 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and Romania provided for 
an  evaluation  of  progress  made  with  respect  to  stabilization  policies  and  structural 
adjustment policies. The quantified performance criteria were identical to  those contained 
in the IMF stand-by arrangement approved in May 1992. The structural adjustment criteria 
were designed to evaluate progress made in the major fields of reform. 
The review of performance criteria was effected in  December 1992  At  that time, the IMF 
had  completed its  mid-term review.  All quantitative macro-economic performance criteria 
for  end-June and  end-September were observed  and  the disbursement by the  Th1F  of the - 42  -
first three tranches of the stand-by credit had  been  effected.  Net  credit to  the  government 
had declined in the first nine months of 1992, as  the fiscal  position had  moved  into surplus 
in the third quarter. Net domestic assets  had remained well  below the  programme ceiling. 
International reserves through September had increased in line with the programme through 
?eptember despite delays  in  disbursements  form  official  sources,  owing to  a  significant 
Improvement in the current account.  _ 
The structural  performance criteria included ·in  the Memorandum  of Understanding were 
reviewed  by  the Commission staff in  cooperation  with  the  authorities.  The  findings  on 
these  criteria,  which  are  summarized  below,  suggested  that  these  conditions  were  also 
broadly met.  Based on  this  assessment,  the Community loan  was  disbursed  in  February 
1993. 
4.1.  Prices and subsidies 
On May 1 and September I,  1992, the government had  increased the price of the consumer 
products still  subject to  control,  cutting  by  50  percent  the  subsidies  on  these  items.  The 
government intended  to  eliminate the  remaining subsidies  in  the  first  semester of 1993. 
With regard to  energy prices, the  government  had  maintained  parity  with  world  market 
prices for crude oil, electricity, coal and lignite, and it had increased the price of natural gas 
by 1  0 percent per quarter in real terms. 
4.2.  Foreign trade 
All  export  quotas  as  well  as  licensing  requirements  for  imports  and  exports  had  been 
eliminated, except for goods still subject to  price control  and  subsidies, and  few strategic 
items. 
4.3.  Privatization 
The Private Ownership Funds and  the  State Ownership Funds  had  been established,  and 
were developing  their  internal  organization.  The National  Agency  for  Privatization  had 
distributed  Certificates of Ownership  representing  28  percent  of the  bank  value of the 
commercial companies (cofl'esponding to 92 percent of the Certificates to be distributed). 
Out of 3000 units  selected  for early  small  privatizations,  l ,214  had  been  sold  by  mid-
November, whereas the structural adjustment criteria called for the completion of the bulk 
of these privatizations by year end.  In  this area,  where some delays had  been experienced, 
the government committed itself to expediate the privatiza_tion process. 
With regard to the thirty companies selected for early pilot privatization, 8 were privatized 
and  18  other  prepared  for  privatization,  of  which  6  were  in  advanced  phases  of 
negotiations. 
4.4.  Enter:prise fmancial discipline 
With regard  to enterprise financial  discipline,  a  new law to  enforce enterprises financial 
discipline (Law 76) was enacted on  July  16,  1992, followed  by  Government Decision n° 
70111992 on the same purpose. The law established procedures by which creditors can sue 
debtors for overdue payments, and the actions they can take, like seizure of monetary and 
real assets, forced restructUring and  liquidation,  against defaulting enterprises. As  a result 
of these  measures,  the state enterprises  arrears  declined  form  25% of state  enterprises 
turnover in June to  15% in October. Furthermore, to reduce tax arrears, the government has 
raised the penalty rate on overdue tax payments to above the level of market interest rate. 
4.5.  Investment 
With  regard  to  investment, the Law providing for free  repatriation of profits  for  foreign 
investors had been passed. - 43  -
5.  Developments in 1993 and prospects 
Macroeconomic  developments  in  1993  indicate  that  progress  towards  stabilization 
continued to be elusive.  Inflation continued unabated with  prices  rising by approximately 
300 percent over the year.  The official exchange rate depreciated sharply in nominal terms 
(from  lei  430 per dollar in  December  1992 to  lei  1280  per dollar by  end-1993);  and  the 
spread between the official rate and that of the parallel market remained substantial (in the 
order of 50  percent  by  year-end),  while  official  reserves  were  depleted.  However,  the 
decline in economic activity seems to have bottomed out in  1993. 
The authorities brought to its fmal stage the process of price liberalization and elimination 
of consumer subsidies.  They eliminated some consumer  price  controls  and  substantially 
adjusted  the  remaini1g  ones  on  May  1,  1993,  while  eliminating  the  corresponding 
subsidies.  Moreover, controls on allowable commissions and  markups were eliminated on 
July  1,  1993.  Also,  VAT was introduced on May  1,  with  a single rate of 18  percent, to 
replace the turnover tax. 
Despite those important and difficult measures, other actions in key areas that are necessary 
to overcome the experienced persistent difficulties in  stabilizing the economy, had not yet 
been  taken  by December 1993.  In  particul~r, the  pace  of reform  in  state enterprises  has 
remained inadequate, allowing to undermine macroeconomic policies and the credibility of 
the  government's  stabilization  efforts.  Also,  the  exchange  rate  regime  needs  to  be 
liberalized, not to discourage much needed export-oriented investment. 
Owing to  these policy  shortcomings,  Romania was  not  in  a  position  to  make  the  final 
purchase under the IMF stand-by arrangement before it expired in end-March 1993, and the 
negotiations  on  a  new  stand-by  arrrangement  with  the  IMF  that  started  early  in  1993 
dragged  on  during  most of 1993.  The  G-24,  at  the  Country  Coordinating  Meeting for 
Romania held in May 1993,  impressed on the Romanian authorities the need to  implement 
forcefully  stabilization  and  reform  measures;  the  G-24  recognized  that  this  will  be  a 
particularly difficult task and that further assistance from  the.)nternational community will 
be critical in the successful implementation of the measures. They however cautioned that 
new complementary macro-financial assistance by the G-24 will be considered in  light of 
the commitment to reform by the Romanian government and in view of the outcome of the 
consultations underway between Romania and the Bretton Woods institutions. 
,~  . 
In December 1993, the authorities finally reached a new  agreement in  principle with the 
IMF, that should be, in principle, a major step towards stabilization and structural reform of 
Romania's economy. In this context, they requested further complementary financing from 
the EC/G-24 that will have to be considered in the beginning of 1994. - 44 -
Vl.  ALBANIA 
1.  Introduction 
In  mid-1992,  against  a  background  of  severe  economic,  social  and  administrative 
dislocation, and facing fiscal and external imbalances much larger than in other countries in 
the  region,  the  government  of Albania,  backed  by  the  strong  political  mandate  in  the 
elections in March, committed itself to the daunting task of implementing a comprehensive 
economic reform:  The immediate priority of the Albanian authorities was  to  stabilize the 
economy and to initiate profound structural changes towards an open market economy. 
The government's programme was supported by the international financial  institutions and 
the G-24.  A  twelve-month stand-by arrangement with the  I1vfF  covered  the  period  mid-
1992  to  mid-I 993.  In  view  of the  need  to  restore  official  reserves  and  of the  large 
commercial arrears that impeded access to  private creditors, the programme was critically 
dependent on complementary external support from  the G-24.  At  the High-Level meeting 
held  in  Tirana in  July  1992,  the G-24  responded  positively  to  the  Albanian  request  for 
complementary macro-financial  assistance  in  the  form  of grants  or highly  concessional 
loans to fill the residual balance-of-payments gap of US$ 165  million. In the context of the 
G-24 initiative, the Community decided, on 28 September 1992,  to  grant Albania financial 
assistance of a maximum amount of ECU 70 million in  the form of a grant, to be disbursed 
in  two installments (Council Decision 92/482/EEC).  Overall, the assistance committed by 
the G-24 under the 1992-93 programme has amounted to  some 70  percent of the original 
gap,  despite  the  fact  that  the  assistance  initially  committed  by  some  countries  was 
eventually disbursed in  the form of tied aid (which does not fall  within the  G-24 macro-
financial assistance scheme). 
The Community grant was disbursed in two tranches. A first trance of ECU 3 5 million was 
disbursed  in  December  1992;  and,  following  a  positive  assessment  of the  economic 
situation  and progress in  the reform process in Albania,  and  a favourable opinion of the 
· Monetary Committee, the disbursement of the second tranche was effected in August 1993. 
Macro-financial  assistance  from  the  Community  and  other  G-24  countries  has  been 
instrumental in permitting tbe government of Albania to implement its ambitious economic 
programme. The foreign financial  assistance was used  primarily to strengthen the reserve 
position  of the  country,  and  allowed  the  authorities  to  rapidly  liberalize  the  exchange 
market  and  to  introduce  a  freely  determined  exchange  rate  within  a  unified  exchange 
market. 
The first stage of economic stabilization and reform having been successfully achieved, the 
Albanian authorities have now shifted from  a  mainly short-term  horizon,  dictated  by  the 
crisis prevailing at the beginning of 1992, toward a consistent medium-term approach.  To 
that effect, they  have  adopted  a  comprehensive medium-term  economic  programme  for 
1993-96. This programme was presented to the G-24 High-Level meeting held in  Brussels 
in November 1993. At that meeting, the G-24 recognized that Albania continues to face a 
very difficult external financial situation and that it  will continue to  need macro-financial 
assistance from the G-24, in  the order of US$ 72 million, for the period mid-1993 - mid-
94, complementary to the ESAF arrangement agreed with the I1vfF in July. In that context, 
the Commission will, in due course, propose further financial assistance to Albania. 
2.  Macro-economic performance in 1992-1993 
In view of the great difficulties and risks under which Albania embarked in  its programme 
in mid 1992, achievements on the macroeconomic front have been considerable.  The slide 
into  hyperinflation  has  been  reversed,  and  the  downward  spiral  of output  has  been 
corrected. By 1993, government.domestic financing requirement dropped (to  11  percent of 
GDP from 41  percent of GDP in the first half of 1992), while credit expansion was reduced 
sharply,  well  within the  credit ceilings,  and  redirected  in  favour of the  incipient  private. 
sector. Credit to  non-performing public enterprises and  state farms  has  been  substantially 
curtailed since the beginning of 1993. In sharp contrast to the situation prevailing up to  the - 45  -
end of 1992, state enterprise financial  discipline has  been enforced  in  1993, and the sharp 
rise in  inter-enterprise arrears which threatened the stabilization effort has been arrested  as 
the system of receivable orders has been abolished and the banks have been instructed 'not 
to  accept  any  payment  order  not  backed  by  sufficient  funds.  As  a  result  of the  tight 
budgetary and  monetary policies,  inflation was curbed (to  a monthly rate of 2 percentin 
1993).  Reflecting  the  strong  domestic  effort  as  well  as  large  external  support,  foreign 
reserves were built up  as  planned  (amounting to  some $  80  million  equivalent to  1  1/2 
months  of imports  at  end-!une  1993,  and  US$  146  million  by  the  year  end)  and  the 
(floating) exchange rate remained fundamentally stable, hovering around  leks  95-105  per 
US dollar. The fall in production has bottomed out since the end of 1992 (GDP is estimated 
to  have grown by  11  percent in  1993),  albeit from .a very  low base,  thanks  to  the good 
performance of the private sector (in agriculture, services and construction), whereas state-
sector industrial output has continued to drop in  1993  owing to the imposition of financial 
discipline. 
The stabilization gains of recent ~onths remain, however, fragile and tentative and Albania 
will have to continue to  rely heavily on  foreign assistance in  the short run.  Exports ($  70 
million in  1992; $ 105 million in  1993) cover only a fraction of import needs ($524 million 
in  1992;  $  58.5  million  in  1993 ).  Furthermore,  the  external  outlook  remains  clouded  by 
Albania's large external debt,  mainly with commercial banks  ($  834  million at  end  1993, 
including accumulated arrears of$ 621  million), and Albania's very limited capacity to pay. 
Whether  Albania  is  able  to  attain  external  viability  in  the  medium  term  will  depend 
critically  on  an  early  normalization of relations with  commercial  banks as  well  as  with 
bilateral official creditors. 
3.  Structural reform 
While making significant gains in  macro-economic stabilization, Albania initiated in  mid-
1992 profound structural  changes towards a market economy.  Critical  measures under its 
programme  for  1992-93  included  major  reforms  of the  price  and  exchange  regimes, 
liberalization of trade  and  foreign  investment,  and  the  start of other  structural  changes 
focusing  on  agriculture,  state  enterprises  and  the  fmancial  sector.  During this  period, 
progress  was  made  in  imposing  financial  discipline  on  state-owned  enterprises  and 
privatizing  agriculture ''and  small  scale  services  and  industry.  However,  reforms  have 
proceeded  at  a  slower  pace  in  the  fields  of privatization  of medium  and  large  sized 
industrial  enterprises  and  foreign  direct  investment.  A  new  momentum  of structural . 
reforms has been built up  in  the wake of the preparation of the comprehensive medium-
term economic programme for  1993-96 formulated in the Policy Framework Paper. 
Price reform has advanced rapidly during the past year and the budgetary cost of subsidies 
has  therefore been  contained.  All  wholesale  and  retail  prices  have  been freed,  with  the 
exception ·of wheat,  bread,  sugar  beet  and  a  number of non-food  items  produced under 
monopolistic  conditions  (energy,  rents,  medicines,  telecommunications,  urban  transport 
etc).  A  new  series  of price  rises  was  implemented  in  mid-1993,  which  included  the 
doubling of the prices of wheat, flour and bread, a sensitive issue due to the importance of 
bread in the local diet and the dependence of the country on wheat imports. This constitutes 
a  major  additional  step  towards  completing  price  reform  in  Albania,  and  should  help 
stimulate  the  recovery  of domestic  wheat  production,  as  well  as  promote  the  import, 
distribution and processing of wheat by the private sector. In an effort to cushion the social 
impact of this measure the government has designed a large compensation scheme, in  the 
understanding that it will be phased out in the course of 1994. Other price rises initiated in 
mid-1993 include the twofold to threefold increase of public housing rents and household 
energy. 
Foreign trade has  been  liberalized,  with  export licensing only  applying  to  products still 
subject to  price controls and  to  a limited  list of strategic products,  or in  order to  prevent 
diversion  of food  assistance.  The  exchange  rate  is  determined  freely  within  a  unified 
exchange market, the efficiency and depth of which has been improved by the licensing of 
foreign exchange dealers and exchange bureaus. - 46-
In agriculture, a key sector of the economy which accounts for half of the value added and 
employs around 60 per cent of the population, the upheaval associated with the dissolution 
of the former cooperative farms resulted in  at least a 35% drop in  output during the  1990-
91  season.  Albania, formerly  a net exporter of fo.od  became a recipient of food  aid.  The 
international  community, with the EC  as  the  principal  donor,  furnished  400,000  tons  of 
food  aid  in  1991-92 and  450,000 tons  in  1992-93.  The privatization of agricultural  land 
resulted in  a 18% rise of output in  1992  and  a further substantial  increase in  I 993  (T 4%). 
Yet, despite the rapid growth of output, further shipments of food  aid  to  Albania might be 
necessary, albeit in reduced quantities.  . 
About 80% of the  land  area has  been  privatized  to  date.  Nearly  all  former  co-operative 
farms,  constituting about 75% of arable land, have been successfully privatized.  This has 
resulted  in  the  creation  of over  315,000  private  farms  State  farms,  which  occupy  the 
remaining 25% of the land and are mostly situated in  the fertile lands of the coastal plains, 
'are being privatized through leasing arrangement~, or through the distribution of  ownership 
rights  to  workers.  The  distribution  of titles  should  be  completed  by  the  end  of 1994. 
However, this strategy has led to the division of arable land into small, uneconomic plots, 
averaging 1 1/2 ha,  and the majority of farmers operate on a subsistence basis. In an  effort 
to facilitate the consolidation of the small holdings, the government is pushing for the rapid 
conclusion  of the  distribution  of  private  ownership  titles.  The  government  plans  to 
complete the  legal  framework  concerning agricultural  property, with  rights  to  sell,  lease 
and mortgage the land, thus leading to the creation of a land market. 
The reform of the public enterprise sector poses one of the greatest challenges to  Albania's 
economic programme.  Clearly,  large sections of industry  are  no  longer viable and  most 
enterprises will  find  it difficult to  operate now that  budgetary support has  been  depleted 
and  they are forced  to operate on  commercial terms,  as  the  capital  stock  is  obsolete,  the 
domestic market  is  small  and  impoverished  and  there  is  no  tradition  and  experience of 
export-orient~d production  and  marketing.  Furthermore,  the  administrative  capacity  to 
carry out a large scale restructuring is limited. 
At first,  in  1992,  reform was  mostly  confined to  the privatization through  direct sales to 
employees of the small units operating i~ the handicraft, transport and services sectors. The 
authorities  had  difficultie~  to  maintain  financial  discipline  on  the  remaining  public 
enterprise sectors.  The sharp increase of inter-enterprise arrears  in  1992 undermined the 
survival  of enterprises  and  posed  a  major threat  to  the  stabilization  policy.  Since the 
beginning of 1993,  however,  the  government  has  stopped  the  flow  of new  arrears  by 
issuing appropriate instructions involving both enterprises and banks. 
Privatization in  the enterprise sector also has  been delayed by the difficulty to establish a 
restitution  policy.  The  passage of a  law  on  the  restitution  or  compensation  for urban 
properties _to  previous owners on  15  April  1993, and  a law for the compensation to former 
owners of agricultural land on 22 April  1993, followed by the administrative arrangements 
to  implement these laws  (including the setting of firm  deadlines  for the presentation of 
claims),  have  paved  the way for the rapid  implementation of a  privatization  strategy,  to 
cbmplement those operated in  1992. 
The  government  is  currently  developing  a  multi-track  approach  that  involves  rapid 
privatization  of small- and  medium-sized  industrial  enterprises  as  well  as  longer-term 
procedures for large, more problematic enterprises. 
The  government  is  proceeding  with  the  estimated  1200-1500  small  and  medium-size 
enterprises (up to 300 employees) quickly, without allowing fiscal  revenue considerations 
to  slow the process significantly.  To  that effect,  the  Council  of Ministers  has  issued  a 
decree on  1 June, that provided for the privatization of those enterprises through auction. 
These auctions will be effected with a decentralized procedure at the level of the district by 
local  councils.  Some  300  enterprises  have  already  been  identified  for  this  immediate 
privatization. 
With regard to the 300 larger enterprises, the government is finalizing a strategy inVolving 
rapid  privatization or liquidation for  most enterprises.  A small  group of "strategic"  firms 
will be sold by tender. Budgetary support will be minimized, focussing mainly on about 30 - 47 -
"problem" enterprises  To deal with those, the government has established, with the support 
of the World Bank, an  Enterprise Restructuring Agency (ERA) placed under the authority 
of the  Council  of Ministers.  The  ERA  is  to  formulate  targets  regarding  privatization, 
liquidation  or  restructuring  for  all  enterprises  under  its  control  in  order  to  bring  these 
enterprises  into  operating  balance  within  1-2  years.  A  fixed  budgetary  envelope  is 
available to finance these reforms. 
Control over the remaining state-owned enterprises will be established through the creation 
of a financial monitoring system and the appointment of outside directors.  A tight budget 
constraint  will  be  maintained  for  all  enterprises,  with  bank  credit  available  only  on 
commercial terms and safeguards against the accumulation of arrears. 
With regard to  the  financial  sector,  a two-tier banking system  was  created  in  Albania in 
early  1992,  when  the  central  and  commercial  banking  activitif.s  were  separated  and 
respectively transferred to the new Bank of Albania and  to  four state-owned commercial 
bariks.  The  resulting  commercial  banking  sector  is  characterized  by  a  high  degree  of 
monopolistic segmentation and  is  burdened by the existence of a  large portfolio of non-
performing loans. 
The government is  in  the process of dealing with the problem of non-performing loans by 
replacing net enterprise debts to banks by  government bonds.  Further restructuring of the 
banking system is envisaged. 
The legal framework of a market economy is  currently. being put into place. The Parliament 
has approved a Company Law, a Banking Law, a Central Banking Law, a Bankruptcy Law, 
an Accounting Law, as well as  labour legislation. The first part of the revised Commercial 
Code  has  been  adopted  while  a  new  Anti-Trust  law  and  a  Civil  Code still  have to  be 
completed. 
In view of the very weak enterprise sector and  the extremely limited outside contacts that 
Albania had before 1991,  it  has  a particular need for foreign  investment.  Yet the existing 
legislation  did  not  provide  sufficient  guarantees  to  ensure  foreign  participation  in  the 
privatization process while the  law  on .land  ownership  does  not  allow foreigners  to  own 
land in Albania (though they may lease it for 99 years). Amendments to the  1992 Foreign 
Investment  Law,  which  will  eliminate  separate  authorization  requirements  for  foreign 
investment  and  will  allow foreigners  to  participate  in  privatization  of state  assets,  were 
passed in  late 1993.  · 
4.  Review of performance criteria attached to the EC financial assistance 
The memorandum of Understanding between the  Commission and  Albania, signed on  10 
December-1992, provided for an  evaluation of progress made with  respect to stabilization 
and  structural  adjustment policies.  The quantified  performance criteria were identical  to 
those contained in  the IMF stand-by  arrangement and  included the following  elements  : 
quarterly  limits on  overall  credit and on credit to  the government,  quarterly  minima for 
international  reserves,  and  limits on external  payments arrears  and on the contracting of 
new external debt by the public sector: 
The structural adjustment criteria were designed to evaluate progress made in the field of 
price, trade and exchange liberalization, the establishment of a legal framework for private 
activity and the privatization of enterprises. The successful review of progress in economic 
stabilization  and  reform,  including  the  compliance  with  performance  criteria,  was  a 
condition for the release of the second tranche of the grant. 
The  review  of  IMF  conditionality,  completed  in  March  1993,  concluded  that  the 
quantitative performance criteria were met and the reform programme remained on track, 
so  that  no  adjustments  to  the  programme were  required.  In  the  face  of the  shortfall  in 
external  assistance,  it  means  that  domestic  policy  restraint  by  Albania  was  stricter than 
envisaged  in  the  programme  to  preserve  the  targeted  external  position.  The  structural 
performance criteria were also  largely  met.  Price reform  advance~ rapidly . Foreign trade 
was liberalized and the exchange rate has been determined freely w1thm  a umfied exchange - 48-
market.  Major elements of the  legal  framework  of a market economy  have  been  put  in 
place. Privatization of agriculture and of small enterprises in  the services sector progressed 
rapidly. 
With all  criteria attached to the  Community loan  broadly  met,  the second tranche of the 
Community grant was disbursed in August 1993. 
5.  Assessment and  prospects 
The Government of Albania now aims to sustain the momentum of stabilization  process, 
promote growth and  progress toward external  viability.  To that  end,  it  has formulated  a 
comprehensive  medium-term  economic  strategy  for  1993-96  and  designed  a  detailed 
programme for the first year under this framework (mid-1993 to mid-1994  ). 
The principal macro-economic objectives of the programme for 1993/94 are : a real growth 
.of3-4 percent; a reduction ofthe 12-month rate of inflation to 33  percent by mid-1994; and 
a further strengthening of the external position, including a build-up of official reserves to 
3 months of imports by mid-1994.  The adjustment strategy will  remain centered on tight 
demand  policies,  supported  by  adequate  extefi1al  support  and  an  early  solution  of the 
arrears problem. 
In order to reduce macro-economic imbalances, fiscal adjustment remains a central element 
of the  programme,  together  with  the  continuation  of tight  monetary  and  state-sector 
incomes policies. In  view of the expected decline of food aid counterpart revenues and the 
need  to  attend  to  a  number  of critical  expenditure  needs  (including  investment  and 
structural reforms) that can no longer be deferred, the commitment to reduce the domestic 
financing of the budget to 7 percent of GDP will constitute a major challenge. In support of 
the  Albanian  programme,  the  IMF  approved  in  July  1993  an  arrangement  under  the 
Enhanced  Structural  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF),  and  the  authorities  have  requested 
complementary  assistance  from  the  EC/G-24  of $  72  million  for  the  first  year  of the 
programme. 
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VII. THE BALTIC STATES 
1.  Introduction 
Following the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in  1940, their economies 
underwent  a  rapid  industrialization  as  a  result  of massive  capital  formation  and  labour 
movements (both from agriculture into industry and from  other parts of the Soviet Union 
into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). They nevertheless kept a strong competitive position in 
agricultural production and provided other (former) Soviet republics with meat,  dairy and 
fish produc;ts, which bad been formerly exported to the West.  Given their higher economic 
efficiency  stemming  from  a  skilled  work  force  and  a  comparatively  well-developea 
infrastructure, the countries' per capita income was significantly above the Union average. 
However,  it  was  increasingly  felt  that  the  Soviet  central  planning  system  restricted  the 
· potential of the economies.  In November 1989, Estonia Latvia and Lithuania succeeded in 
obtaining the adoption of the Law on Economic Independence by the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR,  which opened the way for the initiation of economic reforms  in  a number of 
areas,  including price and  wage determination, fiscal  policy,  and financial  sector policies. 
By the  time  the  Baltic  States  formaJly  regained  their  independence  from  the  (former) 
Soviet  Union,  in  August  1991,  they  had  already  made  the  first  steps  to  reform  their 
economies  and  disentangle  them  from  the  highly  integrated  Soviet  economic  structure, 
which  had  provided  over  90%  of their  imports,  through  their  re-orientation  towards 
Western  markets.  When  in  1992  the  three  countries  had  to  pay  imports  from  Russia at 
world  market  prices,  compared  to  the  earlier  heavily  subsidized  rates,  they  suffered  a 
severe terms of trade shock. 
Mter the Baltic States had become members of the International Monetary Fund (I:MF)  in 
Spring  1991,  they  finalized,  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Th1F  their  stabilization  and 
reform programmes, covering the period from  mid-1992 to  ~id-1993.  In support of these 
programmes,  the  authorities  of the  three  countries  requested  complementary  macro-
financial assistance from the EC/G-24 to- cover the residual financial gaps estimated at US$ 
105  million for Estonia, US$ 210 million for Latvia and  US$  285  million for Lithuania. 
Following  positive  indications  made  by  a  number  of  G-24  countries  towards  the 
participation  in  the  support  scheme,  the  IMF  Board  approved  the  Latvian  stand-by 
arrangement on 14  September 1992, the Estonian arrangement on  16 September 1992 and 
the Lithuanian arrangement on 21  October 1992. 
In November 1992, the EC Council decided (Council Decision 92/542/EC of 23 .11.1992) 
to provide the Baltic States with a loan of up to 220 mecu (40 mecu for Estonia, 80 mecu 
for Latvia and 100 mecu for Lithuania), which corresponded to roughly half of the balance 
of payments  gaps  estimated  by  the  Th1F,  in  order  to  address  the  general  balance  of 
payments  needs  of these  countries;  this  contribution  was  nearly  matched  by financial 
assistance from the EFT  A countries and Japan.  The EC loan agreements and  memoranda 
of understanding  were  signed  with  Estonia  and  Latvia  on  8  January  1993  and  with 
Lithuania on  1 March 1993.  The Commission disbursed the first tranches of the loans to 
Estonia and Latvia on 31  March 1993 and to Lithuania on 27 July 1993.  The release of the 
second  tranches was made conditional on a successful review of progress  in  the area of 
economic stabilization and  reform, including the observance of a number of performance 
criteria agreed by the respective parties.  Following a positive review and the conclusion of 
a  supt::lementary  agreement  regarding  the  absorption  of the  assistance  in  October,  the 
Commission  is  expected  to  disburse  the  second  tranche  to  Estonia  in  Spring  I 994. 
Following similar reviews and subject to analogous agreements, the disbursements of the 
remaining tranches for Latvia and Lithuania are expected for the same period. - 50 -
2.  Estonia 
2.1.  Economic reforms from mid-1992 to mid-1"993 
2.1.1.  Background 
In the course of 1990 and  1991, the prices of a number of goods were either liberalized or 
administratively  raised  and  subsidies  on  energy,  telecommunications  and  transport  were 
reduced.  After the adoption of the Law on  Enterprises in  1989,  the number of Estonian 
companies with less than  100 employees increased  from  34  to  over 20,000 at  the end of 
1991. Following the passage of the Law on Privatization of State-Owned Trade and Service 
Facilities in 1991, the privatization of smaller enterprises progressed substantially  Reform 
of large-scale  enterprises  had  a  slow  start.  Following  initial  financial  sector  reforms 
undertaken  by  the· Soviet  authorities  in  1988  with  the  objective  to  establish  a  two~tier 
banking system, the nationalization of the Estonian financial  system  began.  In  1990,  the 
Estonian authorities recreated the Bank of Estonia, but it was not until  I January  1992 that 
the regional branch of the Gosbank could be liquidated and  incorporated into the Bank of 
Estonia. By early 1992, there were 40 licensed commercial banks, in addition to four state-
owned banks.  After Estonia gained  independence from  the (former) Soviet  Union,  trade 
with this area, and in particular with Russia; collapsed  In  order to  stem this  development, 
Estonia concluded a number of bilateral agreements with former Soviet republics hoping to 
secure the resumption of  imports, in particular of energy from Russia  This was only partly 
successful.  Trade with Western countries grew rapidly,  albeit from  a low level This was 
made  possible  by  Estonia's  fairly  liberal  trade  regime  Since early  1991,  the  Estonian 
Government has adjusted the budget process  and  the'tax system  to  the needs of a market 
economy. 
Following a deterioration of the Estonian economy in  the  1980s  in  line with the gradual 
breakdown of the Soviet planning system, output dropped sharply in  1991  (-II%, after -4% 
in 1  990) due to trade disruption with other Soviet republics  Unemployment remained very 
low during this time (less than  1  %).  Given the liquidity overhang, price liberalization led 
to high inflation. 
2.1.2.  Objectives and features of the Government's reform programme starting mid-1992 
The two main objectives of the Government's economic programme for mid-1992 to mid-
1993 were macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform.  With regard to stabilization, 
the main  features  were the  completion  of price  liberalization,  restrictive  fiscal  policies, 
monetary  discipline under the  currency  board  system,  strict incomes  policy  and  further 
liberalization of the exchange and  trade system.  With respect to  structural  reform,  the 
programme  comprised  an  acceleration  of the  privatization  process,  completion  of the 
restitution  ·process,  financial  sector  reform,  improvement  of  the  social  safety  net, 
restructuring or closure of nonviable enterprises and banks and the establishment of a legal 
framework in support of a market economy.  The programme targeted a fall  in  output of 
15% for the programme period and a deceleration of the annual rate of inflation to 6% by 
the end of  the programme period. 
2. 1.3.  Price liberalization 
By mid-1992 most price controls  had been dismantled,  leaving only some prices under 
regulation  which  were charged  by  certain  state-owned  enterprises  considered  to  be of 
special importance; goods and services produced in the private sector were not subject to 
any  controls.  Further progress  was  made in  the second  half of 1992.  The  Government 
removed the authority of municipalities to regulate the prices of state enterprises operating 
in  their locality.  In  addition,  a  number of items  including bread,  flour,  grains  and sugar 
were removed from price control. Finally, the adjustment of energy prices to world market 
levels was continued with further increases in  the prices of natural gas and fuel  oil. By the 
end of 1992, the price liberalization process had been essentially completed. - 5 I -
2. I .4.  Enterprise reform 
Privatization of small  firms  has  continued  to  progress  By  mid-I 993,  the  share of small 
enterprises  privatized  had  exceeded  50%.  Privatization  of  medium- and  large  scale 
entreprises, however, has turned out to be more difficult than envisaged. Problems included 
disagreements  regarding the privatization  mechanisms  and  unresolved  restitution  issues 
(The Government is committed to restitute or compensate all owners of property in  Estonia 
prior to  1940, or their descendants)  One obstacle to  progress  in  privatization was finally 
removed when the Government set the final deadline of I April  I 993 for the receipts of any 
restitution  claims.  In  August  1992,  the  Government  passed  a  comprehensive  bill  that 
established mechanisms for the sale of enterprises worth more than EEK 600,000.  At the 
same  time,  the  Estonian  Privatization  Office  (EPO)  was  established  to  organize  the 
privatization process. From the initial list of 38  enterprises offered for sale in  late 1992, 25 
were privatized.  By mid-I 993,  another 52  enterprises  had  been offered for .privatization. 
The proceeds of the sales are allocated between a compensation fund for restitution claims, 
the  state  budget  and  the  Bank  of Estonia.  The  authorities  have  also  made  efforts  to 
improve the performance of those  enterprises remaining under state control.  Pressure to 
restructure  resulted  from  hard  budget  constraints  which  were  in  part  maintained  by _ 
applying the Bankruptcy, law passed in  September 1992.  · 
2.1.5.  Financial sector and currency reform 
The Bank of Estonia, which  had  been  reintroduced  in  1990,  is  responsible for  monetary 
policy, managing the payments system and for banking supervision. Until mid-1992, it  also 
undertook some commercial activities inherited from  the merger with the former branches 
of Gosbank and the Vnesheconombank. 
Since its independence from the (former) Soviet Union in  August 1991, Estonia was faced 
with  a  shortage of cash .roubles,  which  had  been  traditionally  supplied  by  Gosbank  in 
Moscow.  This  led  to  the  disruption  of certain  kinds  of payments  and  the  limitation  of 
access  to  bank deposits by the  public.  The  Estonian  authorities  implemented a  currency 
. reform on 20 ~·me 1992 which  put an  end  to Estonia's membership in  the rouble zone (it 
was the first republic to .leave it).  The reform included the reintroduction of the Estonian 
kroon (EEK) as  national currency under a currency board system providing I 00% reserve 
backing for all money isSued.  The exchange rate of the kroon was legally fixed at 8 EEK = 
I DM. The kroon was rapidly accepted as  the only legal tender and  international reserves . 
held at the Bank of Estonia increased following the reform. 
In the period immediately after the currency reform, strains in  the banking system became 
evident.  They were generally  characterized  by· delays  iri  clients'  access  to  deposits  with 
commercial banks, ranging from a few days to several weeks.  As these were symptoms of 
liquidity problems, in  particular with three  large banks,  it was  decided  in  early  1993  to 
recapitalize and merge two of them and take the merged bank under Government control, 
and to liquidate the third one.  This helped restore normalcy to the banking system. At the 
same time, the Bank raised the minimum capital requirement from EEK 500,000 to EEK 6 
million, which contributed to the decline of the number of commercial banks  licensed  in 
Estonia from 40 to 24 by mid-1993. 
2.1.6.  External sector policies 
By March 1992, Estonia bad abolished nearly all  import tariffs that bad existed under the 
Soviet system,  leaving Estonian trade entirely tariff free except for  a few  items  (import 
tariffs on alcohol, tobacco, furs,  automobiles; export tariffs on art works, rapeseed oil  and 
metals)  and  a  0.5% administrative fee on imports.  Since November  1992,  imports have 
been  also  subject  to  a  18%  VAT.  In  parallel  with  the  general  removal  of tariffs,  the 
remaining quotas and licensing requirements for imports had also been abolished to a large 
extent. On 1 January 1993, the list of  goods was further shortened (eliminating e.g. alcohol, 
tobacco, grain, hide, ferrous and non-ferrous  m~tals) so that it covered only oil  shale, clay 
and quartz.  In February  1993,  the Government took trade of non-ferrous metals  under its 
direct  control  (state  monopoly)  in  order  to  eliminate  illegal  re-exports.  As  a  whole, 
Estonia's trade and foreign investment regime can be considered as  liberal. -52-
Except for  the trade agreement concluded  with  Russia  in  February  1992,  which  foresaw 
trade  volumes  guaranteed  by both  Governments,  agreements  concluded  with  most  other 
former  Soviet  republics  between  December  1991  and  July  1992  foresaw  direct  trading 
between enterprises. In general, the agreements did not fulfil their objective in .overcoming 
the severe trade disruptions with former trading partners, in  particular Russia.  In  contrast, 
trade agreements with Finland, Sweden and Norway (free trade except for agriculture) and 
with the EC certainly contributed to a dynamic development of trade with this area. 
Since the· currency reform, the Bank of Estonia guarantees the convertibility of the kroon 
for  valid currency account transactions in  unlimited quantities  and  at  8 EEK  per  I  DM. 
Foreign currency accounts of resident individuals and enterprises with domestic banks were 
allowed  to  be  kept  after  the  currency  reform,  but  balances  could  not  be  increased.  In 
January  1993,  the Foreign Currency Law was approved  according to  which the Bank of 
;Estonia could issue licences to enterprises involved in exports or imports to keep a working 
capital in accounts opened abroad. As  a general rule there was a requirement to surrender 
100% of export proceeds to any commercial banks in  Estonia. Capital account transactions 
. must  receive  approval  of the  Bank  of Estonia.  However,  this  does  not  apply  to  the 
repatriation of  capital by foreign investors. 
2.2.  Macro-economic developments 
2.2.1.  Production and employment 
From mid-1992 to mid-1993, Estonia's GDP declined by an  estimated 18%. This reflects in 
particular the terms of trade shock suffered by Estonia following Russia's move to world 
market prices for energy products since early  1992  and  general  trade disruptions with the 
(former) Soviet Union.  In addition,  it signals the breakdown of the production of certain 
goods  that  are  no  longer  competitive  after  being  exposed  to  international  competition. 
Finally, agricultural production suffered from  the drought of Summer 1992. By mid-1993, 
the  economic  situation  had  broadly  stabilized,  and  there  were  first  indications  that 
industrial production was increasing. 
Compared  to  the sharp output  decline  experienced  in  Estonia  benveen  1990  and  I 992, 
unemployment remained,.low until  mid-1992.  However,  during  the  following  12-month 
period it rose to some 4% of the labour force.  In  addition, there is  increasing evidence of 
temporary lay-offs, unpaid leave and a reduction in working days. 
2.2.2.  Inflation and wage developments 
Tn  mid-1992, the year-on-year increase in consumer prices had  reached  1080%. This was 
above all the consequence of the liberalization of prices and the rise of import prices. These 
factors  continued to play  a  role until  the  end of 1992,  but  during the  first  half of 1993 
inflation  dropped  sharply  to  reach  2-3%  a  month  by  mid-1993.  Apart from  the virtual 
completion of price liberalization, this  successful move towards stabilization is  due to the 
tight monetary policy implied by the currency board system and  the firm  incomes policy 
implemented by the Government since September 1992.  Wage increases were broadly in 
line with price developments during the programme period,  following  a decline  of real 
wages by about 45% in the frrst half of 1992. 
2.2.3.  Public fmances 
Whereas Estonia was not permitted under the Soviet system to  borrow in order to finance 
deficits, such a rule did not apply after independence. Nevertheless, the Government tightly 
controlled expenditures and improved its revenues through a number of tax revisions after 
independence that the  general  budget was  in  sui-plus  in  I 991  and,  owing to  emergency 
measures, also in the first half of 1992.  This fiscal  stance was broadly maintained in  the 
course  of the  following · 12-month  period  with  the  support  of revenue  enhancing  tax 
measures accompanying the currency reform, the removal  of subsidies and  a reduction  in 
tax arrears linked to the implementation of the Bankruptcy Law. In the second half of 1992, 
the budget surplus stood at  1.5% of GDP and  in  the  first  half of 1993  at  1% of GDP. 
However,  if the  Government use of foreign  loans  in  the first  half of 1993  is  taken  into - 53  -
account, the Government general borrowing requirement stood at 2.2% of GDP during this 
period.  These loans  were used  to  finance  critical  imports  and  to  lend  funds  to  the  non-
Government sector in order to suppor investment in  energy and infrastructure. 
2.2.4.  Internal monetary conditions 
Before Estonia left the rouble zone in June 1992, its scope for independent monetary policy 
was  strictly  limited.  Because of the  adoption  of the  currency  board  system,  this  is  still 
broadly the case after the monetary reform, but now Estonia is  effectively insulated from 
the  effects of Russian  monetary policy.  The  link  to  the D-Mark and  the  currency board 
system have strengthened the confidence in the kroon. 
Credit  policy,  which  had  already  been  tight  in  the  first  half of 1992,  tightened  furthe~ 
following  the  monetary  reform.  Despite  an  inflow  of  foreign  exchange,  the  banks 
increasingly refrained from  extending credits as  they became aware of the risks  involved 
when the authorities lowered or stopped altogether the subsidization of ailing enterprises 
and  given that real  estate or other assets  could not be legally accepted  as  collateral. As  a 
consequence, loans were extended  almost exclusively on  a short-term basis,  generally for 
trade deals. 
The real  money stock continued to fall  in the second half of 1992, and it was not until the 
second quarter of 1  993  that broad money rebounded both in nominal and, to  a lesser extent, 
in real terms. The composition of broad money changed dramatically after mid-1992, as  the 
awareness about the risk of banks increased· with the development of the banking crisis.  As 
a consequence, the share of currency holdings  rose from  7.4% in  mid-1992 io  26.5% by 
year-end. 
Interest rates, which were in  the rage of 80-100% for loans (20-40% for deposits) in mid-
1992, rose after the currency reform, and with the intensification of the banking crisis. But 
once the crisis was resolved, rates fell  to  25-30% in mid-1993.  Since this development was 
accompanied by a rapid .deceleration of inflation, real  interest rates which had  previously 
been negative became positive during this period. 
2.2.5.  External developplents 
For the period 1 July 1992- 30 June 1993, the Estonian current account showed a surplus 
of US$  61  mio  (4.3%  of GDP)  compared  to  the  deficit  of US$  213  mio  previously 
forecasted by the IMF. This was to a large extent due to a better than expected performance 
of exports and non-factor services. The expansion ofimports rriay also have been limited to 
some extent by delays in the disbursement of foreign loans. 
After the collapse of trade with the former  Soviet  Union  in  the first  half of 1992,  trade 
volumes with this  area  remained  low (  42% of 1990  import levels,  34% of 1990 export 
levels).  At the same time,  trade with Western  countries  expanded  dynamically  so  that 
exports to  the West constituted nearly two .thirds of Estonian exports in  the first  half of 
1993,  coin  pared to  less  than  10% before Estqnia's independence from  the  Soviet Union. 
This reorientation of trade is  the natural consequence of Estonia's exposure to international 
competition 
Estonia's external debt stood at about 6.5% of GDP  or some US$ 86 mio  in  mid-1993. 
Thanks to  its liberal foreign investment policy and the credibility of its  currency regime, 
Estonia benefited from  foreign  direct investment of US$ 102 mio between mid-1992 and 
mid-1993, which is substantially higher than expected. By mid-1993, the Bank of Estonia's 
gross  international reserve holdings stood at US$ 275  mio (which  equals  4.3  months of 
imports), compared to US$ 62 mio a year earlier.  Net international reserves increased by 
US$  224  mio,  which  is  substantially  higher  than  expected  under  the  original  IMF 
programme (US$ 91  mio). -54-
2.3.  Review of the performance criteria attached to the EC loan 
The Memorandum of Understanding  agreed  between  the  Commission  and  Estonia  after 
consultation  of the Monetary  Committee,  provided  for  a  regular  evaluation  of pr~gress 
made  with  respect  to  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  policies.  The  quantified 
macro-economic performance criteria were identical to those contained in the I1v1F  stand-by 
arrangement and the structural adjustment criteria were designed to evaluate progress made 
in  the  area of enterprise reform,  including  privatization,  banking  sector reform,  foreign 
trade  and  foreign  direct  investment.  A  favourable  review  of progress  in  economic 
stabilization and reform, including the observance of performance criteria was a condition 
for the release the second tranche of  the loan. 
The  reviews  of  IMF  conditionality  concluded  that  the  stabilization  programme  was 
successfully implemented and that the performance criteria were met to the satisfaction of 
the I1v1F  Board. An EC mission to Estonia in  September 1993  concluded that the structural 
adjustment criteria attached to the EC loan were also broadly met: small scale privatization 
continued to -progress;  obstacles related  to  restitution  were  removed  and  new initiatives 
were taken  and  further measures  are foreseen  to  speed  up  the  privatization  process;  the 
generally liberal  trade and  foreign  investment policy has  been  maintained and  investment 
protection agreements have been concluded with EC  members or will  be concluded soon; 
efforts  were  made to  restructure the banking  sector  and  thereby  to  address  the  banking 
crisis.  In  a Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding concluded between Estonia and 
the Commission, the Estonian authorities agreed that they will  pay special attention to  the 
banking  system,  continue  its  restructuring  and  improve  its  capacity  to  perform  normal 
credit operations  and  thus  also  channel  appropriately  to  the  domestic  economy  external 
macro-financial  assistance.  In  order  to  limit  the  Government's  intervention  in  the 
allocation process, it was also agreed that in principle the full amount of the second tranche 
of the EC balance of payments assistance would be channelled through the banking system. 
With  all  criteria  attached  to  the  Community  loan  broadly  met  and  the  Supplemental 
Memorandum of Understanding signed, the second-tranche of the EC medium-term loan is 
expected to be disbursed in Spring 1994. 
2.4.  Recent developments and prospects 
In  the  second  half of 1993,  the decline  in  output  seems  to  have  stopped  and  industrial 
production  has  begun  to  recover.  Unemployment  continued  to  rise  only  slowly,  as 
enterprises were reluctant to implement redundancies because this would force them to pay 
up to eight months'  severance pay.  Inflation, which was reduced  dramatically during the 
first half of 1993  to  a monthly rate of 2-3%,  did  not continue. to  fall  in  the second half of 
the  year.  With the pick up of the economy,  import growth  seems to  have strengthened 
further so  that it is not likely that the current account has remained in surplus in  the second 
half of 1993. 
Estonia bas been receiving external financial assistance during the second half of 1993 and 
in  1994, including from the G-24 countries .(the remaining US$ 56  mio not yet disbursed 
by  mid-1993)  and  the  World  Bank.  In  September,  it  purchased  the  remaining  three 
tranches (some US$ 20 mio) under the first IMF stand-by arrangement.  Estonia concluded 
a  second  arrangement  with  the  IMF  covering  the  period  mid-1993  to  end-1994  (a 
combination of stand-by and systemic transfo~ation facility).  This will give the country 
access to purchases from the Fund in the order of US$ 40 mio over that 18-month period. 
Th.is  arrangement  supports  the  authorities'  comprehensive  programme  that  aims  at 
continuing the transformation of the Estonian economy while maintaining macroeconomic 
stability.  Emphasis will be put on increasing investment  in  infrastructure,  implementing 
structural  policies  aimed  at  strengthening  the  financial  and  entreprise  sectors,  and 
improving the effectiveness of markets, in particular the labour market.  At the same time, 
the authorities will aim at maintaining fiscal prudence and the currency board. - 55  -
3.  Latvia 
3 .1.  Economic reform from  mid~  1992 to mid-1993 
3. 1. I  Background 
In  1991,  the  Latvian  authorities  initiated  comprehensive  price  reforms  which  involved 
administrative price adjustments combined with the liberalization of an increasing share of 
commodities in  the  consumer basket  Associated  with  these  reforms was  a  reduction  in 
subsidies  from  13.7%  of GDP  in  1990  to  1.3%  in  1991.  The  Latvian  authorities  lilso 
introduced a number of measures to nationalize and reform the financial system. The Bank 
0f Latvia took  over the  activities of the previously nationalized  Gosbank and  four other 
state-owned banks (Industrial, Agriculture and Social Banks, which had been created under 
the Soviet reforms of early 1988 and the Foreign Trade Bank). This left the Bank of  Latvia 
not  only  with  central  bank  activities,  but  also  with  commercial  activities  and  assets 
amounting to  65% of total  assets  of the banking system.  In  addition,  thirty  commercial 
banks were created between  1988  and  early  1992,  although some of them  were relatively 
small.  In  June  1992,  Parliament  adopted. legislation  that  allowed  the  Bank of Latvia to 
separate its  commercial banking functions by end-1992.  There were also first efforts with 
respect to enterprise reform and  in particular privatization. A Law on Privatization of Small 
Municipal Enterprises was enacted in November 199 rand amended in  1992.  The Latvian 
programme for ownership comprises three stages  municipalization,  denationalization  (or 
restitution),  and  privatization.  By  mid-1992,  the  first  stage  was  largely  completed,  but 
progress  with  the  other  two  stages  was  hampered  by  unresolved  problems  concerning 
citizenship,  restitution  and  the  lack  of a  coherent  legal  and  institutional  framework. 
Nevertheless,  the private sector grew quite rapidly,  in  particular in  the  area of trade and 
services, as new small enterprises were established or privatized by municipalities. 
3 .1.2.  Objectives and features of the Government's reform programme starting mid-1992 
The two objectives of the Government's economic programme for mid-1992 to mid-1993 
were  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  structural  reform.  The  main  elements  of  the 
programme were the  continued  liberalization of prices  and  of the foreign  exchange and 
trade system,  as  well  as ·a  number of systemic changes,  including an  acceleration of the 
privatization process. The measures were to  be supported by  restrictive fiscal,  monetary, 
and incomes policies, which were considered crucial for creating a stable environment for 
the successful departure from  the rouble zone and subsequent replacement of the interim 
·currency. The programme targeted an  output decline of some 18% and a monthly inflation 
rate of 1 1/2% by June 1993. · 
3 .1.3.  Prrce reform 
In  July  1992,  the  Latvian  authorities  progressed  further  with  price  liberalization.  The 
restrictions on profit  margins  for  processors of agricultural  products were removed  and 
guaranteed minimum prices for agricultural products (except for grain) were abolished. At 
the same time, price restrictions were lifted for fuel  oil, liquid gas and coal for industrial 
purposes (but maintained for household supply),  as  well as  for  international tourism and 
non-rail  cargo  transport.  As  a  consequence  of these  measures,  the weight  of regulated 
goods and services prices in the consumer price index dropped below 8%. In October 1992, 
prices for alcohol were also  liberalized. By end-1992, the price liberalization process was· 
virtually  completed.  Included  in  the  small  number of items  remaining  subject to  price 
control  were utility  prices  and  rents,  which  were  adjusted  upwards  in  Fall  1992  as  a 
reaction to the large increase in the costs of  imported energy. 
3.14.  Enterprise reform 
From mid-1992 to mid-1993, Latvia made substantial progress in small-scale privatization 
for  which the municipalities  were  responsible.  However,  large-scale  privatization  barely 
advanced during this period despite the fact that some 700 enterprises had  been identified 
for  privatization in  1993.  Apart from  unresolved restitution problems (in  particular,  long - 56 -
deadlines for claims ~d  unclear compensation alternatives), the process was  hampered by 
the  lack  of a  centralized  and  coherent  privatization  strategy  and  institutional  set-up.  Jn 
particular,  line  ministries  were  responsible  for  submitting  privatization  proposals  that 
would entail a loss of control on these enterprises. The enterprises which were not  likely to 
be privatized in  the near future  were  transformed  into  joint stock  companies  Only  one 
enterprise had been liquidated by late 1993, which seems to  be due to  the complexity of the 
bankruptcy  law of November  1991  on  the one  hand  and  to  the  fear  to  destroy  a  large 
number of enterprises interrelated by interenterprise debts on the other hand  ~ 
3.1.5.  Financial sector and currency reform 
On 20 July 1992, the Latvian authorities decided to replace the remaining Russian roubles 
in· circulation by Latvian roubles, following the partial  introductio·n of Latvian roubles  in 
May  1992  when  a  severe  shortage of cash  roubles  developed.The  reform  in  July  was 
speeded up by the inflow of roubles related to  Estonia's departure from the rouble zone in 
June, and it was the starting point of a new, tight monetary policy. However, it  is only with 
the introduction of the lats started in Summer 1993 that a permanent currency (the lats) was 
introduced. 
Following the adoption of the Law on the Bank of Latvia in  May  1992, the Bank of Latvia 
issued  instructions  which  made  its  commercial  branches  subject  to  all  the  stipulations 
applying to commercial banks under the Law on Banks and  granted them  a high degree of 
operational independence. At the beginning of 1993, a Privatization Commission appointed 
by the Parliament took over the 49 branches from  the. Bank of Latvia.  Subsequently,  21 
were  consolidated  into  a  core  bank  (Universal  Bank)  which  will  be  rehabilitated  and 
privatized,  and  all  other branches were privatized,  except for  one which was  liquidated 
The Bank of Latvia also  decided  to  increase  the  capital  adequacy  requirement from  the 
current 25,000 lats to 100,000 lats (about US$ 165,000) from  January 1994 with a view to 
strengthening the banking sector. Furthermore, steps have been taken to  strengthen banking 
supervision.  In  particular,  new regulatory  standards  and  formats  of accounts  complying 
with EC directives  have been  established.  The  liquidation of the first  two  banks was not 
realized until Falll993. 
3.1.6  External sector policies 
Latvia has a fairly liberal trade system.  In June 1992, all  export quotas and licensing were 
abolished  and  replaced  by a  system  of export  taxes.  The Government also  decided  to 
abolish the export duties on most products with effect from  1 September 1993.  There are 
no licensing requirements for imports.  But new import duties have been levied since mid-
1992 on selected consumption goods.  The Tariff Council established in  May  1992 by the 
Government to periodically review tariffs and trade taxes has decided in  a number of cases 
to  increase- specific  import  tariffs  in  order  to  protect  local  producers,  in  particular  in 
agriculture.  This has greatly complicated the Latvian import tariff structure.  However, an 
Interim  Customs  Tariff Law submitted  to  Parliament  is  expected  to  partly  correct  the 
situation.  The  proposal  does  not  only  foresee  a  substantial  reduction  of previously 
increased particular tariffs, but also the introduction of (moderate) tariffs for raw materials, 
including energy. 
Latvia's foreign investment law allows free repatriation of capital and transfer of shares in 
the event of  liquidation.  Residents and enterprises are allowed to hold foreign currencies· in 
cash,  in  domestic  bank  accounts  or  abroad.  Enterprises  can  conduct  their  exchange 
transactions  either through  their  banks  or with  private  exchange  dealers.  Neither  the 
Government nor the Bank of Latvia interfere in the allocation of foreign  exchange.  The 
Bank of  Latvia ensures the smooth functioning of the foreign exchange market. 
3.2.  Macro-economic developments 
3.2.1  Production and employment 
Latvia's economic activity suffered greatly from  the terms of trade shock it  faced  in  early 
1992 as  a result ofRussia's decision to  liberalize its  prices and  to bill  its exports to Latvia - 57 -
in hard currency and at (near) market prices  The output decline was further compounded 
by trade disruptions with  the former  Soviet Union,  resulting  in  a GDP  decline of 34% in 
1992 (following a fall of 8% in  1991 ).  But in  the first half of 1993, the output contraction 
decelerated.  Latvia's official unemployment rate increased to  some 5% of the labour force 
in  mid-1993, and increasing numbers of employees accepted a reduction in working time or 
salary. 
3 .2.2.  Inflation and wage developments 
After  the  near  completion  of price  liberalization  at  the  end  of  1992,  inflation  also 
decelerated  rapidly.  By  mid-1993,  the  year-on-year  consumer  price  increase  had  been 
reduced  to  152% ·from  959%  observed  at  the  end  of 1992.  By that time,  the  monthly 
inflation rate had declined to about  1/2%.  This dramatic decline was made possible by the 
tight monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Latvia since the currency reform of July 
1992,  complemented by  a broadly  balanced  general  government budget  and  a  tax-based 
incomes policy. 
Wage  increases continued  to  fall  short of inflation  in  the  second  half of 1992.  In  the 
budgetary state sector this was achieved by the Government's decision in June 1992 to keep 
the minimum wage unchanged at  L  VR 1500,  based on which  all  salaries were calculated, 
and  a  monthly  taxable  flat  allowance  of L VR  400  was  granted  This  allowance. was 
increased in October and November to compensate for price increases.  For non-budgetary 
state enterprises, the authorities adopted a tax-based incomes policy under which excessive 
wage increases were taxed  at  high and  steeply progressive rates.  With this  policy, which 
lasted until  mid-1993,  real  wages  in  the first  half of 1993  were 8.5% lower than  a  year 
earlier (following 14% and  16% declines in  1991  and  1992, respectively). 
3.2.3.  Public finances 
The Latvian Government managed to control budget expenditures and improve revenues so 
that  the  general  government  deficit  for  1992  was  kept,  below  I%  (including  the 
Government's net lending activity  in  the order of 0.8% of GDP) and  a small surplus was 
achieved in the first half of !993.  Apart from  tight budget control, the good performance 
in  1993 must also be attributed to  a better than expected performance in  a number of areas: 
First, profit taxes were1l'luch higher than estimated, which seems to be related to the highly 
profitable  re-export  of (the  often  subsidized)  goods  originating  from  the  former  Soviet . 
republics.  In  addition,  VAT  revenues  benefited substantially from  improvements in  tax 
collection  and  the  change  of the  accounting  law  from  cash  to  accrual  basis.  Finally, 
expenditure for unemployment benefits remained much lower than expected because of the 
relatively slow rise in unemployment 
3.2.4.  Internal monetary conditions 
Following the departure from  the rouble zone in July  1992, the Bank of Latvia pursued an 
independent  monetary  policy  geared  towards  stabilizing  the  economy  and  reducing 
inflation.  It conducted a very stringent credit policy, reducing its credit allocation to banks 
in  real  terms, partly to counteract a  large inflow of roubles  from  neighbouring countries 
and partly to  offset the monetary impact of the Government borrowing in  hard currency 
from state enterprises which was sold to the Bank of Latvia for domestic currency and then 
used to assist the drought-affected agricultural sector.  The refinancing rate of the Bank of 
Latvia  was  raised  in  several  steps  from  an  annual  15%  to  120%  in  October  1992. 
However, real rates of interest for bank deposits reacted only slowly to these changes.  The 
tight monetary stance of the Bank of Latvia Jed to an  inflow of convertible currency which 
strengthened in,  the first half of 1993.  The Bank of Latvia allowed the nominal and real 
exchange rate of the Latvian  rouble  (starting  from  March  1993,  the  lats)  to  appreciate 
significantly  to  partly  reflect  this  higher  demand  for  domestic  currency,  but  it  also 
accumulated a  substantial  amount of reserves to  prevent a rise with potential  damage to 
Latvia's  external  competitiveness.  In  order  tc;>  stem  a  further  currency  inflow  through 
downward  pressure on  market interest rates,  the refinancing rate was  gradually cut back 
again  in  1993;  whereas  interest. rates  on  deposits  have  continued  to  increase,  those  on 
'credits have started to come down slowly. - 58  -
· 3.2.5.  External developments 
The  current  account  situation  for  the  period  )  July  1992-30  June  !993  turned  out 
subst~tially different from _what  had  been  ori~inally  ~xpected.  Instead  of the  planned 
defictt of nearly US$ 300 mw, the current account was  m surplus in  the order of US$  70 
mio or some 4% of GDP. To some extent, there may still be a problem of underreporting of 
imports from former Soviet republics which are subsequently re-exported at  high profits to 
Western  countries.  But  this  situation  also  reflects  a  better-than-expected  balance  in  the 
services account (a surplus of about US$ 200 mio  rather than some US$  80  mio),  which 
can be attributed to a good performance in the transport sector. 
The  reorientation  of Latvian  exports  towards  Western  countries  continued  vigorously 
Export volumes to  the CIS and Baltics fell  by  19% in  1992 and by  51% in the first half of 
. 1993 compared to the corresponding period of the previous year. At the same time, exports 
to the other countries expanded by  107% _and  13%,  respectively,  in  volume terms.  Since 
1992,  their share in  Latvian  export revenues is  more  than  half  On  the other hand,  the 
decline of non-energy  imports from  the  CIS  and  the  Baltics  (55%  in  1992)  decelerated 
substantially in the first half of 1993  to a 5% decline.  There was also a slight deceleration 
of the  contraction of non-energy  imports  from  other countries  (a  35%  decline  in  1992, 
followed by a 24% reduction in the first half of 1993). 
At  the  end of 1992,  Latvia's  external  debt stood  at  4%  of GOP  or some US$  55  mio 
Between mid-1992 and  mid-1993, Latvia benefited from  direct foreign  investment in  the 
order to US$ 50 mio. A crucial factor promoting this foreign  investment activity has been 
the liberal foreign  investment law which allows the repatriation of capital and  transfer· of 
shares  in  the event of liquidation.  On  the  other hand,  unresolved  problems  surrounding 
restitution and property rights, as well as the impossibility for foreigners to  acquire land in 
Latvia have prevented a more dynamic development From  mid-1992 to  mid-1993,  gross 
convertible reserve holdings  of the  central  bank  increased  from  some  US$  I 00  mio  to 
nearly US$ 300 mio which covers more than three months of imports. This reserve increase 
of some US$ 200 mio compares to an  initial Th1F  target of a US$ 50 mio increase for this 
period. 
3.3.  Review of  the performance criteria attached to the EC loan 
The Memorandum  of Understanding  agreed  between  the Commission  and  Latvia,  after 
consultation of the Monetary  Committee,  provided  for  a  regular  evaluation  of progress 
made  with  respect  to  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  policies  undertaken.  The 
quantified  macro-economic  performance  criteria  contained  in  the  Memorandum  follow 
those of  the IMF stand-by arrangement and the structural adjustment criteria included in the 
Memorandum of Understanding were designed )o evaluate the progress made in  the area of 
privatization  and  enterprise  restructuring,  banking  sector  reform,  foreign  exchange  and 
trade regime as well as foreign direct investment.  A condition to release the second tranche 
of the  loan  is  the successful  review  of progress  in  economic  stabilization  and  reform, 
including the observance of  performance criteria. 
The reviews of IMF conditionality concluded that the stabilization and reform programme 
was successfully implemented and that all performance criteria were met, to the satisfaction 
of the IMF Board. An EC mission to  Latvia in November 1993  assessed the  compliance 
with  the  structural  adjustment  criteria attached  to  the EC  loan.  It concluded  that  most 
criteria  were  met.  Banking  sector  reform  had  progressed  well,  and  supervision  was 
strengthened.  Latvia  maintained  the  liberal  trade,  foreign  exchange  and  investment 
regimes; it was expected that those investment protection agreements that had not yet been 
concluded with the EC would be concluded soon. In the area of privatization, progress was 
Jess  forthcoming.  Small-scale privatization advanced further,  but large-scale privatization 
was  hampered  by  the lack  of a  comprehensive  body  of legislation  and  of a  centralized 
approach  to  privatization,  as  well  as  unresolved  problems  surrounding  restitution  and 
property rights.  A  Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding was  agreed  between the 
Latvian  authorities  and  the  Commission,  according  to  which  the  disbursement  of the 
second  tranche  would  be  linked  to  further  progress . in  a  number  of  these  issues. 
Furthermore, in order to  limit the Government's intervention in the allocation process, it is - 59 -
stipulated  that  in  principle the full  amount of the  second  tranche of the  EC  balance of 
payments assistanse would be channeled through the banking system and that the extension 
of a  ~vernment  guarantee on these loaris would be strictly controlled. It is expected that 
the stgnature of the Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding,·and the disbursement of 
the second tranche of  the EC medium-term loan will take place in Spring 1994. 
3 .4.  Recent developments and prospects 
The decline in output appears to have stopped in the second half of 1993, and it is expected 
that GDP will grow in  1994. Unemployment continued to rise slowly to reach nearly 6% in 
December  1993,  as  the  budget  constraints  enterprises  are  facing  were  continuously 
hardening.  It  is  expected  that  progress  in  privatization  will  further  increase  the 
unemployment rate in the course of this ye2r.  Inflation, which was reduced dramatically 
during the first half of I993, increased to some 2% a month in the second half of the year, 
but  this  is  attributable  to  seasonal  factors  and  tax  increases  and  does  not  indicate  a 
departure from  strict monetary  control.  In  October  1993  a  supplementary  budget  was 
approved by Parliament that authorized  increases  in  expenditures  including for  pensions 
and  public sector wages.  Despite a  concurrent increase  in  taxes,  the budget  recorded  a 
deficit in the fourth quarter of 1993 following a surplus during the first three quarters. With 
the pick up of the economic growth and of imports in the course of the second half of 1993, 
the current account surplus is  likely to have disappeared by the end of the year 
External financial assistance received during the second half of 1993 and expected in  I994, 
includes loans from the G-24 countries (the remaining US$  136 mio not yet  disbursed by 
mid-1993), the World Bank and the IMF. The country has concluded a second arrangement 
with the IMF covering the period 1 October 1993 to 31  December 1994 (a combination of 
stand-by  and  systemic . transformation  facility)  which  should  give  Latvia  access  to 
additional  purchases from  the Fund for an amount of SDR 68  mio (some US$ 95  mio  ). 
This  arrangement  supports  the  authorities'  comprehensive  programme  that  aims  at 
maintaining  macroeconomic  stability  and  reinforcing  the  transformation  of the  Latvian 
economy.  The  programme  provides  for  the  continuation  of restrained  fiscal  and  firm 
monetary  policie!i,  the  rationalization  of the  trade  regime  and  a  speeding  up  of the 
structural reform efforts, particularly in the area of privatization. 
4.  Lithuania 
4 .1.  Economic reform from mid-1992 to mid-1993 
4.1.1.  Background 
Following. the adoption of the Law on  Economic  Independence  in  late  1989,  Lithuania 
prepared the legal framework  for the removal of price controls and in February I99I, the 
Lithuanian  Government  permitted  that  enterprises  increase  their  prices  without  the 
approval of Moscow, subject to a  "profitability norm".  Price liberalization progressed in 
several stages, and by early  I992, the majority of prices were liberalized.  From the very 
beginning of economic reform the Government has stressed the importance of developing a 
strong private sector to  support the transition  to  a  market  economy.  The  privatization 
programme included a combination of  vouchers and cash sales.  Vouchers were distributed 
to all  eligible citizens in April  1991  and sales began in  September I991.  By mid-1992, 
nearly 80% of small businesses had been privatized through auctions.  With regard to large 
scale  privatization,  600  of the  II  00  large  enterprises  earmarked  in  the  first  phase of 
privatization had been privatized by mid-I992; i.e., on average 70% of their ownership was 
private. 
4.1 .2.  Objectives and features of the Government's reform programme starting mid-1992 
The two main objectives of the Government's economic programme for mid-1992 to mid-
I993 were to stabilize the economy by adjusting quickly to the terms of trade shock and to 
advance  with  structural  reform.  Elements  of  the  macroeconomic  stabilization  plan 
included the introduction of a new currency and departure from the rouble area,  as well as - 60-
the maintenance of sound fiscal, monetary and incomes policies.  Elements of the structural 
pia~ com~rise:d p~ogress in  b~ilding up a social safety net,  implementing an  anti-monopoly 
policy,  pnvat1zat10n,  enterpnse refonns and  the  development  of a  legal  and  institutional 
framework for commercial activity.  The programme targeted  a decline  in  GOP of some 
22% for the programme year and a reduction of inflation to about 2% at the end of the first 
quarter of 1993. 
4.1.3.  Price liberalization 
By Summer 1992, prices of most goods had already been liberalized.  The main  exceptions 
were energy products, rents,  municipal  and  utility services,  communications,  alcohol  and 
tobacco.  Minimum  support  prices  in  agriculture  had  been  removed  and  agricultural 
subsidies  were  limited  in  order to  keep  the  budget  under  control.  Energy  prices  were 
adjusted to  the rise in  import prices which accelerated in  Fall  1992 when Russia stopped 
providing Lithuania with  energy  at  preferential  prices.  After legislation  defining unfair 
competition and monopoly practices came into force in  November  1992,  the Agency for 
Prices and Competition was established.  It bas the authority to examine prices charged by 
dominant  enterprises (with market shares  above  40%)  and  to  freeze  them  for  up  to  six 
months,  but it  does  not have the authority to  break up monopolies.  In  Spring  1993,  profit 
margins were abolished and  price controls on  petrol,  diesel,  liquefied  gas  and  coal  were 
removed. 
4.1.4.  Privatization 
The privatization process continued in the second  half of 1992.  By mid-December 1992, 
more than  1000 medium  and  large  enterprises had  been  privatized  through  public share 
subscription,  including  almost  350  industrial  plants.  But  following  allegations  of 
improprieties,  the subscription was  halted  by  Parliament  and  then  resumed,  whereas the 
auction of smaller enterprises was interrupted until  the end  of March  1993.  The auction 
procedure  was  changed  to  permit  the  submission  of closed  registered  bids  and  the 
transferability  of vouchers.  The  new  rules  for  privatizing  medium- and  large  scale 
enterprises required that 50% of shares  of an  enterprise being privatized should be sold to 
employees  (compared  to  the  earlier  30%).  Privatization  of  agricultural  enterprises 
advanced well; in  April  1993, a decree was issued to  allow the privatization of otherwise 
unsaleable  enterprises a(a heavily  discounted  price.  By  mid-1993,  nearly  90% of the 
capital of agricultural  enterprises (up for privatisation) had been privatized.  On the other 
hand,  only  little  progress  was  made  in  the  privatization  of land.  The  restitution  of 
agricultural land has been problematic because of the small  size of parcels restituted  and 
because of outstanding restitution claims that exceed the available agricultural land.  The 
process of privatizing non-agricultural land has not yet  begun. 
4.1.5.  Financial sector and monetary reform 
In September 1992, the Bank of  Lithuania was divided into two legally separate central and· 
commercial  banking activities.  The new (Central) Bank of Lithuania was from  then  on 
responsible for  monetary policy, the management of the payments system, and  prudential 
control  and  regulation; until  October  1992  it  also  had  a monopoly on foreign  exchange 
transactions  which  was  subsequently  abandoned.  The  new  State  Commercial  Bank of 
Lithuania resumed ·all  commercial functions of the former Bank of Lithuania inherited in 
1990  and  1  991  from  the former Gosbank,  the  Industry  and  Construction  Bank and  the 
Social  Bank.  Its  assets  account for  roughly one third  of total  assets  in  the commercial 
banking system.  Apart from the commercial banks, there are also the Savings Bank, which 
collects  the  bulk  of household  deposits,  and  the  Agriculture  Bank  whose  large  credit 
volume has been mainly directed towards collective and state farms and in  some cases also 
towards financing of government subsidies to the agriculture sector.  These two state banks 
are  holding  claims  against  Gosbank  in  Moscow,  which  makes  their  financial  situation 
fragile.  · 
After independence,  when the Russian  supply  of banknotes  fell  short of the  increasing 
demand  caused  by  rapid  inflation,  the  Lithuanian  authorities  decided  to  issue  special 
coupons  (Lithuanian  Provisional  Money  (LPM)  or  talonas)  to  supplement  the  stock  of .....  ~  •-"  .  ...  .  .  :•  .  "·  ',:.·  ·.···,···).'' 
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rouble notes  starting from  I  May  1992  In  response  to  rouble  inflows,  the  authorities 
declared that fron 1 October J9G2,  talonas would be the only legal  tender and  provided ir 
at 1: I against rouble holdings, which was the first step of the currency reform.  On 17 June 
1993, the Lithuanian national currency, the litas,  was  introduced and  replaced  the talonas 
over the following weeks.  Prior to  this second step the  exchange rate of the  talonas had 
been stabilized in order to ensure the success of the reform.  The value of the  litas is  kept 
stable relative to a basket of major Western currencies. 
4.1 .6.  External Sector Policies 
Lithuania bas made efforts to implement a liberal environment for imports.  By Fall  1992,. 
there were neither controls nor licenses on imports from  any region  On  the other band, 
there were still ~xport quotas and licensi-,g, although steps were takrn in the course of 1992 
to remove a number of them.  In June 1993, the Lithuanian authorities adopted a new trade 
system which provides for the removal of quantitative restrictions on exports, while export 
taxes were temporarily introduced for some formerly restricted goods. However the export 
of most foodstuffs and some agricultural  inputs remained prohibited until  1 October 1993 .. 
The new system  also foresees  tariff rates  for the majority of goods between  5 and  15%, 
with  many  goods  entering  tariff-free .and  a  few  exceptions  of higher  tariffs  (e.g.,  eggs, 
sugar, butter, oil and a number of manufactured goods at 20-30%, and alcohol, tobacco and 
precious metals up to  I 00%) 
Following the replacement of the  rouble by  the  talonas  in  October  1992,  Lithuania has 
maintained  a  relatively liberal  payments system,  with  a high  degree o( convertibility on 
current  international  transactions.  All  bona  fide  requests  for  making  transfers  and 
payments for imports of goods and services are satisfied.  In  early  1993,  the  Government 
decided  to  introduce  a  surrender  requirement  of  25%  for  export  earnings  of  state 
enterprises  in  convertible  currencies  to  the  Bank  of Lithuania.  Commercial  banks are 
permitted  to  borrow abroad  and  extend  credits  to  non-residents  and  residents  in  foreign 
currencies.  Resident firms may borrow foreign exchange either abroad or from Lithuanian 
commercial banks.  Households and  private enterprises can  hold  their savings  in  foreign 
currency bank deposits.  There is  no  restriction on the transfer of funds held by individuals 
or enterprises in foreign exchange accounts into or out of  Lithuania. 
4.2.  Macro-economic developments 
4.2.1.  Production and employment 
By mid-1992, the disintegration of Lithuania's economic relations with the (former) Soviet. 
Union had contributed to sharp production declines.  After the GDP contraction of 13% im 
1991, the output decline accelerated in the course of 1992 as  inputs were more difficult to 
obtain  and,  following the price liberalization  in  Russia,  at significantly higher prices.  In 
addition, agricultural output was negatively affected by a severe drought in  Summer 1992. 
For the year as  a whole,  GDP is  estimated to have declined  by 38%.  In  the first half crf 
1993, industrial production levelled off and the output contraction decelerated, reducing the 
output decline for mid-1992 to mid-1993 to some 30%. 
Until  mid-1992, the output decline was barely reflected in official unemployment figures 
which stood below 1%.  And over the following twelve months, the rate increased by less 
than  1/2 percentage point.  However, hidden employment was estimated to be in  the order 
of 7%, which is still relatively low in view of the severe output contraction seen in the past 
year. 
4.2.2.  Inflation and wage developments 
Given  the  liquidity  overhang,  Lithuania's  liberalization  of prices,  coupled  with  higher 
import prices, led to a steep price increase. By mid-1992, the year over year consumer price 
inflation stood at 865%. Monthly inflation rates picked up towards the end of 1992 when a 
preferential agreement with Russia on oil  supplie~ ran  out and higher import prices were 
passed  on  to  consumers.  In  addition,  price developments  in  Winter 1992  may  have  also 
reflected expansionary monetary consequences of the currency reform of I  October  1992 - 62-
linked  to  the exchange at  par of talonas  for  roubles  held  in  correspondent  accounts  as 
agreed with Russia.  In  the course of the first  half of 1993,  monthly inflation decelerated 
sign~fica~tly as  a  conse.qu~n~e of strong tightening of monetary policy in  Spring and  the 
contmuatwn of fiscal  dJsc1plme.  By  July  1993;the monthly inflation rate,  which averaged 
14%  in  the first half of the year,  had  decreased to 3%.  Lithuania has  maintained a tight 
incomes policy.  In  the second half  of 1992,  real  wages  dropped  by  more than  half and 
have been kept stable in the course of the f1rst half of 1993. 
4 .2 .3.  Pub  lie finances 
The Lithuanian authorities  have put great emphasis on  fiscal  discipline and  have set  the 
objective of balancing the general  government budget during the  period  covered  by  the 
IMF arrangement (mid-1992 to  mid-1993). Litnuania kept public expenditures under tight 
control  during  this  period,  which  in  fact  resulted  in  a  small  surplus  for  the. general 
government budget  The releases of funds ·to mll;tistries were made conditional  on  actual 
Government  receipts.  This  led  to  sharp  reductions  in  the  real  wage  and  benefit  for 
government employees. In  1993, revenues were strengthened through trade reforms and an 
increase in the general sales tax from  15  to  18%. 
4.2.4.  Internal monetary conditions 
Until  Lithuania's departure from  the  rouble  area the scope for  independent action  in  the 
monetary field  was very limited.  Monetary aggregates expanded  rapidly during  1991  and 
1992.  However,  given  the  rapid  rise  in  prices  during  these  two  years  and  the  limited 
availability  of  banknotes,  real  money  balances  ·declined  sharply  prior  to  the  first 
introduction of the talonas in  Spring  I 992. Mter the full  introduction of the talonas in Fall 
1992,  Lithuanian  authorities  pursued  an  independent  monetary  policy  which  led  to  an 
appreciation of the  talonas  exchange  rate  against the  rouble.  However,  in  the first  four 
months of 1993,  the talonas  depreciated  by  30%  against  the  dollar,. reflecting  to  some 
extent also expansionary monetary consequences of the currency reform, related to the I: I 
rouble/talonas exchange of funds  accumulated  in  the correspondence accounts.  Evidence 
for the lack of confidence in the talonas was also given by large open positions in  foreign 
exchange taken by  Lithu~p.ian commercial banks. 
Monetary policy was  considerably tightened  in  Spring  1993.  In  earlyApril, the Bank of 
Lithuania announced a near-tripling of reserve requirements for the following month and 
the introduction of auctions for central bank refinancing.  These measures; combined with 
continued fiscal and wage dis~ipline, produced a 25% appreciation of  the exchange rate  of 
the talonas  against  the  dollar  in  May  and  June.  This  new  policy  stance  prepared  the 
introduction  of the  litas,  Lithuania's  national  currency  on  25  June  1993.  Mter  the 
Government  replaced  interest  rate  ceilings  (annual  lending  rate  of 25%)  by  minimum 
interest rates payable on deposits,  to  be applied at  both state and  commercial banks (20-
26%), interest rates rose but remained negative in real terms.  This is above all  due to the 
fact  that  the  State  banks,  which  have  the  major market  share,  set  relatively  low  rates 
compared to the commercial banks. 
4.2.5.  External developments 
Following a surplus position in  199I and the first half of 1992, Lithuania's current account 
recorded a deficit in the order of US$  I 50 mio (some 6% of GOP) from mid-1992 to mid-
1993. This is considerably lower than  th~;: original Fund estimates of a deficit of about US$ 
500 mio, mostly owing to a drop in  interrepublican trade and, to some extent, to delays in 
the disbursements of external financial assistance. 
Mter a  fall  of 38% of export volumes  in  1992  (caused  by  the  62%  decline  in  inter-
republican trade), export volumes broadly stabilized in  the first half of 1993, compared to 
the first  half of 1992  (a  22%  decl~e in  interrepublican  trade against  a  18%  increase in 
other trade).  Import volumes, which had dropped by 57% in  1992, continued to decline in 
the first  half of 1993, but at a considerably lower rate (16%, spurred by  a 30% contraction 
in  imports from  former Soviet republics). Clearly, this demonstrates that Lithuania's trade 
reorientation continued as the country was exposed to world market prices. - 63  -
By mid-1993, Lithuania's external debt stood at some 8% of GDP or US$ 250 mio 
4.3.  Review of the performance criteria attached to the EC loan 
The Memorandum of Understanding agreed  between the Commission and  Lithuania, after 
consultation of the Monetary Committee, provide for  a regular evaluation of the progress 
towards  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  The  quantified  performance  criteria 
included in the Memorandum of Understanding are identical  to  those contained in  the  11-
month  IMF stand-by arrangement and  the  structural  adjustment  criteria,  included  in  the 
Memorandum of Understanding were designed to evaluate the progress made in the area of 
price liberalization, enterprise reform,  including in  particular privatization, banking sector 
reform,  foreign  exchange,  foreign  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment.  The  successful 
review  of progress  in  economic  stabilization  and  reform,  ir,cluding  the  observance  o ;-
performance criteria, is a condition to release the second tranche of the loan.  · 
The reviews of IMF conditionality concluded that all  performance criteria were met.  An 
EC  "mission  to  Lithuania  conducted  in  January  1994  concluded  that  the  structural 
adjustment criteria attached to the EC loan were also  met : the Government's role in  price 
determination  had  been  further  r_educed;  banking  supervision  had  been  strengthened; 
privatization  and  restitution  had  progressed;  liberal  foreign  exchange  and  trade  regimes 
were  maintained.  There  was  however  less  progress  in  other  areas  including  the 
restructuring and privatization of the  banking system; the revision and  implementation of 
bankruptcy  legislation,  the  revision  of central  and  commercial  banking  laws  and  the 
conclusion  of  double  taxation  agreements  with  Member  States.  A  Supplemental 
Memorandum  of Understanding  has  been  negotiated  and  is  expected  to  be  concluded 
shortly,  according to  which the  disbursement  of the  second  tranche  would  be  linked  to 
further progress in  a number of these isues.  In  addition,  it  stipulates a series of conditions 
that should allow the proper absorption of the second tranche-through the banking system, 
including  the  intensified  absorption  of technical  assistance.  It  is  expected  that  the 
Supplemental Memorandum will be signed  in  Spring  1994, which should be followed  by 
the disbursement of the second tranche shortly afterwards. 
4.4.  Recent developmepts and prospects 
There  are  signs  that  the  output  stabilized  in  the  second  half of 1993.  Unemployment 
remains relatively low in light of the lower production levels. Following its decline during· 
the first half of 1993, inflation picked up again in  the second half of the year to  monthly 
rates of 4.5%. This is partly due to the fact that the central bank expanded monetary supply 
more than foreseen in order to  avoid an  appreciation of the litas as a consequence of capital 
inflows. The current account appears to have deteriorated further in the second half of 1993 
In September 1993, Lithuania purchased the remaining tranche (some US$  18  mio) under 
the first  IMF stand-by arrangement.  Lithuania has  concluded a second arrangement with 
the  IMF  covering the period  up  to  end-1994  (a  combination  of stand-by  and  systemic 
transformation facility).  This will give the country access to purchases from the Fund in 
the  order  of US$1 07  mio  over  a  17 -month  period.  This  arrangement  supports  the 
authorities'  comprehensive  programme  that  aims  at  building  on  the  stabilization  and 
structural  adjustment programme achieved.  T~e main  programme goals  are to  raise  real 
growth to sustainable levels  while reducing inflation by end-1994  to  single  digits  at an 
annual  rate.  The programme will  attempt to achieve this  by maintaining macroeconomic 
balance and building confidence in economic policymaking, improving the supply response 
of the economy through continuing structural  reform,  directing foreign  financing to the 
most productive uses, and, through these policies, attracting foreign investment. - 64-
VITI. ALGERIA 
l.  Introduction 
On  June 28  and  29,  the European  Council  agreed  in  principle  to  provide  medium-term 
macro-financial  assistance  to  this  country  in  support. of an  ambitious  macro,-economic 
reform programme in the context of politicallibersalisation.  Accordingly, on the basis of a 
Commission  proposal  and  after  a  favourable  opinion  by  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council  decided in  September  1993  to  grant an  ECU  400  million  loan  to  Algeria,  to  be 
disbursed in two tranches (Decision 91/51 0/EEC of 23  September 1991 ). 
The loan agreement and the corresponding Memorandum of Understanding specifying the 
macro-economic .conditions for disbursement of the  two  tranches,  were signed in  Algiers 
on 5 December 1991. 
The disbursement of  the first tranche (of ECU 250 million) was subject to two conditions: 
The  conclusion  of an  agreement  on  a  Stand-By  arrangement  with  the  IMF  and  a 
structural adjustment loan with the World Bank; 
The conclusion of an agreement between Algeria and its commercial bank creditors on 
improving  the  country's  future  debt  servicing  and  repayment  profile  through  new 
loans and/or new refinancing agreements. 
Algeria reached  an  agreement with the IMF in  May  1991  for a Stand-By facility of SDR 
300 million  (US$  430 million)  and  with  the World  Bank  in  June  1991  on  a  US$  350 
million Enterprise and Financial Sector Adjustment Loan (EFSA.L). 
In  October  1991,  the Bank of Algeria also  reached  an  agreement  with  a  consortium  of 
commercial banks, led b~the Credit Lyonnais, for a syndicated loan of US$ 1,454 million. 
This  loan  allowed  an  effective  re-profiling  of commercial  debt  over  a  longer  period. 
Burden-sharing with private creditors was an. essential component in  this loan  agreement. 
Other agreements, including the US$  147 million loan by the Japanese EXJM Bank (April 
1991)  and  an  Italian government guaranteed  inter bank  loan  facility  of US$  7.2  billion 
(May 1991) also contributed to an effective refinancing of Algerian foreign debt. 
In the circumstances, the Commission considered that the conditions for the disbursement 
of  the first tranche were satisfied and the funds were releaSed in January 1992. 
In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, the release of the second tranche 
was subject to two sets of  conditions : 
The respect of the quantitative macro-economic performance criteria  agreed  in  the 
context of  the IMF programme; 
A positive assessment by the Commission.of the progress accomplished in  structural 
reform  programmes,  including  :  convertibility  of  the  dinar,  price  and  import 
liberalization,  adoption of legislative measures  on  a  Commercial  Code,  bankruptcy 
procedures, the establishment of a stock exchange and further liberalization of foreign 
direct  investment.  These conditions  were consistent  with  the  economic  adjustment 
programmes  agreed  between  the  Algerian  authorities  and  the IMF  and  the  World 
·Bank. 
The  lack  of  compliance  with  the  macro-economic  performance  criteria  as  well  as 
insufficient progress on structural reform have, so far,  prevented the release of the second 
tranche. 
Progress with respect to those economic programmes is assessed hereafter - 65 -
2.  Economic developments in 1992-1993 
_ The Algerian adjustment and  reform  programme, which  started  in  1991,  was  designed to 
foster  growth  through  the  implementation  of liberalization  measures,  while  reducing 
inflation  by  pursuing tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  and  achieving  a  viable  external 
situation.  The objective for  1991  was an  increase by 4.5% of real GDP in  1991  (against a 
decline  of  1.5%  in  1990).  Annual  inflation  was  targeted  at  35%  and  the  budget  was 
expected to gradually reach a surplus of 4.8% of GDP, mainly through increased revenue 
from the hydrocarbon sector which accounts for two thirds of all  government revenue. On 
the  external side,  the government's medium-term objective was to  maintain  a significant 
current account surplus so  as  to make possible a reduction in  the stock of Algeria's heavy 
. external  debt An  increased  inflow of foreign  financial  resources  and  a  nbduction  in  the 
· external debt service were also key elements in this respect 
The targets of this  Dv1F -supported programme were met until the end of 1991, but it went 
off-track in early 1992. Socio-political tensions led to a softening of the incomes, fiscal and 
monetary  policies  and  to  an  increase  of credits  to  the  public  enterprises  sector.  These 
factors fueled inflation which remained high throughout 1992 and  is  expected to accelerate 
in  1993.  · 
· The steady appreciation of the real  exchange rate throughout 1992, together with the high 
level of debt service payments, have created a tight situation in  the exchange market and 
delayed the necessary move towards convertibility of. the national  currency. Furthermore, 
from  late  1992 onwards,  a gradual  fall  in  hydrocarbon world market prices had a serious 
negative  impact on  the balance of payments  and  the public finance  situation, since over 
90% of Algeria's foreign  earnings come from  export of oil  and  gas, which also  constitute 
the main source of revenue for the budget 
2.1.  Domestic output and demand 
Real  GDP  growth  was  modest  in  1992  (some 2.8%)  and  the  introduction of restrictive 
foreign exchan,3e allocation procedures, in  late 1992, are likely to increase the shortag•~s of 
imported  parts  and  supplies  to  the  maimfacturing  and  construction  sectors  and  have  a 
serious negative impact p.n  GDP growth in  1993  with adverse implications for the labour 
m~ct.  · 
Growth in  agriculture reached 4.8% in  1992, mainly because of good weather conditions 
but deteriorating conditions  in  1993  may lead  to  a  less  favourable  performance.  Value-
added in  the hydrocarbon industry was growing steadily i'n  1992, despite a slight decrease 
in  output from  108  million  barrels  in  1991  to  106.5  million  barrels  in  1992.  For  1993, 
uncertainties  concerning world  market prices  could  also  influence  developments  in  this 
sector.  · 
2.2  The budget 
Fiscal policies were relaxed substantially in  1992.  Government current expenditures rose 
by 50% in  nominal terms,  largely  because of strong rises  in  the wage bill  (22% in  real 
terms) and social transfers (50% in  real terms).  Revenue rose by 25% only owing to the 
appreciation  of the  effective  exchange  rate ·and  the  resulting  lack  of  buoyancy  of 
hydrocarbon receipts, which account for about two thirds of all fiscal revenues. 
In  view  of the  slow-down  in  the  public  enterprises  reform  programme ·and  of the 
appreciation of the effective exchange rate,  prospects for  improvement of the budgetary 
situation  are  bleak.  Moreover,  the  appreciation  of the  Dinar  and  the  resulting  lack  of 
increase of  .budgetary revenue from  hydrocarbon exports (two  third.!>  of all  revenue) are 
seriously aggravating the overall treasury balance, which turned from  a surplus of 4.3% in 
1991  to a deficit of 0.6% in  1992 and is· projected to  reach a deficit of around 9% of GDP 
in  1993.  " - 66-
2.3  Trade balance. exchange rate developments and external debt 
Exports have decreased from US$ 12.6 billion in  1991  to  US$  II 6 billion in  1992.  They 
are not expected to increase in  1993, mainly due to a stagnation in the hydrocarbon exports. 
Imports  increased  from  US$  7.8  billion  in  1991  to  US$  8.2  billion  in  1992  and  are 
projected  to  reach  US$  8.4  billion  in  1993.  As  a  result,  the  trade  balance  surplus 
deteriorated from  II% of GDP in  1991  to  8% in  1992  and  is  projected at  6% of GDP in 
1993.  A  slow reduction in interest payments  abroad from  US$ 2.4 billion  in  1991  to  an 
estimated  US$  2.2  billion  in  1993  should  somewhat  limit  the  negative  impact  on  the 
current account, which is  expected to deteriorate from  a US$ 2.6 billion surplus in 1991  to 
a US$ 1.1  billion deficit in  1993. 
Since the mid-80s,  the  authorities pursued  a  policy of gradual  depreciation of the Dinar 
(more  than  70%  between  1985  and  1992)  to  reduce  the  gap  between  the  official  and 
parallel  market  rate  and  slowly  achieve  current  account  convertibility.  In  1992,  the 
government changed this policy and stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate became the 
new objective.  This resulted  in  a 22% increase in  the real  effective exchange rate.  This 
appreciation is likely to continue in  1993. 
The external debt stock has been reduced slightly from  a peak of US$ 27.2 billion  in  1991 
to US$ 26.2 billion end 1992 and is expected to decline further in  1993 to  US$ 25.7 billion. 
Total external debt service will fall slowly from a peak of US$ 9.6 billion in  1991  (76% of 
exports) to around 9  billion  in  1993.  However,  in  terms of exports,  the burden of debt 
servicing will  somewhat increase from  76% of exports  in  1991  to  an  estimated  80%  in 
1993, whereafter it is expected to decline again. 
The parallel  market rate stood  at  approximately  60 Dinar  per US  dollar in  June  1993, 
compared  to  an  official  rate of 22.5  Dinar per US  dollar,  which  is  clearly not  a  market 
clearing  rate.  The  spread  between  official  and  parallel  market  rates  has  widened, 
increasing from  I :2 end 1991  to almost 1  :2.7 at present. 
2.4.  Money and credit 
Monetary policy remained· accommodating during the first half of 1991  and became more 
stringent from July onwards only.  However, given the dimensions of the increase in credit 
in  the  first  half,  overall  results  for  1991  still  show  an  increase  by  20.9% of the  broad 
money stock, somewhat above the programme target of 18.8%.  But the increase in  credit 
was  entirely  allocated  to  households  and  enterprises  (+21.1 %)  while  credit  to  the 
government was squeezed (-2. 1%). 
Monetary policy further relaxed in  I 992.  Domestic credit increased by 26.1% of the broad 
money stock.  Again, most of the increase went to  households and enterprises (23.3%) but 
credit to the government was .also allowed to grow slightly (2.8%) to  finance  part of the 
widening budget deficit.  For I 993, credit growth is expected to remain around this level. 
Real  interest  rates  remained  negative  throughout  1991  and  1992,  which  constitutes  a 
serious  disincentive to savings.  Inflation ran  over 32% in  1992  while interest  rates  on 
savings' deposits remained at 8% and on 1-year treasury bonds at  I 0%. 
3.  Status of the reform process 
Economic reform  has  taken  place  against  a  difficult  political  background.  Following 
protests in October 1988, a new multi- party constitution was adopted in  1989.  The Islamic 
FIS swept to victory in local and municipal elections in  June 1990 and in  the first round of 
national legislative elections in December I 991. The second round, scheduled for January 
1992 was suspended and president Chadli resigned.  He was replaced by a "Haut Conseil 
d'Etat",  presided by M.  Boudiaf.  A  period of violent confrontation with the FIS started, 
leading to the dissolution of the FIS and the assassination of Boudiaf in June 1992.  He was 
succeeded by A  Kafi and a new government was formed by Prime Minister B.  Abdesselam 
who pursued a policy of economic austerity and military confrontation with the FIS  Lack - 67-
of  progress  in  solving  the  political  and  socio-economic  problems  resulted  in  the 
replacement of  Abdesselam with  ':1  new Prime Minister, R  Malek,  in August  1993. 
The Abdesselam  government  produced  a  "Work  Programme"  in  September  1992  which 
reiterated the commitment to  economic reforms and  a more liberal market-based economy. 
However,  it  also  emphasized  that  the  social  and  political  situation  required  strong 
government  intervention  and  austerity  policies  which  could  not  be  left  to  the  market. 
Economic reforms would be continued once the internal political problems and the external 
debt crisis would be overcome, after a 3-5years period. 
Mter a  series  of substantial  wage  increases  in  the  public  sector,  which  had  a  negative 
impact on the budget and on  inflation, a "Social Pact" was concluded in  1992  between the 
· government and  the labour unions,  based on job security in  return for a wage freeze and 
restrained price increases. 
Economic  reforms,  particularly  imports  and  currency  liberalization  introduced  under 
.president Chadli, have been slowed down.  Emphasis has  been  put on  economic austerity 
with  priority utilisation of convertible  currency for  servicing of external  debts,  without 
rescheduling.  Further depreciation of the dinar has been excluded. 
Import controls have been  put  in  place  in  October  1992,  which  are  likely  to  slow down 
economic  growth  and  deepen  the  recession  because  of shortages  of imported  inputs. 
Foreign  currency  is  allocated  to  banks  for  transactions  not  exceeding  US$  100,000. 
Transactions exceeding this  amount or "strategic" imports  are  decided  on  a case-by-case 
basis  by  an  ad-hoc  Inter-ministerial  Committee.  The  new  rationing  system  classifies 
imports in four categories: 
a)  "strategic" imports (goods related to  hydrocarbon production, essential consumer goods 
like  cereals,  agricultural  inputs,  medicines,  etc )  for  which  official  foreign  currency 
reserves are available and subject to a decision by an Inter-ministerial ad-hoc Committee; 
b)  imports to  enhance production  and  investment  activiti~~ for  which  foreign  currency 
allocations  are  decided  by  the  Intet-ministerial  ad-hoc  Committee  if they  exceed  US$ 
100,000, by commercial banks for amounts below this limit; 
c)  "authorized" imports for which no  official  foreign  exchange cash  or credit) is  made 
available but which can be financed on private foreign exchange accounts; 
d)  "luxury" goods for which  imports are  "suspended"  and  for which neither official nor 
private foreign exchange can be used; barter deals are forbidden too. 
In  June  1993  the government  proposed to  partially  liberalize the exchange rate with the 
introduction of a two-tier exchange rate' mechanism: an official (fixed) rate for the exports 
of oil  products,  debt servicing and  the imports  of essential  goods,  and  a  (floating)  free 
market rate for all other transactions (other  exports, transfers by immigrants, transactions 
on residents' foreign currency accounts).  · 
With regard to reforms in the financial and enterprise sector, the government presented an 
Economic and Financial Structural Adjustment programme that was supported by a World 
Bank loan (EFSAL).  The programme aimed ·at  improving the efficiency of  the banking 
system (new prudential ratios, opening the domestic market to foreign banks) as  well as  a 
reform of the public enterprises sector.  The government has granted or is  about to grant 
fmancial autonomy·to 363  public enterprises but their (partial) privatization and financial 
restructuration has slowed down since early 1992.  For the 22 remaining non-autonomous 
public enterprises, audits and financial restructuring plans are in preparation. 
A reform programme for the crucial housing sector has been introduced in  1993, focusing 
on increased private sector participation in  the construction of dwellings,  removal of rent 
caps, a reorganization of the housing credit syst-em,  replacing general interest rate subsidies 
by a targeted housing assistance programme, reform of public construction enterprises and 
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In  the framework of the IYth  Prot~col on  tec~nical and  financial  cooperation benveen the 
Community and  Algeria,  the  Commission has  made  available  in  July  1993  a  70  mECU 
grant  as  a  contribution  to  this  reform  programme.  This  grant  will  finance  a  sectoral 
imports programme of construction materials .to finish  the construction of about  I 00,000 
housing units.  Counterpart funds from  the import programme will be used to  finance the 
construction and rehabilitation of housing units.  This programme was  developed in  close 
collaboration with the World Bank, which has also instructed  a housing sector loan with a 
construction material import programme (March 1993 ). 
4.  A review of macro-ecocomic performance ~nd structural reform criteria 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Community and  Algeria  specified  two 
sets of conditions for the release of the second·tranche (150 inECU).  The first set refered 
to the quantitative criteria in  the Stand-By arrangement between Algeria and the lMF and 
ensured compatibility between this arrangement and the Community's Balance of Payments 
Support.  The se<:ond  set refered to a number of specific economic reform measures to be 
implemented by the government. 
4.1.  Performance criteria agr~ed with the IMF 
On  3 June  1991,  Algeria reached  an  agreement with  the  IMF  on  a  1  0-month  Stand-By 
facility for an amount of SDR 300 million.  The first tranche was immediately disbursed 
This facility was acco·mpanied by an  external contingency mechanism of SDR 210 million 
under the Contingency and  Compensatory Financing Facility (CCFF).  The performance 
criteria and indicative targets in this programme included quantitative targets on changes in 
net domestic assets; treasury debt reduction, credit to public enterprises, external borrowing 
and international reserves. 
The  first  review of performance  criteria  was  concluded  in  November  1991,  based  on 
performance through September 1991, and led to the release of the second tranche.  In fact, 
performance  criteria were met until  December  1991,  taking  into  account  the  additional 
measures  taken  by  the  government  at the  end  of fiscal  year  1991 .  Total  purchases 
amounted to 225 mSDR by the end of 1991. 
/'' 
From  early  1992  onwards  the  programme  got  off-track.  Monetary  and  budgetary 
performance criteria were not  met.  The second review,  due  in  March  1992,  was  never 
compl~ted and the final  purchase was never made.  No  new programme has  been agreed 
upon smce. 
4.2.  Structural reform criteria. 
Five economic reform measures have been targeted in the Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning the Community loan:  current account convertibility of the Dinar, liberalization 
of prices,  liberalization of imports,  legislative measures and  protection of foreign  direct 
investments. 
Progress  in price libera!isation  has  been  encouraging,  with  a  gradual  move from  fixed 
prices to controlled margins for most consumer goods and the total liberalisation of prices 
of farm products.  By  June 1993, the prices of only three basic foods remain subsidised. 
Prices of public utilities, transport and fuel still need to increase further to reflect economic 
costs. 
Some  progress  has  been  made with  respect to  the  legislative  measures  foreseen  in  the 
Memorandum of Understanding.  The government has introduced an Investment Code and 
a Commercial Code which will substantially improve the legal environment for private and 
public  enterprises  and  will  also  protect  and  liberalize  foreign  direct  investments.  Both 
these  Codes  are operational  now.  The regulatory  environment  for  the  establishment of 
foreign banks in Algeria has also been liberalised. - 69-
Major  problems  remain  however  with  respect  to  the  move  towards  current  account 
convertibility  of  the  Dinar  and  liberalisation  of  imports.  In  September  ] 992  the 
government backtracked on  earlier exchange rate liberalisation  policies  by  introducing  a 
stringent foreign  exchange rationing  system  combined  with  rigid  import  controls.  This 
halted the process of gradual depreciation of the Dinar, started in  1985, and actually led  to 
an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, thereby reducing the competitiveness of 
the Algerian economy and creating internal price distortions.  The announced introduction 
of a  two-tier  foreign  exchange  market  in  1993  constitutes  a  positive  step  in  the  right 
direction but further progress appears necessary. 
5.  Assessment and prospects 
The  government  has  made  some  progress  in  the  implementation  of structural  reform 
measures over the last two years.  Prices of most goods have been liberalized in principle, 
although some forms of administrative  control  apparently  remain.  Legislative  measures 
have  also  been taken  to  improve the  legal  environment for  commercial  enterprises  and 
foreign investments. 
Major  problems  remain  with  regard  to  the  introduction  of  full  current  account 
convertibility of the Dinar and the liberalization of imports.  The fixed exchange rate policy 
has led to  a considerable appreciation of the Dinar and  a growing budgetary deficit which 
keeps the economy under inflationary pressure.  A more flexible two-tier exchange market· 
system  might  by  considered  as  a  "second  best"  solution  for  a  short  transitory  period 
towards full convertibility.  The combination of a slow-down in  the reform  process and a 
restrictive imports policy have brought real  economic growth  to  a virtual standstill while 
inflationary pressure has not been stabilized. 
Because of the discontinuation of. the macro-economic stabilisation programme agreed with 
the IMF  and  lack of progress in  key  economic reforms,  conditions  for the release of the 
second tranche (ECU ISO million) of the Community loan have not been met. 
Faced with a particularly difficult political and economic environment Algeria has recently 
resumed  discussions with  the  Th1F  on -a  new  programme to  be supported  by  a  stand-by 
arrangement. Key policy measures associated with the new programme would include : the 
liberalization of the  exchange rate  regime  and  foreign  trade;  tight  fiscal  and  monetary 
policy;  public enterprise reform and  domestic price liberalization.  Owing in  particular to . 
the  recent  decrease  in  energy  prices,  it  is  expected  that  Algeria  will  have  to  meet 
considerable·  external  financing  needs  in  1994/95  and  that  without  substantial  official 
assistance from  abroad the new programme under discussion  with the IMF  could  not be 
implemented. 
The Community has recently indicated in this respect that the macro-financial cooperation 
with Algeria initiated  by the first tranche of the  1991  balance of payments  loan will be 
pursued, including if appropriate through new initiatives, on the basis of the conclusions of 
the discussions underway with the Th1F. - 70-
IX.  ISRAEL 
1.  · Introduction 
On 22  July  1991,  the European Council,  taking into  consideration  the  adverse  economic 
_consequences  of the  Gulf conflict,  on  the  basis  of a  Commission  proposal  and  after  a 
favourable opinion by the European Parliament, decided to grant an ECU 160 million loan, 
accompagnied by a ECU 27.5 million interest rate subsidy, to the State of Israel and a ECU 
60  million grant to  the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories,  and  authorized 
the  Commission  to  negociate  the  terms  and  conditions  with  the  beneficiairies  (Decision 
,91/408/EEC of22 July 1991)4 
The loan agreement between the Community and Israel and the attached Memorandum of 
Understanding were signed on  16 December 1991.  The terms and conditions set out in the 
Memorandum of Understanding were the following: 
i)  The loan will be disbursed in  a single tranche following the modalities set out in  the 
loan agreement; 
ii)  The interest subsidy will  be disbursed  in  successive  instalments  in  accordance with 
the provisions in the loan agreement;  · 
iii)  The funds are made available for the purpose of financing the essential imports needs 
of the population of Israel; 
iv)  The  Israeli  government  will  submit  to  the  Commission,  no  later  than  one  year 
following the disbursement of the aid, a report on the utilisation of the funds. 
The loan, with a maximum duration of seven years, was released in  January  1992.  At the 
same time, the amount of the interest rate subsidy was put into an account at the Bank for 
International Settlements  f~rpayment to· the Bank of Israel in  succesive tranches on dates 
when interest payments are due.  In accordance with paragraph 2(iv) of the Memorandum 
of Understanding, the Government of Israel informed the Commission on 26  October 1992 
that the funds had been used entirely for the purchase of imported fuel. 
In  the  Memorandum  of  Understanding,  the  Community  took  note  of  the  Israeli 
government's firm intentions to ensure a sustainable external financial situation, contain the 
budget deficit,  proceed with the liberalisation of the economy and  ensure the  appropriate 
conditions for a steady development of foreign direct investment in Israel 
Economic policies and developments in the Israeli economy are assessed hereafter. 
2.  Recent economic developments 
Since 1989,  the Israeli economy was subjected to two major economic shocks.  First, the 
Gulf War caused a slump in  the export and tourism  industries  and  thereby increased  the 
trade balance deficit.  The adverse consequence of the Gulf War on the external balance Jed 
to the approval of the ECU 160 million Community Joan as well as the approval of an SDR 
266 million Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility by the IMf.in March 1992. 
Second,  a  massive  wave  of new  immigrants,  mainly  from  the  Former  Soviet  Union, 
increased the population by around  10%.  This required substantial absorption efforts both 
in  the  housing  sector  and  in  the  labour  market.  The  authorities'  strategy  has  been  to 
The utilisation of the ECU  60 million grant  to the Palestinian population of the  Occupied Territories has been 
discussed in a separate report. - 71  -
provide the immigrants with subsistance grants, housing and education but to abstain from 
direct intervention in the labour market, which could be counterproductive in the long run. 
Emphasis was put on improving the business environment, which. would lay the basis for a 
gradual absorption of the immigrants into the labour market.  · 
2.1.  Domestic output, prices and employment 
The rate of  growth of real  GOP gradually increased over the period 1990-1992, from  5.4% 
in  1990,  to  5.9%  in  1991  and  6.5%  in  1992.  The  inflow of immigrants  contributed 
substantially  to-this demand-driven  growth  performance.  Overall  private  consumption 
demand increased by  12.4% in  1991  and spending on residential housing increased by 76% 
in the same year.  From  1992 onwards,  a decrease in  the  number of immigrant arrivals, 
· from  a  monthly  aver4ge  of over  20.000  in  1990-91  to  around  7.000  in  1992,  and  the 
resulting  build-up of a stock  of unsold  housing units  (20.000  end  1992),  slowed  down 
construction  activity (+4.5%). ·But strong export  performance  (+12.7%),  after  the  Gulf 
War slump, took over as the main driving force behind economic growth.  In March 1993, 
the closure of the borders with the Occupied Territories  led  to  a slow-down  in  economic 
activity.  But this trend  is  likely to  be reversed after the signature of the peace agreement 
with the Palestinians. 
In  spite  of this  strong  economic  performance  and  a  4%  annual  average  increase  in 
employment over the past three years,  the rapid growth in  the .labour force  resulted  in  an 
overall increase in the unemployment rate from 8.9% in  1989 to 11.2% in  I 992.  New jobs 
were mainly concentrated in  the construction industry and nearly two thirds of these jobs 
were taken  up by  immigrants.  As  a  result,  the  unemployment  rate  among  immigrants 
declined  from  38  %  in  1991  to  28%  by  end  1992.  In  the  first  half of 1993,  the 
unemployment rate continued to drop against the background of the closure of the borders 
of the Occupied Territories which led to a partial substitution of Palestinian workers with 
Israelis. 
The substantial  increase in  the  labour force  resulted  in  a  nominal  wage  increase below 
inflation  levels.  In  1991,  real  wages  decreased  by  3.2%  while  labour  proc>Jctivity 
increased  by  2.5%.  In  1992,  this  tendency  was  somewhat  reversed  with  a  real  wage 
increase by 0.9%, mere!)'  reflecting the fact that certain wage contracts had been negotiated 
on the basis of  a higher expected rate of  inflation, and a reduction in productivity by  I. 5% .. 
Consumer price inflation varied between  18  and  20%  p.a.  over the  period  1989-91.  In 
1992,  it  slowed down  to 9.4%,  the  lowest level  for  the past decade.  A  reduction  in  the 
budget deficit, a more flexible labour market with  lower real wages  and  a fall  in housing 
prices, have contributed to this achievement.  In the first half of 1993, inflation accelerated 
to around .12% in annual terms, mostly due to a rebound in housing prices after the fall in. 
the second half of 1992.  But a slow-down occured again in mid-1993. 
Fiscal policy 
Whereas overall government revenue and expenditures amounted to around 70% of GNP in 
1985, these ratios were reduced to  53.7% for revenues and 58% for expenditures by  1992. 
Taxation policy .shifted away from direct toward indirect taxes (VAT rate increase from 16 
to  18%).  In  1992,  a  reduction  in  top  marginal  income  tax  rates  (from  60  to  48%, 
subsequently increased to 50% in August 1993)) and corporate taxe rates (from 61  to 41%) 
was introduced. 
On the expenditure side,  defense spending was reduced from  12.75% of GNP in  1985 to 
8.75% in  1992.  Defense imports, mainly financed by  foreign grants,  also  fell  from  6 to 
2. 75%  of GNP  over  the  same  period.  · On  the  other  hand,  social .services  spending, 
including transfers to  immigrants,  increased from  I 0 to  1  5% of GNP  between  1985  and 
1992. 
Since  1990,  budgetary  policy  has  been  fundamentally  affected  by  the  objective  of 
absorbing  the  wave  of immigration,  through  subsistence  grants,  providing  for  housing 
needs and a variety of employment and investment incentives. - 72-
The  initial  cash  grant  for  arnvmg  immigrants:,  completed  with  health  insurance  and 
unemployment  benefits,  altogether  amounted  to  an  average  US$  I 0.000  per  year  per 
immigrant.  . Wage  sub~idies for  immigrants up  to  one third  of the salary  and  up  to  two 
ye_ars  were mtroduced  m July  1991.  Some 30.00Q  employees have so  far  participated  in 
th1s programme 
From  the  acceleration  of immigration  in  1990  up  to  mid-1992,  the  authorities'  housing 
strategy was based on the belief that the housing market would react too slowly and needed 
additional incentives.  Public spending on immigrant housing was channeled through direct 
construction,  guaranteed  sales  of houses  bui'ld  by  private  constructors  and  mortgage 
subsidies.  In  order to  avoid  a worsening budget deficit,  these  housing sector incentives 
have  been  financed  by  a  significant  reduction  in  the  proportion  of public  spending  on 
defense, a temporary 5% income tax surcharge (cancelled in  August 1993) and an  increase 
in  the VAT rate.  In the second half of 1992, following a slow-down in  immigration, the 
newly elected government scaled down spending on  housing by the cancelation of 12.000 
planned  housing  units  and  an  elimination  of the  housing  sales  guarantee  for  private 
contractors. 
Public infrastructure expenditure has  stabilised at  a very low 2% of GNP in  recent years, 
thereby contributing to  road  congestion which presently constitutes a serious bottleneck to 
economic growth. ·A 30% increase in  infrastructure investments is  planned under the 1993 
budget. 
In  spite of the increased social  expenditure due to  immigrant arrivals, the overall  budget 
deficit declined from 4.25% of GNP in 1991  to 2.75%.in 1992. 
Outstanding public debt has declined from  154  to  129% of GNP between  1987 and  1992 
but remains very high.  Interest payments represented 8% of GNP and  14% of government 
expenditure in  1992.  ' 
2.3.  Trade balance and external debt 
In the wake of the GulfWp, exports stagnated around US$  12.2 billion in  1990and 1991. 
Imports,  on the  other  hand,  continued  to  grow,  fueled  by  demand  stemming  from  the 
inflow of immigrants.  As  a result, the trade balance deteriorated from  a US$  2.8 billion 
deficit in  1990 to a US$ 4.8 billion deficit in  1991.  In  I 992, the trade balance deteriorated · 
further to a US$ 5.4 billion deficit.  It is expected to stay around that level for 1993. 
The services balance improved substantially following a post-war rebound in tourism, from 
a  US$. 2.5  billion  deficit  in  1991  to  a  US$ ·1.8  billion  deficit  in  1992.  By  contrast, 
intergovernmental transfers fell  back to  pre-war levels aiound  US~ 3 billion, after a US$ 
3. 8 billion peak in  1991. 
Owing to a significant increase in both private and  public unrequited transfers, from US$ 
5.3  billion in  1990 to  US$ 6.7 billion in  1991  and 6.9 billion in  1992, the current account 
remained roughly balanced. 
Since the Gulf War, direct investments and other long-term capital have registered a net 
outflow.  The  overall  balance  remained  marginally  positive  due  to  short~term  capital 
movements.  Only in  1992 did a US$  1.2 billion (1.8% of GDP) deficit occur for the first 
time since 1988, provoked mainly by an outflow of  short-term capital (US$  1. 7 billion). 
The credit  guarantees,  obtained  from  the  US  government  at  the  end  of 1992  (US$  1  0 
billion  over 5  years  or US$  2  billion  per  year),  will  enable  the  authorities  to  promote 
productive inves~ents in the domestic economy while building up reserves. 
Total external debt stood at US$ 23.5 billion at end  1992.  The gross external debt service 
ratio improved substantially, from 36.8% of total exports in  1990 to  29.2% in  1992.  Net 
external debt service also fell from 29.1  to 22.3% over the same period. - 73  -
2.4.  Exchange rate, money and credit 
Until  I 991, Israel maintained a relatively fixed exchange rate pegged to a currency basket 
and  floating  within  a  band  around  a  midpoint  rate,  with  periodic  realignments  to 
compepsate for the loss  of competitiveness· stemming from  high  domestic  inflation.  In 
December  I 99 I, a  more flexible  "diagonal  band"  exchange rate system  was  introduced, 
whereby  the  midpoint  was  devalued  daily  vis a vis  a  currency  basket  and  at  a  pre-
announced rate, while the exchange rate floated  freely within a band around this moving 
midpoint.  This  avoided  speculative  attacks  on  the  national  currency,  the  Shekel,  in 
anticipation of devaluations willie competitiveness was assured by setting a pre-announced 
devaluation rate consistent with the expected domestic inflation rate. 
For  I 992,  the crawl  pace of depreciation  v. as  fixed  at  9%,  consistent  with  an  expected 
inflation  rate  of  14%.  Inflation  turned  out  to  be  lower  than  expected  (9.4%),  which 
resulted in  a real depreciation of the Shekel  by 6%.  For I 993, the crawl  pace was set at 
8%,  against  an  expected  inflation  rate not  exceeding  I 0%.  In  July  1993,  the  expected 
annual inflation rate was reviewed downwards to 8% and the crawl pace was slowed down 
to 6%. 
In  the early parts of 1991, interest rates were kept low to stimulate investment.  Fallowing 
an  unexpected 3% devaluation  in  March  1991,  which was  perceived by the  market as  a 
change in exchange rate policy, interest rates had to increase to dispel this view.  As capital 
inflows continued during 1992, domestic interest rate lowered again, agaif1St  a background 
of decelerating inflation and economic growth.  Moreover, pressure by  the Bank of Israel 
on  commercial  banks  to  reduce  the  borrowing-lending  spread,  as  well  as  increased 
competition on financial  markets,  further reduced lending interest rates.  By mid-1993,  a 
temporary increase in  interest rates occured against the background-of a slight rebound in 
inflation.  Real interest rates remained positive throughout the period 1991-93. 
Until  the mid-80s,  the credit  market  used  to  be  dominated  by  the  government  need  to 
finance  persistent  large  budget  deficits.  The  reduction  of this  deficit,  together with  a 
deregulation of  financial markets, increased the share and stimulated growth of unregulated 
credit to the private sector.  Short-term bank credit increased by roughly 27% in both 199 I 
and 1992.  · 
/" ,· 
3.  Status of the reform process 
The  Israeli  authorities  have  stressed  the  crucial  role  of structural  reforms,  aimed  at 
improving competitiveness. and  efficiency,  in  their  strategy  to  promote  investments  and 
accelerate economic growth. 
At the start of the reform process, the state owned around 85  business companies, with an 
estimated  net  worth  of US$  I 7  billion  representing  over  25%  of GDP,  strategically 
involved  in  the  banking,  communications,  construction,  energy,  transport  and  defense 
industries.  In  1991  and  1992, the government planned to sell 20 companies but effectively 
sold only 7 totaling only US$ 250 million in government revenue.  The need for structural 
reform prior to privatisation, legal problems and vested interests, all  provided obstacles to 
the success of the privatisation programme.  For 1993,  a revenue of US$ 400 million  is· 
budgeted under the privatisation programme, wruch is too small compared to the net worth 
of state enterprises to be considered  a substantial  reform  of the economy.  However,  in 
August I 993, the Treasury announced an acceleration of the privatisation programme, with 
emphasis on the banking sector. 
Public sector wages have remained virtually constant in real terms over the past three years, 
while private sector wages have declined by 7% in  real  terms over the same period.  A 
public  sector  wage  negociation  was  conducted  in  1992  which  aimed  at  reflecting 
productivity  differences  in  the  wage  structure  and  breaking  the  link  between  public 
enterprises and public service wages.  Although the private sector labour market has been 
able  to  absorb  a  large  part of immigrant labour,  increased  flexibility  could  enhance  its 
absorption capacity.  Reforms in the minimum wage law and in shift-work regulations and - 74-
authorisation of private employment bureaus are required but no substantive reforms have 
been proposed yet. 
The  authorities  concluded  free  trade  agreements  with  the  United  States,  the  European 
Community (currently under review)  and  the  EFT  A countries,  and  have  implemented  a 
programme to  liberalise trade with  "third"  countries.  All. quantitative  import  restriction 
have been  replaced with  an  equivalent tariff  Tariffs  are  scheduled  to  be  reduced  to  a 
maximum  of 8-12% over  5-7  years.  Taxes  on  imported  tourist services  and  on  travel 
abroad have been abolished.  A 2% import duty surcharge and a 2% export subsidy, which 
constituted  trade  restrictions  under  GATT  rules,  have  been  abandoned  in  July  1993. 
Consequently, the Israeli  economy has, for the first time in its history,  a single exchange 
rate for all transactions. 
Exchange restrictions have been  liberalised with the objective of establishing full  current 
account  convertibility.  Israel  accepted  the  obligations  under  Article  VIII  of the  IMF 
Articles cif Agreement on 21  September 1993. 
4.  Assessment 
Since  the  introduction  of the  structural  reform  programme  in  the  mid-80s,  the  Israeli 
economy has been substantially liberalised, notably the financial  and foreign trade sectors. 
While the results.of the privatisation programme have, so far,  remained below expectations, 
the state's share in the economy has been reduced.  The decrease in the government budget 
deficit, together with a monetary an·d  exchange rate policy aimed at nominal  stabilisation, 
have considerably lowered inflationary pressure. 
On  top of these structural changes, the authorities have managed succesfully to  cope with 
the  economic  consequences  of the  Gulf War  and  the  massive  inflow  of immigrants. 
Prudent budgetary policies,  aimed  at satisfying immigrants' subsistence needs,  combined 
with temporary tax measures, have prevented a worsening budget deficit. 
The rather slow privatisation process,  combined with  persistent high  public debt-to-GNP 
ratios, continue to weigh on the public-deficit and  leave little room  for a highly desirable 
increase in public investmept in basic infrastructure which could, in turn, be a driving force 
behind continued economiC growth in the next few years. 
The  Community  balance of payments  loan  has  contributed  to  a  stabilisation  of Israel's 
external financial situation in the wake of the Gulf War and permitted the continuation of a 
prudent monetary policy which has finally resulted, in September 1993, in the achievement 
of full  current account convertibility and  the acceptance of the obligations under Article 
VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement by the Israeli authorities. 